

< Kick-Off Seminar >

Individualization and Community Reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo: From the Perspective of Risk Society

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Kick-Off Seminar of Global Research Network 2017

Individualization and Community Reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo: From the Perspective of Risk Society

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- 場所: Cherry Room, Hoam Faculty House, SNU
- 主催: 中民社會理論研究財團
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8:30-9:00 Registration

9:00-9:30 Opening Ceremony

Opening Address Shim, Young-Hee, PI of the Research

Keynote Speech Han, Sang-Jin (SNU, Seoul)

"Historical Context of Social Governance Experiments in East Asia:
The Challenge of Risk Society"

9:30- 12:30 Session 1

Individualization Reconsidered from the Experience of Social Governance in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo

Shim, Young-Hee (Hanyang Univ., Seoul)

Pragmatic Communitarianism and the Possibility of Democratic Social Governance:

Focusing on the Case of *Sungmisan* Village Community in Seoul

Park, Young-Do (SNU, Seoul)

Action-Theoretical Approach to Community Reconstruction in Seoul and Beijing:

The Analysis of Push and Pull Factors

Han, Sang-Jin (SNU, Seoul), Shim, Young-Hee (Hanyang Univ., Seoul) & Kim, Jung-Su (The University of Hong Kong)

2:00-6:00 Session 2

The End of Modernism and the Deconstruction of the Social Forms of Life

- Death and Birth of Family and Local Community in *Setagaya*, Tokyo -

Yazawa, Shujiro (Seijo Univ., Tokyo)

Bringing the Society Back In: The New *Qinghe* Experiment and Social Governance in China

Li, Qiang (Tsinghua Univ., Beijing) & Zheng, Lu (Tsinghua Univ., Beijing)

Social Serving or Mobilizing? - NGOs and Civic Participation in Urban China

Wang, Hao (China Agricultural Univ., Beijing)

The Role and Impact of Government Purchase of Social Work Services in Social Governance:

with Its Focus on Social Protection for Children at Risk in Qinghai and Anhui Province, China

Jianping Yao (North China Electricity Power Univ., Beijing) & Kim, Byung Cheol (Renmin University of China, Beijing)

6:00-7:00 Discussion

Lee, See-Jae (The Catholic University of Korea, Seoul)

Baek, Seung-Wook (Chung-Ang Univ., Seoul)

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■ Opening Address

Shim, Young-Hee
(PI of the Research, Hanyang University, Seoul)

Thank you for participating in this seminar and welcome to this seminar. It is part of the project “Individualization and Neighborhood Community Reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo: From the Perspective of Risk Society” which started as one of Global Research Network (GRN) projects 2017-2020 sponsored by National Research Foundation of Korea.

I am particularly glad because of the two meanings the project has for me. First, Prof. Han and I have been very much interested in the issues of individualization and social governance issues for a while. However, this is the first time that we study these two topics as linked together. And I am very glad to have such an opportunity. Second, Prof. Han and I are interested in East Asia and its difference from the West. We have been collaborating with our friends in Beijing and Tokyo quite a while. But this project provided an official opportunity to collaborate and develop our ideas together in East Asia. I sincerely welcome our collaborators from Beijing and Tokyo.

And there are many to say thank you. First of all, I thank all the presenters who worked hard to write good papers for this seminar. I also thank Prof. Lee See-Jae and Prof. Baek Seung-Wook, the discussants, who will make important comments to improve the papers. I particularly thank Prof. Shujiro Yazawa who leads the Tokyo Team, Prof. Zheng Lu who leads the Beijing Team, and Prof. Han Sang-Jin who leads the Seoul Team. Prof. Han is an actual PI of this research, playing key roles in writing a proposal, in organizing the three teams, and in arranging the publication of the papers.

And in this regard, I thank the *Korea Journal* for providing us an opportunity to publish some of our papers in a special issue of the journal, of course, after rigorous reviews. I thank those who helped us prepare for this seminar. Finally, I thank the National Research Foundation of Korea for providing us this opportunity.

We have just started the first year of the three-year project. I hope this project will not only bear fruits with good academic works, but also make our friendship in East Asia closer and flourish.

Thank you very much.

The Historical Context of Social Governance Experiment in East Asia The Challenges of Risk Society

Han, Sang-Jin
(Seoul National University, Seoul)

Abstract

This paper serves as a short introduction to this special section and is aimed at clarifying the historical context of social governance in East Asia in the following order. First, it shows how a complex risk society emerges in East Asia as unintended consequences of too rapid success in economic development during the last several decades. Second, it will also be examined how East Asia differs from the Western countries in terms of the historical trajectories of risk society and their consequences. Third, the paper will demonstrate the magnitude of public perception of risks at various dimensions among the citizens of Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo based on survey data. Fourth, an interpretation will be made that social governance initiatives, in the form of neighborhood community reconstruction, has emerged in East Asia as a distinctive response to the challenge of risk society in general and the public cry for life security in particular. Despite variations of this historical context from one country to another, this paper shows the converging significance of the paradigm of risk society as a background of social governance experiments in East Asia.

Keywords: risk society, East Asia, social governance, public perception of risks, neighborhood community reconstruction

Introduction

This paper is intended to serve as introduction to our global network research on “individualization and neighborhood community reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo: from the Perspective of Risk Society.” Our research group is composed of the experts from Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo. We treat neighborhood community as a concrete site for ‘social governance’ as an important issue for academic research and public policy as well in East Asia today. To begin with, we want to clarify the historical context of this experiment and show how social governance has emerged as a response to the challenges of risk society. Needless to say, neighborhood community reconstruction, as such, is not new. The related topics have been frequently discussed in the research areas as community studies, urbanization, city planning, housing policy, and gentrification. The research frameworks of local government and environmental studies have also been employed in this regard. But we think that this research is unique in that it explores the significance of social governance and hence neighborhood

community reconstruction, largely, but not exclusively, from the perspective of risk society. This means that we hold a specific strategy of understanding this experiment as an actual or potential (preemptive) response to the challenges (threats) of risk society in East Asia. Given this goal in mind, it may be necessary in this introduction to draw attention to the broader implications and a kind of practical urgency associated with the use of the concept of risk society in the context of East Asian development.

In particular, this paper draws keen attention to the relation between risk society and social governance experiments in East Asia. These experiments start from the judgment that state alone, how strong it may be, is unable to solve the problems of risk society. This has been made clear officially even in China. A new framework of social governance is indispensable. Whether our discourse is transnational or local, the basic logic and principle is the same. In this regard, it is important to understand how risks in risk society differ from the conventional types of risks. In other words, risk society is not just continuity from industrial society but involves a rupture or metamorphosis. It evolves out of industrial society but in such a way that it gains new forms, characters, and modes of operation. Consequently, it is not possible to solve the problems of risk society by the logic of industrial society.

Retrospectively, the theme of risk society was first introduced to the international conference in East Asia in November, 1995 when the 6th International Conference of Asian Sociology was held in Beijing. That time, the author presented the paper entitled “The Rush-to Industrialization and its Pathological Consequences: The Theme of ‘Risk Society’ in the Asian Context.” In this presentation, I paid special attention to the high-consequential risks which began to strike South Korea from 1994. No one could have imaged such terrifying catastrophic happenings. The Korean examples were used as data, so to speak, to support and articulate the theme of risk society. In a similar way, in this introduction, I will also rely on the Korean discourses by and large and develop argument in the following order. First, I will show briefly 1) how traditional society was transformed into modern industrial society. Not much space is needed since this topic is all too common. I will then show 2) how the catastrophic experiences of risks gave rise to flourishing risk discourses from the middle of the 1990s up to the massive popular risk demonstrations from 2007. Following this will be 3) a brief analysis of the magnitude of the public perception of risks based on the 2012 citizens survey data of Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo. Finally, the paper will show 4) how the social governance policy and experiments, as a response to the challenges of risk society, have rapidly gained momentum and steadily progressed in the metropolitan city of Seoul during the last several years

Where East Asia Stands Today?

Until recently, the image of East Asia had been rather bright and attractive. During the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, the so-called ‘the four little dragons’ like South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore were often picked up as a role model of economic development for many developing countries in the world. Since the 1980s, furthermore, China began to take the open-

door and reform policy and accelerate her own path of modernization and, in a short span of time, ascended to a symbol of economic and political power of the world together with Japan. This signifies something good, bright and attractive. A brief overview of the contemporary world history after the Second World War shows clearly that East Asia has moved far ahead of other third world regions and thus gained the recognition as an exemplar of successful catch-up modernization after the Western countries.

The origin of the East Asian modernity can be traced back to Japan in the middle of the 19th century when Japan, as a 'late-comer,' together with Germany, modernized her economy and military by way of effectively mobilizing the available conditions of development. These conditions include the strong state backed up by efficient bureaucratic apparatuses and disciplined bureaucrats and the educated labor force. The strong state functioned as the central coordinator and pace maker of the whole processes of modernization while keeping politics and society under strict control to maintain social order as a condition for the state-led rapid industrialization. This bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) model of economic development established in Japan was later transmitted to South Korea in the 1960s and then to China from the 1980s

The image of East Asia, however, began to shift recently from the object of global envy to the object of increasing uncertainties and risks. The image today thus appears highly mixed, ambiguous, and even contradictory. From a certain perspective, East Asia may still be seen as a hope or even as a future of the world in terms of economic vitality and cultural resources. Yet the dark reality has emerged rapidly too as evidenced by such transnational trends as the conflict between China, Korea, and Japan coming from the unresolved past history of Japanese colonialism, the nuclear threat from North Korea, and the structural tension and hegemony struggle between the United States and China as the two global super-powers. The perceived level of anxiety from these trends is particularly high in the Korean peninsula. At the same time, it is also true that East Asia increasingly faces complex risks originating from runaway global economy, power politics, and the contradictions of rush-to industrialization. We can speak of the 'over-determination' of risks in the sense that risk productions in multiple systems tend to be more and more interpenetrative and interdependent. Consequently, the citizens who suffer from the lack of life security are increasing.

This indicates that the state-centered BA model of development firmly institutionalized in East Asia produced not only the bright story of economic success but also entailed the unintended dark reality of complex risks. It is still too early to explain fully the metamorphosis of modern industrial society into global risk society. But it is now clear that we are now living in a categorically different world from the past in the sense that we can no longer solve the problems we face by extending the previous state-centered model of risk management. Neither state welfare nor private insurance offers a reliable solution. Not the traditional form of government, but a new framework of governance is required. Also, transnational cooperation going beyond nation state and nationalism is indispensable in order to adequately deal with self-destructive consequences of modernity, such as Holocaust, anti-humanity crimes and war, atom bomb and

high-tech chemical weapons, climate change, international terrorism, global economic crises, and the trends of socio-economic polarization and poverty. In this regard, in East Asia, unlike Europe, the legacy of strong state still dominates over civil society prioritizing national (state) interests over public interests or civil initiatives for reciprocal understanding. Since the political elites who occupy state power are inclined to take as much advantages as possible by advocating the politics of national interests, the conflict among state powers tends to break out and become easily aggravated along the history problems emotionally charged. In this sense, East Asia is still caught in the iron cage of state-centered development.

The BA Trajectory to Industrial Society

The transformation of traditional agricultural society into modern industrial society has been extensively discussed in social science for a long time. The topic of modernization is almost banal. The historical trajectories are not the same, though. They differ significantly from one region to another and from one country to another even in the same region. In the case of East Asia, Japan, South Korea, and China pursued modernization in different timing and historical configuration. Therefore, despite their commonalities, they differ considerably in terms of the internal dynamics and consequences of modernization. However, it is possible to assess the degree of historical change by applying a set of common quantifiable measures.

In the case of South Korea, we can examine briefly what happened during the 40 years from 1955 to 1995. Then we find that per capita income in 1955 was just 65 US Dollar but it increased to 12,282 Dollar in 1995. This record testifies the miracle of ‘Han River.’ In addition, GDP increased from 1.4 billion Dollar to 556.3 billion Dollar during the same period. The scale of export also increased from 24.6 million Dollar to 125.06 billion Dollar. Such a rapid economic growth triggered profound social changes which affect employment pattern and occupation structures and educational opportunity. For instance, the number of university was just 69 in 1955 but increased to 305 in 1995. The primary sector employee in 1958 was as large as 81.6 percentages of the working population, but it drastically decreased to 12.5 percentages in 1995. In contrast, the secondary sector employee increased from 4.6 percentages to 23.6 percentages and the tertiary sector employee sharply increased from 13.8 percentages to 64.0 percentages during the same period. Combined, all these figures clearly show that the whole society was radically transformed in that period. The term of compressed modernity captures the logic and consequences of this rush-to industrialization.

Table 1. Basic Indicators of Social Change

	1955	1965	1975	1985	1995
Per Capita GNP (\$)	65	131	610	2,400	12,282
GDP (100millin \$)	14	31	217	1,002	5,563
Export (million \$)	24.6	175.1	5,081	30,283	125,078

	1955	1965	1975	1985	1995
Primary Industry Employee (%)	Not available	58.5	45.7	24.9	11.8
Secondary Industry Employee (%)		10.4	19.1	24.4	23.7
Tertiary Industry Employee (%)		31.2	35.2	50.6	64.5
University (number)	69	131	190	236	305
Urbanization (%)	18.3 (1950)	33.8 (1960)	48.0	64.9	78.2

To examine the process of modernization more closely, as of 1955, Korea was one of the poorest and most miserable countries in the world seemingly with no hope. Korea suffered not only from exploitation and discrimination by the Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945) but also from the Korean War (1950-1953) which totally destroyed all the cities and industries in both North and South Korea, not to mention the loss of several millions of people. In this situation, the April student revolution in 1960 opened the road to modernization in its complex senses which includes popular sovereignty and cultural awakening. Yet economic modernization began to be accelerated during the 1960s after the military *coup d'état* in 1961 and particularly during the 1970s when the military general President Park Chung-hee implanted a strong BA state in Korea. Certainly, “his military-dictatorial rule deeply scarred the nation with a countless violation of human rights, destroying social fabrics of a civil society.” But his conviction and ardent wish for modernizing Korea “was matched by no other leader.” He was enthusiastic about building a wealthy and militarily strong Korea.

The engine of economic growth started from the light manufacturing industries during the 1960s. As exports of shoes, wigs, textiles and toys boomed, a great number of young females left their families in the rural areas to get a job in the cities. President Park declared the new policy of heavy and chemical industrialization in 1973 and began to mobilize all the available financial and organizational resources to achieve the goal he set forth earlier than he promised, such as the increase of per capita GNP and exports. His BA machines worked very well in this regard. The Korean BA model of state-centered industrialization produced continually such impressive outcomes as miraculous expansion of exports; success in developing the automobile, semiconductor, shipbuilding and steel industries; establishment of large industrial complexes in Changwon, Ulsan, and Kumi, etc.; construction of high-rise buildings in downtown Seoul, Pusan, Taegu and other major cities; overflow of passenger cars; rapid development of communications infrastructure; the spread of consumption-oriented culture. Consequently, as of 1995, 78.2 percentages of the population lived in city and 48.4 percentages of women participated in the labor market.

Transition to Risk Society

Yet it must be stressed that the Korean trajectory of modernization was neither linear nor

smooth. It involved serious contractions and conflicts because it entailed uneven development, regional discrimination, the suppression of human rights and numerous symptoms of risks. In this regard, we can view the middle of the 1990s as a transitional threshold from modern industrial society to a complex risk society in Korea. The Korean public began to be deeply shaken and shocked from 1994 by such catastrophic disasters as the collapse of Han River's *Songsu* Bridge, the collapse of the *Sampung* Department Store in a middle-class district in Seoul, and the gas explosion in the subway in the city of Daegu which followed in succession. People suddenly realized how precarious human life was and how meaninglessly so many lives were lost. On the surface, these accidents may appear to have resulted from technical flaws. However, when one reflects more carefully, it becomes clear that these disasters are nothing but the outcomes of 'organized irresponsibility' and 'manufactured risks' intrinsically related to the strategy of a "rush-to" development. As risk society emerged visibly, people began to be worried about that high-consequential disasters can happen any time and any place threatening the safety of their everyday life.

There is another reason why we can consider the middle of the 1990s as a transitional threshold to risk society. Perhaps, this is more important since the risks involved are transnational in nature. In late 1990s, Korea faced the unbearably painful outcomes of the global economic crisis for the first time since it had launched economic modernization in 1960s. No one was able to anticipate it. Korea was totally unprepared. Looking back later on, nevertheless, it became clear that, as unexpected side effects of the stock market opening policy and the liberalization policy of the foreign currency adopted after Korea entered into OECD in 1995, the amount of foreign debt sharply increased in late 1997, primarily because private investment banks were eager to obtain as much external loan as they needed to finance aggressive investment, and this included short-term loans. In fact, "strong signals were sent to warn of precipitous dangers" (12) but neither the Bank of Korea, nor the Ministry of Finance and Economy, nor the Blue House was able to monitor the coming disaster. being "intoxicated by their own success, and enjoying it a little bit too much and too long." The costs of the IMF intervention were proved to be very high and painful. Numerous business firms collapsed and a great number of the workers lost job. The Korean economy had to go through structural adjustments dictated by IMF. Consequently, not only the blue-collar workers but also many middle class members such as professional, managerial, technical supervisor, and white-collar office workers were laid off. This experience was part of Asian economic crisis which was deeply related to the financial market of the global economy. Korea thus became deeply entangled in global risk society.

Despite this contradiction, care should be taken not to miss another trajectory which is equally significant and important. Parallel to the BA model of state-centered development and the accumulation of the problems it generated, a strong moral energy of protest and deliberation continued to express in various forms. However brutal and merciless the bureaucratic and military control might be, the moral forces unfolded continually not from the margin but from the center of civil society, such as prestigious universities, churches and cultural sectors of arts and media. The Korean story of modernization shows interesting interactions of these parallel

developments which have made the society healthy, open, and plural. In other words, critical self-reflection has been deeply built into the process of modernization. This means high potential for public reasoning and deliberation which grows in history. This also means that the public has become more sensitive to the limits of the present and, hence, future possibilities than being satisfied with what has been achieved. This explains why the public perception of risks in Korea is much higher and sharper than in other countries.

Risk Society as a Social Construction

When we talk of the mid-1990s as the threshold to risk society, we presuppose certain relation between the actual occurrence of disasters and discursive formation. This relation is neither mechanic nor automatic. Discourse is never just representation of the reality out there, but functions always as an intervention or articulation. More often than not, discursive practice is selective and exclusive. Some events, activities, tragedies receive hot attention while others being neglected or marginalized. In this sense, we should understand risk society as a social construction of risk society through complex series of discourses and communications.

Yet it is important to know of the real aspect of risk society. For instance, the *Samsung* Department Store located at the middle class residential area in Seoul, which looked splendid in appearance with five stories above ground and four below, the total building space of which was as large as 73,877 square meter, just suddenly collapsed on June 29, 1995. This was fatal since so many consumers as 501 people were crushed to death and 937 consumers were injured. People were deeply shocked by this accident. On October 21, 1994, part of the Han River's *Sungsu* Bridge suddenly collapsed resulting in dropping many passenger cars into the river taking away the life of 32 citizens. On April 28, 1995, gas explosion occurred in the construction site of subway in Daegu which caused the death of 102 lives and the injury of 117 citizens. Some years later, on February 18, 2003, fire became spreading while a subway train was running in Daegu resulting in the death of 192 lives and the injury of 148 passengers.

Furthermore, the consequences of the economic crisis which swept over Korea and Asia as well at the end of 1990s were brutal. In 1998, 22,828 medium and small size firms closed down, according to the government estimate that time, pushing the employees into the street. The Bureau of Statistics released that the total number of employees as of April, 2000 was reduced as much as 1.215 million compared with that of April, 1999. In other words, 9.7 percentages of the blue collar workers and 13.9 percentages of the white collar workers lost job during that period. Consequently, while it occupied only 2.6 percentages in November 1997, unemployment rate increased to 6.7 percentages in April, 1998 and soared up to 8.7 percentages in February 1999. The regular workers decreased drastically while irregular workers increased. The percentages of the regular worker out of the total wage earners were 54.9 percentages as of April, 1997, but it dropped to 48.2 percentages in April, 1999. All these figures show clearly the real aspects of Korea as risk society.

However, there is no immediately obvious reason for those accidents, disasters, losses, and uncertainties to be interpreted from the perspective of risk society. They could have been interpreted in different ways. For example, these could be seen as a social problem in the conventional sense. In Korea, however, these accidents and disasters gave rise to a strong concept of risk society. Risk society was meant to be a critical reflection of modern industrial society produced by the BA style of state-centered development. In other words, triggered by the shocks from these disasters, intensive discourses began to take place in the academic and media fields advocating a fundamental self-reflection of the taken-for-granted logic and consequences of rush-to development. This reflects the normative potential kept alive in the heart of the public. This public sensitivity began to work as a driving force for the social construction of risk society via multiple paths of communication. This means that the emergence of risk society in Korea owed much to the actual occurrence of disasters and accidents referred to above but has been made possible by the deliberate discursive interventions by such opinion makers as the intellectuals, journalists, policy makers, and various activist groups.

Discursive Formations

Of particular significance in this regard is the warm reception of Ulrich Beck in Korea in the academic and public spheres. He captured public attention by arguing that risk society is different qualitatively from industrial society, that the risks we face today are highly transnationally interconnected, that it is no longer possible to solve this problem by conventional methods of risk management, and that risk society calls for a new type of governance which requires citizen participation together with open communication, transparency, and responsibility of the public institutions. In this way, the public received Beck to support a new model of development as both an alternative to the old-fashioned state-centered model and a response to the challenge of risk society.

In fact, numerous discourses on risk society began to spread from 1995. The starting international event was the presentation of the paper in the 6th Asian conference in Beijing in 1995 which I referred to in the beginning of this paper. Within Korea, the quarterly journal “*Sasang*” (Ideas) began to show related articles from 1995, as exemplified by the paper entitled “Korea 50 years since Independence: From rush-to Modernization to Reflexive Modernization.” This paper drew attention to various kinds of risks that Korea faced including the three disasters exploded in 1994 and 1995 and explored a new approach from the perspective of reflexive modernity. In 1998, the journal devoted the whole volume of the autumn issue to the analysis of Korea as risk society from various topics and disciplines. Related to this, *Korea Journal*, an internationally well recognized English journal produced by the Korea UNESCO, devoted the whole volume of the spring issue of 1998 to the various aspects of risk society in Korea.

What came out of this discursive formation was the extraordinary degree of complexity and heterogeneity of risk society Korea faced. Complexity presupposes that causes of risk are

diverse.

The emergence of risk society was diagnosed as intrinsically linked to the dissolution of the moral foundation of society. Risks were understood not simply as a technical problem, but fundamentally as a political and moral problem. The instrumental reason associated with the rush-to development became predominant over moral reasoning. Human relationships have been degenerated into instrumental calculation, while everyone becomes preoccupied with obtaining as many material gains, as quickly as possible. An important argument was that all types of risk, whether they are transnational or local, whether they are traditional, industrial or post-industrial, became deeply interwoven and condensed due to the compressed nature of the BA style of rush-to development. Consequently, it was argued that such vital organizations for protecting life and security as the state administration, banks, and credit institutes turned out to be far from controlling risks but immensely involved in creating and spreading them. Obviously, this type of discourse which gained prominence and salience from the middle of the 1990s was meant to be a critique of the mainstream of the state-centered rush-to development. Various authors agreed to identify the logic of the BA state and its developmental policies not simply as conditions for modernization but also as root causes of high-consequential risk society. These critical discourses yielded strong appeal to public perception, producing social pressure for a constructive turn of state policies.

Public Anxiety and Risk Demonstration

Nevertheless, the gap between public demand for change and state policies became widened considerably as Korea had to go through the processes of structural readjustment dictated by IMF from 1998. The government took reform measures as global standards to increase the transparency of governance structure of corporations, especially large conglomerates, and the efficiency of the labor market and the financial institutions. But this reform policy produced massive lay-offs forcing painful economic downturn to numerous households. This means that life risks drastically increased to the majority of the population. Furthermore, since 2007 when political power was handed over to the conservative camp, against the continuing social streams toward the critical reflection of the past and reflexive modernization for the future, new attempts have been introduced to reinforce the control power of the BA machines from the above. The conventional paradigm of growth-oriented economic policy regained the upper hand at the cost of welfare policy. The authoritarian control over civil society began to be strengthened curtailing the political and civil rights of the citizens. Also, the imperative of FTA was prioritized over the popular concern with life risks and health. In this context, a large-scaled protest broke out in April, 2008 and millions of citizens joined voluntarily for more than three months.

The key issue of this candlelight vigil was the public worry about vCJD (mad cow disease) that might result from the government decision to re-import the US beef suspended. The origin of life politics with the explicit focus on mad-cow disease can be traced back to 2003 when a case of mad cow disease was confirmed at a United State cattle farm. The then government halted

imports of the American beef responding to the demand of concerned citizens and animal medicine experts. After the conservative camp took office in February 2008, however, the concerned politicians, high-ranking officials, as well as business organizations of the United States began to wield pressure upon the Korean government to resume beef imports. Washington maintained that free trade agreement with Seoul could hardly be ratified unless the Korean government allows the resumption of the American beef imports. In this context, on the first day of the Korean President's official visit to Washington, April 18, 2008, the Korean government announced that an agreement had been reached and the Korean market will be made open to the American beef. On April 29, 2008 MBC aired a popular news program, "PD Notebook," showing a video clip of "downer" cows at U.S. farms with the statement that people who consume the American beef could contract the human form of mad cow disease, and that the Korean government had turned a blind eye to this danger to proceed the import resumption swiftly. This news inspired many young people to participate in candlelight vigil whose climax was June 10, 2008 when one million citizens joined it in Seoul.

Of particular significance in this regard is a sharp competition of two camps that emerged in due course, the mainstream power bloc and citizen alliance. The first was composed of the Korean government, mainstream conservative newspapers, business organizations, economists, and such foreign powers as the U.S. government and international health organizations. The second was composed of young citizens, especially women, groups of animal medicine experts, critically-oriented minority newspapers, MBC television, and some religious groups. The first bloc advocated the paradigm of national interests in relation to free trade agreement with the United States, whereas the latter advocated the paradigm of life politics by putting emphasis on the danger to public health. The two camps struggled hard to get as much popular support as they needed by using various means. The two camps showed remarkable differences in constructing the problems of mad cow disease. The citizen alliance sensitized attention to the people's right for health and popular sovereignty while the power bloc discredited their worries as relying on unfounded rumors. Despite large disparity between the two camps in terms of opportunity structure and resource mobilization, the citizen alliance was able to gain overwhelming support from the public mass, forcing the President to issue an official apology on May 22, 2008. This clearly shows that risks and health became a burning political issue mobilizing extraordinary public sensitivity.

Nevertheless, the public frustration and disillusionment over the failure of the government to properly respond to the citizens' demand for life security and participatory change has continued to stay high as before or even increased. In the case of the 2008 candlelight vigil expressing the sensitivity to the risk of mad cow disease, the government continued to hold the official view of defining citizens' risk demonstration as ill-founded upon unscientific rumors rather than recognizing the right of the people to express their views on health. From the latter's eye, the probability of catching mad cow disease, as a scientific calculation, is only one of the many factors to be considered. However little the chance may be, no one can deny the right of the citizens to express their concern and ask government to do its best to protect them from the possibility of this risk.

It is an empirical question to examine how citizens see the issue at hand. Since the difference in perception between government and candlelight vigil participants is clear enough and much discussed, we can ask in a nation-wide survey which position the respondents would take. When they face with such type of risk highly uncertain as mad-cow disease, we can ask whether they would follow government since it represents the official authority backed up by election. Conversely, we can also ask whereas they would hold the view that the government should respect citizens' judgment because it is citizens who face such risk if it breaks out. In fact, it was asked to which opinion of these two the respondents feel closer. The choices were given in a scale from 1 to 9, from the most pro-government attitude to the most pro-citizen attitude. Sorting up, those closer to government authority occupied 19.2 percentages, whereas those closer to citizen's judgment represented 60.9 percentages. Those who stayed in the middle were 29.9 percentages. Furthermore, it became clear that despite the concerted efforts by the government and conservative camps to downgrade the image of the candlelight vigil 2008, those who viewed the movement to be legitimate and peaceful were far greater than those who took the opposite views. The patterns of responses were proved to be closely correlated. Those who see the issues from the eyes of citizens are inclined to evaluate the candlelight vigil as legitimate (43.7 percentages) and peaceful (48.1 percentages), and those who takes the pro-government perspective define it as illegitimate (32.8 percentages) and violent (26.9 percentages).

Later the risk demonstration gained more public attention through the two catastrophic experiences of 'Sewol ferry disaster' and "MERS disaster" in 2014 and 2015 respectively. To describe these shortly, Sewol ferry left Incheon port near Seoul for *Jeju* Island with 476 passengers on April 16, 2014. The majority of the passengers, 324, were the high school students who were on board for a study trip. When the ferry was passing by the south-western coast of *Chonam* Province, however, the ferry keeled over and began to sink gradually in the sea. It was completely sunk on April 18. Meanwhile, the families of the passengers, mostly fathers and mothers, had rushed themselves to the *Paengmok* harbor and found that what they could do is only painfully observing the sinking ship not very far from the harbor. No proper rescue was given to the passengers. As a result, 295 out of 476 passengers were buried at sea. It gave unbearable shock and sorrow to the people who were watching over the sinking ferry through the broadcasting alive, particularly in sympathy with the parents who lost their beloved children.

The catastrophe was a typical case of man-made disaster. The rules of safety operation were not implemented from the start. Efficient rescue was blocked by false information aired to the passengers in the ship, complete incompetence of maritime police, irresponsibility of crews, distorted communication among concerned bureaucratic agencies. The emotional feelings such as anger, sorrow, frustration, and heartbreaking tear began to spread all over the country from eyes to eyes via television broadcastings.

Officially representing the families of the victims, the Association of the Bereaved Families

was formed and advocated two main objectives to achieve. The first was the full investigation of truth and responsibility and the second was the construction of safe Korea. Later President Park Keun Hye promised a state reform to realize safe Korea. In early stage, however, government completely failed to make an efficient disaster intervention. It was proved that the catastrophe was not even properly reported to the President. As criticism began to be focused on Blue House and President, all the issues became more and more politicized, and the ruling and the opposition parties, as well as their organized supporters in the society, confronted each other using all kinds of ideological weapons of stigmatization and labelling. Consequently, the image of the Sewol disaster as a symbol of national integration and solidarity was degraded into a political power struggle.

One year later, a collective panic swept over Korea from May to June 2015 concerning the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) as a typical case of man-made catastrophic disaster. The spreading of MERS patients could be effectively controlled if the health-related public authorities and the hospitals had taken the strong early measures needed to control MERS including comprehensive medical examination and surveillance. The failure of the initial intervention can be fatal. The first confirmed patient of MERS was a man of 68 years old who returned from Bahrain on May 4, 2015. He showed symptom of MERS on May 11 and had visited several local hospitals before he visited a larger hospital in Seoul where he was officially confirmed to have been infected with MERS on May 20. This period of two weeks was critical since the contact with him either in the same room or building of the hospital gave rise to the second and third infection. His family members, other patients, and medical personnel were infected. While he shared sickbed with others in the same room while travelling many hospitals, he unintentionally spread MERS disease to as many people as more than 27. Two of these were dead in early June. The suspected patients to be isolated also increased dramatically up to 1,312 on June 3.

As in other countries, the major channel of infection was the larger hospitals with advanced medical technologies where many patients visit. Infection took place widely especially in Samsung Hospital in Seoul. The government authorities were unprepared to deal with the attack of MERS and thus lost critical time for the initial response. They repeated no worry about MERS despite the undisputable increase of the confirmed patients and suspected isolated. They even warned to punish those who spread rumors. Due to the lack of transparent information and the missing public trust on the government, a collective panic emerged and swept over the society deeply penetrating into every corner of social life. People were psychologically forced not to go out, not to meet, not to visit hospitals and to wear masks in all public places. Consequently, tourism and consumption were severely hit. The record of the MERS attack for 70 days from the beginning includes 138 confirmed patients, 36 dead, 16,693 suspected isolated, 98 concerned hospitals, and the economic damage of the hospital amounting to 200 million US Dollars.


According to the magazine *Hankyoreh* 21, there are six common characteristics of Sewol ferry disaster and MERS trauma. The first is the failure of the early effective response in both cases.

The second is the lack of reliable information particularly about the number of the victims. The third is the lack of keen attention of the President to the catastrophic disasters. The fourth is the easygoing judgment of the control tower. The fifth is the lack of advanced facilities and trained human resources. The final is the occupation of decision-making positions by non-experts.

Citizens Survey on Risk Governance

The survey study conducted during October and November 2015 over the citizens of Seoul showed clearly how they evaluate risk governance related to the two disasters described above. The items of evaluation include 1) government's initial response, 2) transparent information by government authorities, 3) the reliability of mass media, 4) the reliability of social media, 5) the control tower role of the Blue House, 6) response of the ruling party 7) the response of the opposition party 8) investigating those responsible for aggravating the disaster, 9) formulating preventive measures in order not to repeat the same disaster, 10) providing sympathy and condolence the victims and their families. The evaluation over those items of risk governance turned out to be consistently very low for both cases of MERS and Sewol ferry, as Figure 1 shows. The average score is little more than 20 points out of 100. Overall, the responses to Sewol ferry are lower than those to MERS. In the case of Sewol ferry disaster, the lowest are government's initial response 16.9, investigating responsibility 18.4, and transparent information by the government 18.5.


Figure 1. Citizens' evaluation of the disaster management by various institutions



The 10 items can be clustered into three domains: 1) the institutional responsibility, 2) the reliability of the media, and 3) required performance of the must-do tasks. The institutional responsibility includes 5 items: government's initial response to disaster, transparent information by the government, Blue House as CEO of disaster management, the ruling party's response, and the major opposition party's response. Among these, the first domain is the most crucial since it turns out clear that Seoul citizen regards the most serious problem of risk governance is the lack of institutional responsibility. In the case of the Sewol ferry disaster, the average institutional responsibility is as low as 19.8 out of 100 maximum and 21.3 in the case of MERS disaster.

Figure 2 shows that institutional responsibility is consistently low with little variation. Government's initial response to disaster and transparent information by the government got the lowest evaluation. The role of opposition party is better than that of the ruling party and Blue House, but the difference is negligible. Overall, Seoul citizens share the view that systematic irresponsibility is deeply built into public institutions as government agencies, the ruling and opposition parties as well as Blue House. As a whole, institutional responsibility turns out to be little better in the case of the MERS (21.3) than the Sewol ferry (19.8). But the mean score is extremely low which means that citizens are full of dissatisfaction and frustration due to the lack of institutional responsibility. Organized irresponsibility deeply built into public authorities has prompted citizens' mounting frustration and anger.

Figure 2. Citizens' evaluation of the degree of institutional responsibility




The risk perception can yield significant influence on action and emotion. In the case of the MERS disaster, 63 percentages of the respondents confirmed that they cancelled or postponed the appointment with friends and medical doctors. Concerning anger and frustration, citizens were asked whether they 1) got angered with the inability of the government, 2) felt serious damage of national pride, 3) came to distrust the hospitals, and 4) got angered because no one took responsibility for the disaster. As to the extent of anger and frustration, the average

response ranges from 70 to 80 points. The emotion of anger and frustration is particularly high over the absence of responsibility (79.2 out of 100 maximum) and the inability of the government (77.3).

In the case of the Sewol ferry disaster, the survey questionnaires included many items to assess the extent of 1) emotional drive for solidarity with victims' families, 2) sympathy for citizens' rally and hunger strike, 3) anger and frustration. The first emotional sympathy is directed towards the victims and their families. The second action-oriented domain is related to such activities as citizens' rally and hunger strike. The third moral domain touches upon anger, shame, and frustration. As Figure 3 shows, the mean scores of the three domains make it clear that anger and frustration is much higher than others. The average scores of anger and frustration are 75.4 out of 100 maximum, whereas the action-oriented solidarity is 46.9 and the emotional drive for solidarity with the victims' family is 54.2.

Figure 3. Comparison of the means score of the three domains



As to the two objectives of risk governance demanded by the Association of the Families of Bereaved, that is, a thorough investigation of truth and responsibility and the construction of safe Korea, the average score for the first goal realized is only 27.7 out of 100 maximum and for the second goal 25.5. Both are extremely low. Concerning President Park's promise of state reform, the average score of its realization is only 28.8 out of 100 maximum.

Social Governance Experiment and its Impacts

It is in this historical context of public anxiety and risk demonstration that enormous social pressure was formed pushing society and politics, particularly large city local governments to seek a new paradigm of social governance. So far, local self-government has gone far ahead of central government to work out a new approach. The best example in Korea is the metropolitan government of Seoul led by Mayor Park Won-Soon.

An episode may reveal a deep trend behind the surface. Ulrich Beck visited Seoul in July, 2014 and met Mayor Park and talked about the implications of his theory of risk society to Asia in a special forum at city hall of Seoul. Mayor Park and Beck had then a public dialogue as part of international conference and this dialogue was broadcasted live. There emerged good will to

cooperate. Unfortunately, and sadly, however, Beck suddenly passed away in the first day of 2015. On March 16, 2015 a tribute ceremony was held in Press Center located at the downtown of Seoul and Mayor Park joined and delivered sobering reflections. He recollected that Beck visited Korea exactly “when the Korean people was deeply shocked by, and became sorrowful over, the tragedy of Sewol ferry just like with a full body.” He remembered Beck consoling Seoul citizens and offering an advice to “learn from this tragedy and act to change the system to move from such catastrophic situation toward emancipatory catastrophism.” The mayor found a message of hope from here, saying that this message was “impossible without the trust of history and love of humanity” and that Beck’s reflection on the risks Korea faces “as the other side of the remarkable success captured his mind with profound resonance.” The mayor then recollected vividly Beck’s emphatic recommendation that “as a global city, Seoul can and should play an important role as a pioneer of reflexive modernity and civilizational metamorphosis, going beyond compressed modernity and the speed-first preoccupation.” The tribute showed the mayor’s commitment to “a participatory governance based on open and reciprocal communication, cooperation, and reflection with citizens.” An important point in this regard is that he referred to a specific policy program of “*ma-eul*” community reconstruction as an example of the participatory governance he had launched on. Here, *Ma-eul* means neighborhood. This means that he has, in fact, advocated and developed a participatory model of social governance since 2012 when he was elected to the mayor of Seoul.

Nevertheless, insofar as local government works as the provider of policy and resources, it is always a sensitive issue how to understand the relation built into public-private cooperation. More often than not, the experiment has turned out to be close to a top-down than bottom-up model. Since he became a politician as a leader of civil movement and NGO activities, Mayor Park was well aware of the bottom-up experiences of neighborhood community reconstruction available in Seoul. In fact, he attempted to extend the lessons of these experiences to Seoul city administration. It was necessary for him, therefore, to enact new ordinances and establish institutional framework based on dense consultations with citizens. These were the conditions for a new model of social governance characterized by open space of citizen participation and bottom-up consensus. More specifically, the announcement that any group with more than 3 citizens are eligible for applying for neighborhood community project was meant to provide fair opportunity to all innovative ideas, preventing the conventional favored treatment of large organizations and interest groups with powerful resources. In the evaluation process, all applicants were invited to present their proposals and discuss in terms of relevance and feasibility. The participants were likely to accept the emerging consensus while learning how to prepare their proposals better for the next opportunity.


In this way altogether 4,978 proposals were accepted from 2012 to 2015 and implemented to provide services of various kinds to the residents of the concerned districts. The services included education and care, residential safety, senior citizens’ health, arts activities, mutual help economy, community media activity, multi-cultural understanding and activity, etc. The project leaders of this new experiment during this period were estimated to be about 72 thousand many of whom belonged to the middle class and the resident participants were 230

thousand at maximum. Women occupied 73 percentages of participants and the age groups of 30s and 40s were most active. The concrete shape and content of this experiment differed from one project to another. Certain areas with participatory tradition (Mapo-gu and Seongbuk-gu in Seoul) turned out to be more active and advanced in this regard. As a new grassroots experience, the project-based neighborhood movement started from the initial stage of ‘planting seed’ and moved to that of ‘sending forth buds’ and that of ‘hope’ and finally to the stage of self-producing community. Neighborhood community movement, though recognized and supported by Seoul government, unfolded largely outside the district office until 2015.

Community reconstruction movement began to progress to a new model of social governance explicitly from 2015. Seoul city decided to delegate community reconstruction policy to district office together with supporting resources. Accordingly, neighborhood planning committees composed of the leaders of the project-based community movement began to be formed. They called the resident general assembly to get approval of the community plan they had prepared and sought an official cooperation with the basic administrative unit of ‘Dong’ under district office. This has given rise to the formation of the framework of social governance at the level of neighborhood community within the geographic boundary of ‘Dong’. Responding to this bottom-up trends, Seoul city began to launch a new flexible policy called ‘door-to-door’ service to work out a better consultation and cooperation with neighborhood planning committee.

The general assembly of residents, as a residential public sphere, was held in many places to discuss the common issues among residents. The residents often voted to decide their priorities, allowing early voting as well as on-line voting together with on-site voting. For instance, in one case, the residential assembly decided the issue of youth and safety as the most urgent problem out of 9 issues with 370 votes out of total 1144. As the objects of this participatory social governance, such life issues as risks and safety, health and welfare, education and care, ecological environment, local history and culture, the use of common space, safety of residential area, neighborhood mutual help, the problems of senior citizens, youth and children are included in most cases.

Furthermore, in the case of Seoul experience of social governance, 14 administrative units of Dong within 4 office districts where this new experiment of neighborhood reconstruction took place were chosen as the sight for empirical study of the effect of this experiment. The first survey was conducted in September, 2015 when this new experiment was just about beginning. The second survey was conducted after one year in August 2016 and collected data were examined to assess the influence of this experiment. Data analysis shows significant changes. For instance, as to the question “how many neighbors do you have with whom you exchange greetings in everyday life?” those who answered more than 11 occupied only 26.4 percentages of the respondents in the first survey but sharply increased to 70.7 percentages in the second survey. As <Figure 4> shows, the answer to the question “how many close neighbors do you have who will help you when you become helpless?” shows a clear-cut different trend in the second survey than in the first survey.

Figure 4. Percentages of the respondents by number of neighbors who support you

Consequently, as to the nature of public-private relation, in the second survey compared to the first one, defining the relation as ‘mobilization’ is drastically reduced from 44.5 percentages of the respondents to 6.6 percentages, whereas defining it as ‘partnership’ increased from 6.6 percentages to 43.6 percentages. More significant and suggestive than this is the change of the residents concerning how to solve their life issues when they face them. In the first survey, the responses like “do nothing” was 26.3 percentages, “relying on personal network” was 18.2 percentages, and ‘raising petition’ was 33.8 percentages. These attitudes occupied as much as 78.3 percentages of the respondents in the first survey. Contrastingly, however, in the second survey, such active responses as “joining in collective solution” and “directly leading such collective solution” occupies 59.7 percentages. This clearly shows how influential social governance experiment is in transforming citizens’ consciousness and strengthening the solidarity among them.

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Individualization Reconsidered from the Experience of Social Governance in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo

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Abstract

This paper attempts to articulate the relationship of individualization and social governance in the form of neighborhood community reconstruction in close relations as dual aspects of the same coin in East Asia. Seldom has it been attempted to draw out this reciprocal relation in empirical research. Individualization has been widely discussed but with negligible attention to community reconstruction, and vice versa. This tendency can be confirmed not only in the West but also in East Asia. Against this, the author attempts to grasp individualization and community reconstruction as concomitant historical changes in East Asia. This paper has three main topics. The first is to synthesize the main outcomes of the researches on individualization conducted so far and compare the similarity and difference between the West and East Asia. The second is to examine the negative consequences of individualization on community life such as mutual help and solidarity. Unleashed from the protection of either welfare state or economic firms, individuals tend to be isolated and are forced to deal with the life risks they face by themselves. This enforced individualization tends to increase the level of anxiety in everyday life and community tends to lose its integrative function. The third is to demonstrate why, as a response to the community disintegration, the social governance responses are far stronger in East Asia than the Western countries. Since East Asia has a long tradition of emphasizing relationship, the shock of community breakdown will be greater and thus the efforts to overcome this will also be greater. There are various models of social governance, and many of them are still in the process. Thus, it is not easy to review them all. But this paper will introduce some of them to show the reciprocal relations of individualization and social governance as clearly as possible based on the available empirical evidences.

Keywords: individualization, community network, anxiety of everyday life, social governance, East Asia

1. Introduction

This paper attempts to articulate the relationship between individualization and social governance in the form of neighborhood community¹ reconstruction as dual aspects of the

¹ The word neighborhood community is used to represent *Maekul* in Korea, even though community means network as well as neighborhood.

same coin in East Asia. More specifically, it tries to show that individualization, which resulted with the success of the industrial society, that is, the first modernity, brought forth individualization, and individualization brings forth negative consequences (as well as emancipation), which in turn, works as a driving force for social governance movements and experiments in East Asia.

This kind of study is needed for several reasons. First, seldom has it been attempted to draw out this reciprocal relation in empirical research. Individualization has been widely discussed but with negligible attention to community reconstruction, and vice versa. This tendency can be confirmed not only in the West but also in East Asia. Against this, the author attempts to grasp individualization and community reconstruction as concomitant historical changes in East Asia. Second, social governance response is particularly strong in East Asia. And there is a need to explain this interesting phenomenon. The focus on the connection between individualization and social governance might help us explain why social governance responses are particularly strong in East Asia.

In this context this paper raises three research questions: 1) How have the researches on individualization unfolded in the West and East Asia? 2) What are the consequences of individualization on community life? 3) What kinds of social governance responses and why they are so strong in East Asia? I will discuss these three issues in the following.

2. Individualization Researches in the West and East Asia: One-way vs. Dual

The first is to synthesize the main outcomes of the researches on individualization conducted so far and compare the similarity and difference between the West and East Asia. The problem consciousness is that the individualization research in the west has been one-sided, in the sense that it focuses on dis-embeddedness of the individuals, but not on the re-embeddedness² of them (Shim and Han, 2010, 2013). Researches on the individualization in East Asia show that in East Asia people are very much individualized but at the same time very much family-oriented. It shows that the family is still very important. In this sense the path for individualization is different from the west. (Han and Shim, 2016), That is, individuals are not only dis-embedded but also re-embedded into the community network.

In this context I will review researches on individualization as a structural process of transformation and as relationship between the individuals and community in East Asia and the West. I will start with the individualization in the west.

Individualization Researches in the West: One-Way “Libertarian” Individualization

In the West, among others, Beck (1992), Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have carried out pioneering research on the problems of individualization. The concept of individualization

² The concepts of dis-embedding and re-embedding will be discussed in the following section.

indicates a categorical shift in relations between an individual and the society with dis-embedding and re-embedding (Beck, 1992, p. 127)³. Here individualization means that individuals get unleashed from the previous frameworks of welfare financed by either the state or business firms or by the family and have to take care of their survival by their own means (Han & Shim, 2010; Shim & Han, 2010).

According to Beck (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 202-203), individualization works as in the process of dis-embedding and re-embedding. Dis-embedding is described as a liberation from the class, the family, and work routine.

Individualization liberates people from traditional roles and constraints in a number of ways. First, individuals are removed from status-based classes. Secondly, the entire structure of family ties has come under pressure from individualization and a new negotiated provisional family composed of multiple relationship—a ‘post-family’—is emerging. Thirdly, the old forms of work routine and discipline are in decline with the emergence of flexible work hours, pluralized underemployment and decentralization of work sites.” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 202-203).

Thus the individual is removed from traditional commitments and support relationships, but exchanges them for the constraints of existence in the labor markets. In spite of these new forms of constraints, individualized cultures foster a belief in individual control—a desire for a ‘life of one’s own’. Re-embedding in Beck’s sense is described as getting into new forms of reintegration, from the class to the identity, from the family to the post-family, and from traditional work to flexible work, but with new forms of control (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 203).⁴

Thus individualization is a complex process related to as diverse conditions such as cultural changes, legal entitlement, political participation, and internet communication, among others. First, it is related with cultural democracy. Individualization presupposes that individuals get liberated step by step from the taken-for-granted constraints exercised by collectives of various kinds. An outcome of this historical process is human rights or individual sovereignty. Second, individualization involves the emergence of an individual as subject of legal rights. It is an individual, not any collectivity that is legally entitled to make a claim for right. Third, individualization means the emergence of an individual citizen as the subject of political participation whose mode of action differs significantly from collective actors. Fourth, the process of individualization tends to be further facilitated by the development of the communication and digital revolution.

³ Beck’s original explanation of individualization shows the following three-dimensional process:

‘[D]isembedding, *removal* from historically prescribed social forms and commitments in the sense of traditional contexts of dominance and support (the “liberating dimension”); the *loss of traditional security* with respect to practical knowledge, faith and guiding norms (the “disenchantment dimension”); and—here the meaning of the world is virtually turned into its opposite—re-embedding, *a new type of social commitment* (the “control” or “reintegration dimension”).’ (Beck 1992: 128; italics original).

⁴ This seems to me a continued dis-embedding rather than a re-embedding.

At the same time another line of exploring the meaning of individualization today is how to manage risks and dangers that citizens may face in their life. In the Western countries, responsibility for risk management is shifting more and more to individuals. With respect to the economic life the concept of individualization assumes that individuals get unleashed from the previous frameworks of welfare financed by either the state or business firms or the family. In other words, individuals have to take care of their life by their own means, as seen in personal insurance packages.

Beck-Gernsheim (2008) is a good example. According to her, Westerners left their traditional way of life, pushed not only by detraditionalization but also by legal development and the emergence of welfare state. Divorce, for example, which was extremely difficult for women, became possible through changes in social mores expresses through changes in the law and the emergence of the welfare state (Beck-Gernsheim 2002). The rise of the “post-familial family” (Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Shim 2011) is a case in point. Different from the nuclear family, the “post-familial family” refers to diversified forms of family: (1) based on confluent love, (2) characterized by gender equality, and neither assuming (3) heterosexual relationship only, nor (4) people from the same nation (Giddens 1992). Thus the family in the Western countries today is characterized by “marriage and divorce chains,” “conjugal succession,” “multi-parent families,” “patchwork families,” and “elective family relationship” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 96). It is a change from “living for others” to “a life of one’s own” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 54), which is based not only on individualization, but also on individualism. It is a historical process that tends to break up people’s traditional rhythm of life, that is, so-called “the standard biography,” and to give way to “do-it-yourself” life history (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). The basic idea that everything depends on individual free choices we would like to call a “libertarian individualization”⁵ of the West.

⁵ This is one of the four types my colleague and I developed. The types were developed areas follows.

Table types of individualization (Shim and Han, 2013: 196)

		Goal of Orientation	
		Collective Interests	Self-Interests
Mode of Thinking/Acting	Traditional	A Conventional Types of Collectivism	B Family-Oriented Striving Individualization
	Reflexive	C Public-Minded Participatory Individualization	D Self-Centered Libertarian Individualization

Type A is characterized by both strong collective interests and traditional way of thinking/acting, thus it can be called “conventional types of collectivism”. This type can be typically found among those who consider collective interests to be more important than self-interest in a traditional way. Type B is characterized by traditional way of thinking/acting (for example, family-oriented), but tries to pursue self-interests for survival. The self-interests here can be interpreted as private interests. Thus it can be called “family-oriented striving individualization.” This type tends to be frequently found among those who strive hard to get out of poverty for the welfare of the family rather than an individual in question. The type which we have called “family-oriented individualization” (Shim and Han, 2010) can be classified as a category of this type. Type C is characterized by reflexive way of thinking/acting closely associated with the mode of action pursuing and advocating public interests. A typical example is civil movements based on individual decision to join through either on-line or off-line deliberation in order to pursue certain values of public significance. Thus it can be called “public-minded participatory individualization.” Han’s study on the so called the “386 generation” reveal this type of individualization (Han, 2007). Type D is characterized by both reflexive way of thinking/acting and pursuit of self-centered individualizing tastes and preferences. This type can be typically found among the younger generations like the teenagers or 20s. Libertarian individualization may develop fully when such conditions are met as cultural democracy, welfare state, and classical individualism (Baumann, 2001; Beck, 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).

As has been shown in the above, western theory of individualization has, in fact, unfolded with the tacit historical assumption of the individualist tradition. More specifically, individualization researches in the west, particularly that of Beck, is one-way development of dis-embedding. Thus it is an objective process of “enforced individualization.”

I see no problem with the issue of dis-embedding since it is exactly what is going on almost everywhere in the global risk regime today. The analyses of Japan (Suzuki et al. 2010), China (Yan 2010), and Korea (Chang and Song 2010) clearly demonstrate this. We have no intent to dispute about it. However, my colleague and me perceive that this is only half of the story to be investigated. What remains to be seen is where and how re-embedding in my sense⁶ is proceeding, and with what kinds of consequences⁷ (Shim and Han, 2010, 2013; Han and Shim, 2016). This is particularly so in East Asia.

Thus a question can be raised on whether the theory of individualization based on the Western tradition of individualism can be reasonably extended to East Asia. In this context we tried to demonstrate how individualization as a structural transformation tends to be combined with cultural traditions in multiple ways⁸, making East Asia quite different from the West (Shim and

⁶ My concept of re-embedding used in this paper is different from Beck's. It is considered as searching and trying to find something alternative to individualization. I use it in a sense different from Beck's, since Beck's concept seems closer to the continuing des-embedding. More specifically, re-embedding, according to Beck, is considered as getting into new forms of reintegration, from the class to the identity, from the family to the post-family, and from traditional work to flexible work, but with new forms of control (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 203). When we think from a broader spectrum, however, this seems to me not a re-embedding, but rather a continued dis-embedding, in the sense that the direction toward the individualization is kept based on the assumption of soft network of 'libertarian self-oriented individualization'. As for me, I consider 're-embedding' should be something alternative to individualization and use the concept of re-embedding in this sense.

⁷ To analyze this my colleague and I have developed a model (Shim and Han, 2010) utilizing Beck (1992) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002)'s theory of individualization. In order to better reveal the dynamic aspects of individualization as three dimensional process of “dis-embedding,” “disenchantment,” and “re-embedding” (Beck, 1992: 128)⁷, We combined the structural-objective dimension and cultural-discursive dimension on the one hand, and push and pull factors of transformation on the other, and made the following model (table 2)(Shim and Han, 2010).

Table: conceptual framework of individualization

	Objective-structural	Cultural-discursive
Push factors	Global risks Dis-embedding	Breaking-away energy Survival uncertainty
Pull factors	New institutions Re-embedding	Forward-looking energy Justification

To clarify, the process of dis-embedding unfolds under the objective-structural conditions such as global risks which, as a push factor, unleash individuals from traditional and modern welfare arrangements. This objective-structural tendency gives rise to the collective experience of fear, anxiety, and disillusionment which originates from survival uncertainty. In other words, the cultural-discursive stream of disenchantment (Beck) works as a push factor. Re-embedding, in turn, can be made possible in reality when a new institutional arrangement is formulated and backed up by public policies and laws. Yet the process of re-embedding cannot stop here since it requires a forward-looking perspective or motivational support from cultures, ideologies, and collective aspiration. Otherwise, the process of re-embedding may face serious misunderstanding, conflict and tension. Therefore, individualization can move well only when the culture-based pull factors operate reasonably well leading individuals to accepting and, if needed, justifying a new institution offered, that is (Shim and Han 2010). Seen from this conceptual framework, re-embedding is as crucially important as dis-embedding for individualization.

⁸ More specifically, we have argued that individualization as a structural transformation can be adequately understood only when both the push and pull factors and hence both socioeconomic and cultural-discursive dimensions are properly understood in close interactions. The push factor means a structural force compelling large numbers of people in a society to change their patterns of behavior. More often than not, this is socioeconomic in nature, whereas the pull factor is deeply associated with the cultural and discursive process of social construction (Shim and Han, 2013).

Han. (Shim and Han, 2010, 2013; Han and Shim, 2016)

More specifically, we argued that East Asia is distinctive by its cultural emphasis on the value of flourishing community, including the family, and therefore consider this relationship to be of paramount significance for understanding individualization. In East Asia the individual has been considered not as a socially isolated, atomized, independent subject, but rather as deeply interwoven with the community as a person is with his or her family (Shim and Han, 2013). Then why and how East Asia differs from the West while comprehending common characteristics of individualization?

Individualization Researches in East Asia: Dual Individualization

The relationship between individuals and community is an important factor that distinguishes East Asia from the West. Thus I will review some researches on individualization in China, Japan, and Korea. Many of them focus on the process of individualization, and a few focus on the relationship between individuals and community. These two are related, but I will focus on the latter, because the latter shows the difference of East Asian individualization from the West better.

“Striving Individual” in China

There are a few studies on individualization in China (Yan 1996, 2003, 2009, 2010). Yan is representative. After his work on “The Chinese Path to Individualization” (Yan, 2010) ⁹, in which he traced the origin of the individualization process to the Maoist era, arguing that some collectivist programs of social engineering and the socialist path of modernization under Maoism ironically resulted in a partial individualization of Chinese society, he deals with the issue of the relationship between the individual and community in his more recent work (Yan, 2012).

In “Of the Individual and Individualization: the Striving Individual in China and the Theoretical Implications”, he deals with not only dis-embedding but also the re-embedding process of individualization in China. He argues that with the individualization process a new model of individual appeared in China, which he called “the striving individual.” Through his interviews with a farmer in a Chinese village, he revealed that many people in China strive hard to make money for their children’s education and success. The “striving individual” is characterized as having a materialist goal in value orientation and is different from the “enterprising individual”

⁹ Yan examines profound social changes during the three decades of the post-Mao reforms, discussing the contours of individualization in various aspects, such as the privatization of labor and the economy, rural-urban migration of workers, rights awareness, politics of lifestyle, and the self and the subjective domain of individualization. As a conclusion, Yan argues that there are similarities with the individualization process in Western Europe, but also some important differences. According to him, individualization in China is characterized by the management of the party-state and the absence of cultural democracy, the absence of a welfare state regime, and the absence of classic individualism and political liberalism (Yan 2010). Unlike in Western Europe where individualization results from the radicalization of modernity itself, Chinese individualization remains a developmental strategy under the direction and management of the powerful party-state (Yan 2010). The Chinese individualization process remains at the stage of emancipation politics of first modernity. Yan’s argument is persuasive. However, Yan (2010) focuses on the dis-embedding, not the re-embedding process of individualization (Shim and Han, 2013).

of the West who is more oriented to expressive and post-materialist goal.

These recent studies of Yan on the striving individual indicate *both* an individualizing *and* a family-oriented tendency. This characteristic has also been found from our research on the transnational marriages in Korea, particularly from the women who have come to Korea for marriage from Northeast China and Southeast Asia (Shim and Han 2010). This characteristic indicates a type of individualization which may be called “communitarian individualization.”

“Porous” Individual and “Leeway” between Liberty and Deprivation in Japan

There is considerable research on individualization in Japan within the context of the family. Even though there are researches on individualization as a structural transformation in Japan (Suzuki et al. 2010)¹⁰, I will focus on the researches on the relationship between individual and community. The relationship between individuals and community has been touched upon by Morita’s (2009) and Ishida et al’s (2010) works.

First of all, Morita (2009) shows an interesting contrast between Japan and the West in terms of an ideal-typical self. In line with Charles Taylor, he contrasts the typical self in the West as “buffered” while the Japanese case is “porous.” The “buffered” self has developed discipline and self-control and seen him/herself more and more as an independent and sovereign individual not subject to any external constraints. This idea emerged from the Western process of religious reform toward a transcendental existence of the individual in dialogue with god. While the Western modern self had to enclose its boundary completely, the self in Japan remains porous even after it is institutionally modernized, because in Japan where collective rituals are not considered negatively, the “porous” self did not feel it necessary to close itself against the world completely. Consequently, the Japanese self is more vulnerable to intervention from the outside world in the form of collective rituals (Shim and Han, 2013).

Morita’s accounts are insightful in revealing the characteristics of “porous individual” in Japan. However, their arguments are basically conceptual and need to be substantiated by empirical studies. Ishida et al’s work (2010) based on survey researches fills this gap.

Ishida et al (2010) define the individualization of relationships as the situation in which a “leeway” is allowed for the intervention of individuals making choices on their own in developing and maintaining relationships. And they consider two types of discourses on

¹⁰ Suzuki et al (2010) argue that two mechanisms were responsible for risk management in the first modernity: first, Japanese management/company-centrism (private corporations that guaranteed long-term stability for employees and their families), and second, land development policies implemented under the guidance of bureaucrats. This means that company-centered society and the developmental state functioned as a buffer. However, from the 1990s these systems were fundamentally destroyed by globalization and neoliberal policies. Japanese company-centrism broke down, paving the road to individualization of employment. Since then individuals in Japan had to rely on themselves and find their own way. Now, individualization within the context of the family has advanced as the rate of unmarried people and the divorce rate have climbed. They have demonstrated the tendency of disconnecting individuals from the first-modern institutions and placing the burden of survival on the shoulders of individuals. In this neoliberal context, individuals are encouraged to be independent and autonomous. Yet individualization involves not only disembedding but also reembedding. However, their discussion remains largely tied to the role of the push factor and not well extended to the pull factor. Thus there is a further need for a research (Shim and Han, 2013).

relationship: one is the “liberation” discourse that ties the individualization of relationships to individual self-realization and demonstration of individuality, and the other is the “deprivation” discourse that ties the individualization to the weakened state of existing relationships. And they investigated which aspects—liberation or deprivation—appear in family, company and local communities with empirical data. They found that even though the Japanese are positive about living an individual life free from family and corporate relationships in the context of liberation, in order to deal with the risk of deprivation they easily resort to family members and corporate community that formerly controlled or bound them.

More specifically, with regard to the family, they asked the question, “What is the most important thing in your life?” within the reality of the increase in the number of single households (which comes as a result of the deprivation by individualization). The responses to the question are highly suggestive: the proportion of “the family” among other items kept on increasing from 12% (1958), to 13% (1968), 23% (1978), 33% (1988), 40% (1998), 45% (2008), while the proportion of “life, health, myself” decreased and/or remained as the same, with 22% (1958), 29% (1968), 23% (1978), 23% (1988), 23% (1998), and 19% (2008). This shows an increasing hope for “the family” contrary to the reality of deprivation of the individualization (Ishida et al. 2010)¹¹.

Ishida et al.’s work (2010) on people’s attitude to the relationship between individuals and community suggests some ideas about the possible reactions of the people in the individualized society and is also very suggestive very suggestive not only for citizens’ attitude toward the relationship between the individual and community, but also for a community movement.

“Dual Individualization” in Korea

There have been considerable debates on the characteristics of individualization in Korea. Among them, Chang (Chang 2009; Chang and Song 2010) and Shim and Han (Shim and Han, 2010, 2013, Han and Shim, 2010, 2016; Shim, 2011, 2013) are representative. Chang (Chang 2009; Chang and Song 2010), combining the concepts of compressed modernity and risk society, characterizes individualization in Korea as “individualization without individualism” (Chang and Song 2010)¹². This is a very important observation. However, Chang's discussion

¹¹ Ishida et al.’s other findings are as follows. With regard to Corporations—while the reality is that lifetime commitment, the seniority wage system and enterprise unions rapidly were deteriorated in the 1990’s, the ideal corporate system turned out to be—lifetime commitment 86% (2007), and the job people consider ideal turned out to be “a job with a stable income” 52% 2009, and “a job I can enjoy” 47% 2009, which show people’s hope for both the liberty on the one hand and security yearning for the “good old days”, contrary to the reality.

With regard to local relationship—they asked about citizens’ participation in neighborhood and residents’ associations. And it turned out that the proportion of “non-participation” was 51.5%, “several times a year” 35.8%, and both combined the proportion reached nearly 90%, meaning that most members do not participate. As an alternative solidarity, they looked at people’s inclination for volunteerism and the reality of volunteer activities. —And 59.9% said they “want to participate”. It shows that both middle-aged and elderly people value volunteerism. The meaning they drew out is that while the longing to return to traditional ties with neighbors was not strong, the desire to develop a new solidarity instead is strong. These findings, that is, people want some kind of warmth, security, and new solidarity in the family, corporations and local relationship, can be connected to the question of re-embedding (Ishida et.al. 2010).

¹² Chang considers the recent phenomenon of delaying marriage and low birth rates as risk-evasive individualization. His argument is that in this state of compressed modernity, the family, which used to be the welfare foundation.

focuses mainly on the dis-embedding process of individualization, not on the re-embedding process. Thus I focus on other studies which focus on the relationship between the individual and community

Shim and Han attempted to deal with the re-embedding process of individualization based on empirical researches, by paying attention to women marriage migrants (Shim and Han 2010), “community model of the family” (Shim, 2011), “striving individuals” (Shim and Han, 2013, Shim, 2013), and “dual individualization” (Han and Shim, 2016). They have examined these because they shows *both* individualizing *and* family-oriented tendencies. More specifically, in their work on “the Family-Oriented Individualization and Second Modernity” (Shim and Han, 2010), women marriage migrants turned out to be individualistic in the sense that they pursue their own course even taking the risk of being separated from their family, as a determined challenge to the survival uncertainty their family faces. They are “individualistic” because they came all the way from their home despite the various anticipated difficulties. On the other hand, they are also very family-oriented, that is, “familial,” because they came for better living conditions of the family, and, with family responsibility, do their best for their new family and endure the difficulties for their families in the home country. This individualization was called “family-oriented individualization” (Shim and Han 2010). Perhaps, a similar example is the so-called “wild goose families” (Lee and Koo 2006) frequently found in Korea. This case also illustrates well both individualization and family-oriented networks, not simply in a traditional way, but innovatively. This pattern of transformation is distinctive to Korea.


Another effort to integrate both the dis-embedding and re-embedding process of individualization is seen in their work on “Dual Individualization in East Asia”(Han and Shim, 2016). This study tried to argue that individualization in East Asia has a Janus face showing a tendency of individualization of the west on the one hand and characteristics of community-oriented individualization on the other. For this we developed two typologies of individualization; the first, the typology of individualization in society in general, and the second, the typology of individualization in the context of the family. The types in the first typology include “conventional types of collectivism” (type A), “family-oriented striving individualization” (type B), “public-minded participatory individualization” (type C), and “self-centered libertarian individualization” (type D). The types in the second typology included “integrated community” (type 1), “fragmented community” (type 2), “community-oriented individual” (type 3), and “self-centered individual” (type 4).

The results are shown in figure 1 and figure 2. First, as to individualization in society in general (Figure 1), self-centered libertarian individualization of the west (type D) turned out to be high in two East Asian cities, Tokyo (70.7%) and Seoul (52.1%), even though it turned out to be relatively low in Beijing (33.0%). Second, as to the individualization in the context of the


n for individual, has lost its functions as welfare resource or buffer zone, and that the family members have no choice but to be unleashed from the family and rely on one's own efforts and ability, even though they are not equipped with strong individualism as in the West. Thus he calls the individualization in Korea “individualization without individualism” (Chang and Song 2010).

family (figure 2), the “community-oriented individual” (type 3) turned out to be highest among the four types with 49%. Beijing and Tokyo show a surprisingly high proportion of type 3 or “community-oriented individual”, with 70.6% in Tokyo and with 56.3% in Beijing, showing the characteristics of the family relationship in East Asia. Seoul, on the other hand, shows a different distribution, showing the highest type in type 4 with 43.6%, with “fragmented community” type as the second. A closer analysis shows that there is a change going on in individualization moving from type 1 through type 2 and type 3 to type 4. Third, as to the more detailed analysis of the “community-oriented individuals,” which seems to be the characteristics of individualization in the context of the family, it turned out that in Beijing and Tokyo, there are more “community-oriented individuals” not only among the elderly but also among the younger generations of the 20’s and 30’s. This seems because they are in difficult situation in real life even though they are individualistic in attitude. “Parasitic singles” and “*hikikomoris*” in Japan, “*kenlaos*” among the “*Balinghou*” (born after 1980) and “*Jiulinghou*” (born after 1990) in China could be examples (Han and Shim, 2016).

Figure 1. Distribution of Types of Individualization in General in Three Cities



Source: Han and Shim, 2016: 156

Figure 2. Distribution of Types of Individualization in the Context of the Family in Three Cities

Source: Han and Shim, 2016: 161

The research findings are very interesting, showing that in East Asia people are very much individualized in society in general in urban transformation, but at the same time very much family-oriented in the context of the family. In this sense the path for individualization might be called “dual individualization.” The implications of the findings for the future of the family are that even though the individualization is underway, it has special characteristics of family-orientation unique to East Asia. It shows that the family has special meaning for East Asian citizens and thus the family, even though it faces many problems and crises, is still very important in East Asia.

Thus, through the review of individualization in China, Japan and Korea, we can say that there are tendencies showing the dual aspects of individualization in all three countries: in the concept of “striving individual”(Yan, 2012) in China, in the concept of the “porous” self (Morita, 2009) and empirical studies on “the leeway” between liberty and deprivation (Ishida, et al. 2010) in Japan, and in the concept and empirical studies of “family-oriented individualization” (Shim and Han, 2010) and “dual individualization” (Han and Shim, 2016) in Korea.

The dual aspects of individualization in East Asia is shown not only in empirical studies using statistical analysis, but also in the neighborhood community reconstruction movements. These neighborhood community reconstruction movements are related with the negative consequences of individualization.

3. Negative Consequences of Individualization on Community Life: Anxiety and Family Risks

Then what are the consequences of individualization on community life such as mutual help and solidarity? There can be two possibilities: one is liberation and the other is anxiety due to the loss of security. Individualization brings to ever growing people not only unprecedented freedom of experimenting, but also brings an unprecedented task of coping with the consequences (Bauman, 2002)

Discourses on Negative Consequences

However, in Korea discourses on the negative consequences of individualization are strikingly prevalent and they are emphasized by academicians and policy-makers alike. Usually academicians are critical, while policy-makers are not, having tendency to see the positive side of the phenomena. However, there are some exceptions. For example, Mayor Park Won Soon of Seoul Metropolitan Government, who put much emphasis on neighborhood community policy said as follows, when he was asked whether a happy life is possible in Seoul where ten million people are living:

When people live crowded, each individual tend to feel lonely and more isolated. Thus they need social connection or attachment. We cannot be happy with growth and development in material and external aspects alone. We can live happily when we are bonded and connected with the neighbors. That is why Seoul Metropolitan Government is emphasizing neighborhood community. (Park Won Soon, quoted from Ahn et al. 2016; 5).

Many indicators show that people's living in Seoul have been exhausted. They are suffering not only with the side-effects of compressed economic growth such as the keen competition, increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and the weakening of social safety network, but also with the disorganization of the family and neighborhood community. People suffer because with the disappearance of neighborhood community, realistic means of life such as infant care, family events, routine convenience and information exchange also disappeared. The policy of neighborhood community can be positioned in this context to resolve the problem with the partnership between the public and the private.

Cho-Han (2013), who is an academician as well as local community activist, also pointed out the same arguments.

Seoul is changing into a "a city of fragmented individuals". Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant accident, Asian people began to realize the limit of the growth and the fact that we are living in a risk society. Particularly in Korea, where we underwent the compressed modernization, the intensity of the crisis is more severe as shown in the intensity of the labor, unhappiness index, etc. For example, there emerge murder between people living in the same apartment due to noise complaint issues between floors. And there increase rapidly people left alone on the verge of mental breakdown. Besides there are many citizens who have to overwork to pay for the private education and insurance, young children who are tired in the shuttle bus in between the school and the private academy, house

poor, and working poor, etc. In this situation it is fortunate that the word *maeul* (neighborhood community) is emerging in this unhappy ‘construction state’, because it is a proof that we still have the will to face the crisis squarely and to communicate, that is, we have the regional resilience. (Jo-Han, 2013, 83)

My colleagues and I also made similar claims. Unleashed from the protection of either welfare state or economic firms, individuals tend to be isolated and are forced to deal with the life risks they face by themselves (Shim and Han, 2013). This enforced individualization tends to increase the level of anxiety in everyday life and community tends to lose its integrative function.

Empirical Researches on Negative Consequences

This argument is further supported by empirical studies such as the study on family risks in East Asia based on a survey in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo in 2012 (Shim, Kim and Kim, 2014)¹³. This study dealt with some important risks related to individualization such as anxiety in everyday life, and various family risks among others. They could be good examples to discuss the negative consequences. Thus I will briefly introduce them here.

High Perception of Everyday Life Anxiety in East Asia¹⁴


First, in relation with “everyday life anxiety”, we asked the following questions about four items: “How strong a feeling do you have about the following everyday life anxiety?” The four items are: “(1) I feel anxious that I might fall behind because the competition is too severe in our society”(anxiety over the competition), “(2) I am worried whether I could manage it if a member of the family get sick or encounters an accident”(worries about family accidents), “(3) I am worried if my home economy becomes needy due to economic crisis” (worries about household living due to economic crisis), and “(4) I feel lonely and desolate because I have no one who understands me” (loneliness and heartlessness). These questions are to see which aspects of everyday life are more important among the work-related (the first question), family-related (the second and the third questions), and relation-related¹⁵ anxiety (the fourth question). For the comparison the points were converted to scores on 100 points.

¹³ The surveys were conducted by Prof. Li Qiang of Tsinghua University in China, by Prof. Han Sang-Jin of Seoul National University in Korea, and by Prof. Li Tingjiang of Chuo University in Japan respectively. The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents such as sex, age, education, standard of living, marital status in three cities are as follows: in terms of gender, there are more men in Beijing than in Seoul and Tokyo, while proportion of gender is similar in Tokyo and Seoul. In terms of age, there are more younger people (in their twenties) in Beijing, while there are more elderly people (over sixties) in Seoul.

¹⁴ Summary of the analyses in Shim, Kim and Kim 2014

¹⁵ Here relationship could mean pure relationship. Pure relationship refers to a relationship for itself, not for material or other interests (Giddens, 2001).

Figure 3. Perception of Everyday Life Anxiety in Three Cities



Source: Shim, Kim and Kim 2014: 250

When we see the perception of everyday life-related anxiety in three cities respectively (figure 3), work-related and family-related anxieties are high with more than 50 scores and only the relation-related one is relatively low with scores lower than 50 score. More specifically, in Seoul, the highest anxiety are worries about the family accidents (70.4) and worries about the household living due to economic crisis (70.4), all family-related anxiety, and the lowest is loneliness and heartlessness (49.8), the relation-related aspect. Similarly, in Tokyo, the highest are worries about the family accidents (67.2), worries about the household living due to economic crisis (64.5), the family-related aspect, and the lowest is loneliness and heartlessness, the relation-related aspect. In Beijing, the highest is anxiety over being left behind due to competition (70.7), the work-related, and the lowest is loneliness and heartlessness (37.7), the relation-related aspect. When we compare the perception of everyday life-related anxiety in three cities (figure 3), anxiety perception is higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and somewhat lower in Beijing, except in one: anxiety over being left behind due to competition, work-related anxiety¹⁶.

When we compare aspects of anxiety, the family-related anxiety is higher than the work-related and relation-related aspects, except the one on work-related aspect in Beijing. More specifically, worries about the family accidents (70.4, 67.2, 65.3), and worries about the household living

¹⁶ This could be because in China capitalism is relatively recently introduced, and people are more sensitive to competition, while in Korea and Japan people are accustomed to competition and take it for granted.

due to economic crisis (70.4, 64.5, 57.6), that is, the family-related anxiety, are higher than the work-related aspect, that is, anxiety being left behind due to competition (63.0, 60.0), except in Beijing (70.7), and also higher than the relation-related aspect, that is, loneliness and heartlessness (49.8, 46.3, 37.7). This shows that the overall tendency of everyday life anxiety in three cities can be said to be quite high. And this anxiety comes from the fact that one has no security against the work-related and family-related risk and has to take care of oneself when there are sudden accidents or economic crisis. However, the relation-related anxiety, which can be attributed to individualization seems to be still relatively low. Next, let us see more specific family risks due to individualization.


Seriousness of Various Family Risk Perception in East Asia¹⁷

In order to see the “seriousness of various family risk”, we asked the following questions about seven items, “How serious do you think the following family-related risks are in our society?” The seven items are: 1) divorce, 2) low fertility, 3) decrease in the parent’s role in home education, 4) isolation and suicide of the elderly, 5) individualist tendency, 6) decrease in mutual help in the family, and 7) conflict in the property distribution. They were measured in Likert scale (from 1 “not serious at all” to 4 “very serious”). For the comparison the points were converted to scores on 100 points. Among these seven items, divorce, no children or low fertility, isolation and suicide of the elderly and individualist tendency (1,2,3,4) can be considered as the “second modern type” risks, while decrease of parent’s role in home education, decrease of mutual help in the family, and conflict in property distribution (5,6,7) can be considered as “the first modern type” risks.¹⁸

¹⁷ Summary of the analyses in Shim, Kim and Kim 2014

¹⁸ Since this research was focused on the family risk, the types of risk have to be redefined to fit the family context. In order to do this we relied on the concept of the family in the first and second modernity. Among the various differences between the two, we paid attention to the difference in terms of the task of the family and the relationship between the couple. First, the task of the family in the first modernity is primarily, but not exclusively, material, while the task in the second modernity is far more emotional than material (Shim 2011, pp. 26). In the case of second modernity, most of the functions of the family such as economy, education, welfare have been moved to the social institutions out of the family, whereas this is not so in the case of first modernity. Consequently, the emotional task of the family has become crucially important for second modernity while the principle of love becomes radicalized. Second, the relationship between the couple has also changed. To make it simple, the first modern relationship is based on sexual division of labor and gender inequality, while the second modern relationship is based on individualization and gender equality. In the former, the family functions as a strategic unit of community to survive, while in the latter we can find a specific relationship characterized by “I am me” (Beck 1992, p. 175), living “a life of one’s own” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, p. 22). For more details, please refer to Shim, Kim and Kim 2014.

Figure 4. Perception of Seriousness of Family Risks in Three Cities



Source: Shim, Kim and Kim 2014: 251

When we see the perception of family-related risks in three cities respectively, Seoul and Tokyo show a similar pattern, showing high scores in most of the items, and Beijing shows a different pattern. More specifically, in Seoul, the highest risks among the seven family-related risks are isolation of the elderly (76.6), no children or low fertility (75.2), individualist tendency (74.7), and divorce (74.1), all “the second modern type”. The lowest are conflict in property distribution (63.0), decrease in mutual help in the family (66.4), which can be considered as “the first modern type”. In Tokyo, the highest are no children or low fertility (79.1) and isolation of the elderly (77.7), “the second modern type”; and the lowest is conflict in property distribution (52.1), “the first modern type.” In Beijing, the highest is conflict in the property distribution (62.0), “the first modern type”, and the next is divorce (61.8), and the lowest are isolation of the elderly (42.3), no children or low fertility (42.7), “the second modern type”. When we compare the perception of the seven family-related risks in three cities (figure 3-2), family risk perception is higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and lower in Beijing except in one: conflict of property distribution¹⁹.

¹⁹ When we compare the family risk perception according to the two types of risks, “the second modern types” turned out to be somewhat higher than “the first modern type” in Seoul and Tokyo, while “the first modern types” seem to be higher in Beijing. More specifically, “the second modern type”, that is, the first four items, turned out to be higher in Seoul and Tokyo and lower in Beijing except divorce. Particularly, the contrast between Seoul-Tokyo and Beijing is quite striking in the case of low fertility (79.1 and 75.2 vs. 42.7) and isolation and suicide of the elderly (76.6 and 77.7 vs. 42.3). Among “the first modern type,” the conflict on property distribution (62.0) stands out as the highest in Beijing. And two other “first modern types”, that is, decrease of parent’s role in home education (51.6) and decrease of mutual help in the family (53.0), turned out to be neither so high nor so low but about the middle¹⁹, even though higher than two “second modern types,” that is, low fertility (42.7) and isolation and suicide of the elderly (42.3).

From these findings, we can see the family risks are high in three cities, even though there are variations among them. More specifically, citizens' perception on family risk as a whole is higher in Seoul and Tokyo. As to their perception on the two types of family risk, "the second modern type" is higher in Seoul and Tokyo, and "the first modern type", particularly conflict in property distribution, is higher in Beijing. Compared with Beijing citizens, the finding that Seoul and Tokyo citizens are more sensitive to family risk in general, and the second modern types of risk in particular indicates that the society in which they live has been transformed into second-modern life conditions with risks of individualization.

The research findings of the everyday life anxiety and family risks clearly show that risk perception of the second modern type (which certainly are due to individualization) are high and that the consequences of individualization are negative. This is probably because in East Asia, there are no buffer zones like the welfare state, classical individualism, and cultural democracy which can make the negative consequences of individualization less severe. Then the next questions is: how do they react to these risks.

Citizens' Wish for the Desirable Future of the City


In order to find out citizens' reaction to negative consequences of individualization, I analyzed citizens' perception on the direction of development for the desirable future of the city of Seoul (Beijing or Tokyo) from the 2012 survey in three cities in East Asia. Even though these two are not directly related, we can at least conjecture from the results. The questions I pay attention are: "Which direction of development do you think is better for the desirable future of the city of Seoul (Beijing or Tokyo)?" And there were four items under the question. First, "a city with local government initiative" vs. "a city with citizens' participation", second, "a city of contemporary trend according to international standard" vs. "a city with traditional cultural characteristics", third, "a city with many high-rise apartments" vs. "a city with alleys and communities", and fourth, "a city with rationality and effectiveness" vs. "a city with affection and closeness". And the results are as shown in figure 5. The first part of the four dichotomies are more government initiated, more international, more contemporary, and more rational dimension, while the second part are more participatory, more traditional, more communal and more affective dimensions. The results are shown in figure 5.

As shown in figure 5, we can find similarities in three among the four items: that is, "a city with citizens' participation", "a city with alleys and communities", and "a city with affection and closeness" in the three cities. These three are considered to be related with the making of local community with close and intimate relationship for which the residents themselves participate in making together with others. The fourth item, that is, "a city with traditional cultural characteristics", is somewhat different not only in its meaning, but also in its distribution. Thus I will focus on these three items.

First, with regard to "a city with citizens' participation," the scores are high with 73.1 (Beijing), 64.6 (Tokyo), and 63.4 (Seoul) out of 100 scores. Among the three cities, Beijing show highest scores showing citizens' desire for participation. This may be because citizens' participation is relatively more difficult in Beijing than in Seoul and Tokyo where citizens' participation in the local government is already institutionalized. Second, with regard to "a city with alleys and communities", the scores are also high with 66.8 (Seoul), 61.7 (Tokyo), and 59.3 (Beijing) out

of 100 scores. Seoul is highest in this regard probably because there are too much new construction and many of the alleys and communities have not been preserved, but destroyed. Third, with regard to “a city with affection and closeness”, the scores are also high with 63.4 (Beijing), 59.2 (Seoul), and 56.1 (Tokyo) out of 100 scores. The fact that the scores are similarly high in these three items clearly show that citizens in the three cities hope for such a direction of city development

Figure 5. Wish for the Direction of Development for the Desirable Future of the City



This can be related to the analysis I have shown above on the negative consequences of individualization. My assumption was that the risk of second modernity and individualization brings forth negative consequences, which in turn, will bring forth attitudes and efforts to counter them. In the above analyses of survey data, I have shown that everyday life anxiety and family risks turned out to be quite high in the three cities, which we can assume have come from the risks of second modernity and individualization. We can also conjecture that the attitude preferring a city with local communities with closer and warmer relationship, such as “a city with citizens’ participation”, “a city with alleys and communities”, and “a city with affection and closeness” may have some relationship with the negative consequences of risk and individualization as seen in everyday life anxiety and family risk. Of course, more empirical researches and more analyses have to be conducted for more specific relationship.

The enforced individualization tends to increase the level of anxiety in everyday life and makes the community lose its integrative function. Empirical researches support the argument and enforced individualization brings forth negative consequences. Besides the empirical studies showing the attitudes, the fact that there are so many voluntary local community movements

and social governance experiments in East Asia, particularly in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo, big cities with high individualization, also provides grounds for this argument. I will discuss the local community movement and social governance experiments in this context.

4. Social Governance Responses Why Stronger in East Asia?

As mentioned above, negative consequences can be related not only to the positive attitude for a city with local communities, but also to various movements and/or experiments of local communities and social governance in East Asia. For example, we can name *Sungmisan Maeul* in Seoul, *Qinghe* experiment in Beijing, and *Setagaya* in Tokyo. Some are bottom-up and voluntary, others are led by the government, and still others are led by the experts. Even though there are differences in approaching the issue, the fact that there are such efforts show that these movements and experiments could be interpreted as efforts to counter the risk of individualization through community network reconstruction. Here I will briefly introduce three models in three cities of East Asia and then focus on the case of Seoul.

Three Models of Local Community Reconstruction and Social Governance in East Asia

In Beijing, China there have arisen various models of social governance since the basic framework of social policy was shifted from “social management” to “social governance” at the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC (Communist Party of China) Central Committee in 2013 (The 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 2013; Han, Shim and Park, 2017). This shift can be understood as a response to the social risks accumulated after the market-oriented reform. More specifically, Chinese society emerged as a risk society after the collapse of *Danwei* regime (Han, Shim and Park, 2017). The party-state leadership defined social risks as developmental risks and responded to such risks with a society-building policy which was practically implemented in the form of the *Shequ* (neighborhood community) reconstruction. The newly established social governance has the dual tasks of the policy, that is, the reconstruction of the social service supply system, on the one hand, and the grassroots democracy building, on the other.

Qinghe experiment can be positioned in this context. Even though there was an old *Qinghe* experiment, here I focus on the new *Qinghe* experiment carried out by Tsinghua University team. This *Qinghe* experiment started on the backdrop of fragmentation of the community (Ge, 2014) and is characterized by the participation of various experts and “deliberative” governance model (Han, Shim and Park, 2017). In general, the deliberative model in China is developed to strengthen the communication between party-state and citizens. Despite its shortcomings, the most important significance of this experiment lies in the fact that it reveals a possibility of dealing with the risk of welfare delivering and authoritarian deliberative system (Li, 2016; Wang, 2010; Han, Shim, and Park, 2017).

In Japan so called *Matsizukuri*, that is, to make a local neighborhood community, linking the local government and experts together with the participation of the residents have been widely

expanded since 1970's (Taniguchi and Marshall, 2016).²⁰

Setagaya²¹ is known as one of the first of these desirable neighborhood community making with cooperation of the residents and administration in Japan. In Setagaya from 1975 the ward chief was elected by residents' voting, not by appointing. In 1979 Setagaya designated two regions resilient for disaster under the slogan of "Let us make a neighborhood community resilient to natural disasters," which was further strengthened since the 3.11 Fukushima nuclear plant accident. In the 1980's they held a residents' meeting for neighborhood community making to listen to the voices of the residents. And what the residents said at the meeting were made into the ordinances in 1982, which has become a rule since then. And residents' association for neighborhood community making was also made at this time. Two characteristics of neighborhood community making in Setagaya are as follows: first, piecemeal improvement and participation of the residents. For example, when they want to widen a road or make a small park (so called pocket park), they do not make it at once, but widen it little by little according to the residents' cooperation. Second, city plans are made together with the residents. For example, their plan map for neighborhood community making was not made by the ward office, but by talking with the residents. In 1992 they established Setagaya support center for neighborhood community making" which is the first in its kind in Japan, which now is changed as "Setagaya Trust Foundation for neighborhood community making" for sustainable neighborhood community making (Kim, 2014).

In Seoul, Korea, *Sungmisan maeul* is a lively and representative example among neighborhood community movements in Korea. It is even considered as an "evidence of 'real utopia'" by Erik Ohlin Wright (Lee, 2014, *Hankyereh*). In an interview with *Hankeyreh* in 2014 Wright said as follows:

The most impressive time in my stay in Seoul was the day at *Sungmisan maeul*. The behavior of the grassroots in *Sungmisan* community was very interesting and the joint project of the residents unfolded here were unique. The outcome of *Sungmisan maeul* is amazing, considering the situation that most of the movements do not take firm root giving birth to new organizations." (Erik Ohlin Wright, quoted from Lee, 2014, *Hankeyreh* July 21, 2014)

²⁰ Mr. Park, Won Soon, the Mayor of Seoul and once a famous NGO leader in Korea, describes *Machizukuri* in Japan aptly as follows. His observation and comment is considered to be correct and to have perceived well the characteristic of citizens' activity in Japan above all, citizens' activity in Japan does not have any nationwide network, and looks even shabby. (omitted) They exist so separately, that I judged it would be difficult for them to send strong political influence. Furthermore, I could not find out any advocacy organization as PSPD ('People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy') that I have belonged. But, when I entered into individual area, found the citizen activists extended (in) various activities in each community, and I could confirm the depth and health of Japanese civil society. Especially, 'the Cooperative Society' was impressive. (omitted) There is no large scaled organization in Japan, but they have made small groups and have been practicing various activity and experiments though the effect is rather modest. I think Korean citizen movements should study and make a research these characteristic." (Hayashi, 2007)

²¹ Setagaya City is well known and representative. It was established in 1932 with the merger of two towns and two villages, these being Setagaya, Komazawa, Tamagawa, and Matsuzawa. Later, in 1936, another two villages, Chitose and Kinuta, merged with this municipality to form today's Setagaya City. Today, the city has grown into the largest residential community in Tokyo. Over the years, residents and the city have pursued autonomy and building a tolerant and vibrant community, while working together to protect the area's culture, traditions and precious natural environment, including the Kokubunji cliff line, many rivers, and farmland (City of Setagaya, 2014).

***Sungmisan maeul*: a “Real Utopia” of an Individualized Community?**

Why is *Sungmisan maeul* considered as an evidence of real utopia? I will briefly introduce the community. *Sungmisan* mountain is an ecological park where more than 1,000 residents visit every day when a plan was made to make it a park in 1993. In 1994 some of the residents of *Sungsandong*, *Mapo-gu* district in Seoul (about 10 parents) who were not satisfied with the existing childcare services, made a “communal childcare cooperative” together with neighbor residents in the region in order to overcome the burden of childcare. As it got a good response, it expanded to other communal child care cooperative. And as the children go to the primary school, afterschool care program was made, and then an alternative school. As the children grow up, parents made a cooperative for good food and living foundations such as cooperative society, car hospital, radio broadcasting, etc. In 1997 when associations for communal childcare, common food were made and expanding, the office of waterworks of Seoul Metropolitan government declared the *Sungmisan* water-supply reservoir plan together with an apartment construction plan. That is, they will construct a reservoir at the top of the mountain and a apartment complex at the foot of the mountain. Thus residents’ solidarity to save *Sungmisan* (hereafter *Sungmisan* solidarity) was formed in July 1997 and they did various opposition movement to block the plan²². (Yoo, 2010; Wui 2013; Kim and Han, 2014)

After many ups and downs, finally, in October 2003, the office of waterworks of Seoul Metropolitan Government decided to suspend the construction plan of *Sungmisan* reservoir. During this conflict the press began to call the village as *Sungmisan maeul* and the residents themselves have the identity of *Sungmisan* neighborhood community people. This struggle has special meaning for *Sungmisan maeul*, because it became a moment for people to gather and talk and thus to develop many other important activities for the *Sungmisan maeul*²³. (Yoo, 2010; Wui 2013; Kim and Han, 2014)

How can we characterize the *Sungmisan* neighborhood community? As shown in the philosophy of the *Sungmisan* School, the value *Sungmisan* neighborhood community pursues can be characterized as cooperation, voluntariness, and ecological value (Yoo, 2010). First, *Sungmisan* neighborhood community started by making a “common/sharing space” with “relation network”, instead of solving each individual’s needs separately. It started with making and operating a daycare center they dreamed of together with neighbors, not like the ordinary people who knew only one solution of sending their children to existing daycare center. And then it kept on expanding, to alternative school. to a cooperative society (Lee, 2010), to a

²² Seoul metropolitan government, confronted with the opposition (in 1997), said that they will make an ecological park after constructing the reservoir. However, the *Sungmisan* solidarity kept their opposition movement, because once destroyed, it will not be possible to restore it to its original state. And they conducted ecological survey on *Sungmisan* mountain and also got 20,000 signature for a petition against the plan in October, 2001. In early 2003 there occurred surprise logging on the mountaintop by the office of waterworks of Seoul Metropolitan government. And the residents pitched (set up) a tent on the mountaintop in the cold weather to guard the *Sungmisan* for several months on the one hand and, visited district council members and congressmen and held public hearings to persuade them on the other. The points were whether the reservoir is really necessary, and how important the *Sungmisan* mountain is in ecological sense, etc. (Yoo, 2010)

²³ And during this opposition movement they made a systematic, and official organization called Mapo solidarity based on the communal childcare cooperative, cooperative society, etc. Mapo solidarity has four divisions: division for participatory politics, division for environment, division for press, and division for welfare/education. *Sungmisan* village movement can be considered as a successful case of local community movement and later chosen and adopted as a model of local community case by the Seoul Metropolitan Government (Yoo, 2010).

grocery, to neighborhood community theater, to neighborhood community café and restaurant, to neighborhood community festival, and to various communication and sharing. (City of Seoul, 2013:133)

And second, they practice the task in a way respecting each individual's voluntariness. They do not force any one for the collectivity. They are very "communal" in cooperation, but they are also very "individualistic" in respecting the voluntariness of the individual. In this sense *Sungmisan* maeul is fitted to the East Asian style of individualization and can be called an "individualized community". This respect of the individual is found in the process of decision making. "They never impose or force one's own opinion to other people.... They do not follow the majority rule which they think is a very violent way of enforcing the position of the majority, but try to talk it out until everybody understands or agrees (Wui, 2011: 56). Of course, this process takes a longer time, but they think it is eventually a better way of leading to the consensus. In this sense it can be called an "individualized community."

Social governance in Seoul

Even though the first social governance to make neighborhood community started in Gwangju, Jeonnam, it was Seoul Metropolitan government led by Mayor Park Won Soon who made it expand systematically. Mayor Park was aware of the importance of the neighborhood community for a happy life in the cities. Thus he made the revitalization of neighborhood community as one of his major election pledge when he ran for the Mayor of Seoul Metropolitan Government in October, 2011. He thought the neighborhood community was disorganized as a consequence of the compressed economic growth, and thus he will restore it to make Seoul a happier living place. Mayor Park's neighborhood community policy can be divided into two stages: The first stage is during his first term as a mayor (from 2012 to 2014), and the second stage is during his second term (from 2014 to 2017)²⁴. The first stage can be characterized by encouraging the emergence and connection of the residents and the second stage is characterized by the expansion from neighborhood community network to regional level and door-to-door community service (Yoo, 2015).

The first Stage: Spontaneity of the Residents

As a mayor after the election he held several meetings together with the civil activists to prepare for the policy, since making local communities has the character of public-private partnership in principle and should not be initiated by the local government. He established foundation and system for the policy, based on the models of existing communities such as *Sungmisan* village or *Samgagsan* village (Ahn et al, 2016: 40). And he made ordinance to support neighborhood community in February, 2012, made the position of general manager officer in charge of neighborhood community in March, 2012, and constituted a committee for neighborhood community, a public-private partnership organ in April, 2012. Based on this he made a master plan for neighborhood community for the next five years and opened "comprehensive neighborhood community support center" as a middle level support organization in August, 2012. And the grassroots activists began to make "neighborhood community net" in each

²⁴ There can be several ways of dividing the stages. Here the stages were divided by the term of the mayor.

district to correspond to the policy. Thus the policy could get into the orbit/start in earnest (Ahn et al, 2016: 109-110).

In February, 2013, a promotion plan synthesizing the detailed services of the eleven departments of Seoul Metropolitan government to support community was announced. Three principles or essential features of neighborhood community policy of the Seoul Metropolitan government which is still valid today were revealed at that time. They are: Three residents or more can apply, and they can apply at any time, with inclusive budget system, and various support was possible such as support for incubating, support by themes and by stages of growth, etc. (Ahn, et. Al. 2016: 110). These principles were made to encourage the voluntarism and spontaneity of the residents, that is, to encourage the spontaneity of the residents and make it easy for residents to emerge and connect by themselves (Yoo, 2015). In 2014 plans to support middle-level organization for the districts in Seoul were made.

The second Stage: Door-to-Door Community Service and Residents' Initiative

While the objective in the first stage was to encourage more residents to come out and get active, in the second stage efforts were made to make it expand from residents' groups to regional level ('dong' and districts). After his reelection as a Mayor of Seoul, he further promoted the neighborhood community policy to make a public sphere so that neighborhood community could be expanded to the regional level and more residents can discuss and participate in it. In 2015 "door-to-door community service center" and "village energizer," the two institutional experiments to make regional public sphere, were established. In 2016 two policies of supporting the spontaneity, emergence and growth of neighborhood community resident on the one hand and of connecting the neighborhood community with autonomous regional self-government were promoted together as neighborhood community policy of Seoul Metropolitan Government (Ahn et al, 2016; Yoo, 2015). Thus considering these neighborhood community policy of Seoul Metropolitan Government, we can say that social governance responses in Korea, and also in East Asia in general, is very strong.

Then why is the social governance experience so strong in East Asia? First, East Asia has a long tradition of emphasizing relationship. In this context, the shock of community breakdown would be greater and thus the efforts to overcome this would also be greater. Second, the path to individualization in East Asia is different from that of the West. While the individualization in the West was supported by the welfare state, classical individualism, and cultural democracy and could be expanded in one way of development of liberty, it was not so in East Asia. In East Asia, individualization was rather a "dual individualization," and has both aspects of liberation and deprivation. This probably has something to do with severity of the negative consequences of individualization without the buffer zones such as the welfare state, company or the family. Probably that is why the social governance responses are stronger in East Asia.

5. Summary and Conclusion

This paper attempted to articulate the relationship between individualization and social

governance in the form of neighborhood community reconstruction in close relations as dual aspects of the same coin in East Asia. More specifically, it tries to show that individualization, which resulted with the success of the industrial society, that is, the first modernity, brought forth individualization, and individualization brings forth negative consequences (as well as emancipation), which in turn, works as a driving force for social governance movements and experiments in East Asia.

This paper asked three main questions. They were: 1) How have the researches on individualization unfolded in the West and East Asia? 2) What are the consequences of individualization on community life? And 3) What kinds of social governance responses and why so strong in East Asia?

As to the first question, I tried to synthesize the main outcomes of the researches on individualization conducted so far and compare the similarity and difference between the West and East Asia. In short the individualization in East is dual individualization, different from the one-way development in the West. As to the second I tried to examine the negative consequences of individualization on community life such as mutual help and solidarity. Unleashed from the protection of either welfare state or economic firms, individuals tend to be isolated and are forced to deal with the life risks they face by themselves. This enforced individualization tends to increase the level of anxiety in everyday life and community tends to lose its integrative function. I showed the level of anxiety and family risks in East Asia together with the wish for the direction of development for the desirable future of the city. As to the third question, I tried to demonstrate why, as a response to the community disintegration, the social governance responses are far stronger in East Asia than the Western countries. In this context this paper tried to introduce some of modes of social governance in East Asia, particularly that of Seoul, to show the reciprocal relations of individualization and social governance as clearly as possible based on the available empirical evidences.

Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that social governance responses in East Asia are strong. And the reasons why they are strong in East Asia can be found not only in the long tradition of emphasizing relationship, but also in the unique path to individualization in East Asia. In East Asia, individualization was rather a “dual individualization,” and has both aspects of liberation and deprivation. That is why the shock of community breakdown is greater and thus the efforts to overcome this is also greater. This probably has something to do with severity of the negative consequences of individualization without the buffer zones such as the welfare state, company or the family. Probably that is why the social governance responses are stronger in East Asia.

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**Pragmatic Communalism and the Possibility of Democratic Social Governance:
Focusing on the Case of *Sungmisan* Village Community in Seoul.**

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the *Sungmisan* village community as a bottom-up model of the urban community formation and to discuss its characteristics and significance for the democratic social governance. First, I will describe the historical process of the bottom-up formation of the *Sungmisan* village. Second, through a few examples I will present two organizing principle of *Sungmisan* village community: cooperation and deliberation. Third, I will show that the *Sungmisan* village is not formed as a part of the neoliberal crisis-management strategy but as a community-based democratic alternative to the neoliberal governmentality and therefore has the potential to be a model of democratic social governance. Lastly, it will be argued that this potential of *Sungmisan* village has its origin in what can be called the pragmatic communalism, which serves as the common base of two different organizing principles of *Sungmisan* village, cooperation and deliberation.

Keywords: *Sungmisan* village, bottom-up model of the urban community, pragmatic communalism, democratic social governance. cooperation, deliberation.

Action-Theoretical Approach to Community Reconstruction in Seoul and Beijing: An Analysis of Push and pull factors

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Abstract

This paper takes an action-theoretical approach to social change with an intention to grasp and analyze the driving forces of urban neighborhood community reconstruction under way in Seoul and Beijing from the perspective of participant actors. For this, we distinguish two actor groups, that is, leaders and residents and pay attention to how they become engaged in social governance experiments in terms of push and pull factors. Push refers to ‘because of’ driving energy such as frustration and anxiety whereas pull means ‘in order to’ energy like ideology and dream for a better life. The *Sungmisan community* in Seoul and the *Qinghe Y community* in Beijing chosen for our study differ in many dimensions. The former has been led by a distinctive group called the 386 generation in Korea deeply engaged in people-oriented activities. In contrast, the latter has been led by an expert sociologist group of Tsinghua University. We will show in this paper, 1) what kind of concrete change has taken place through community reconstruction in each case, and 2) how the leader group and community residents have interacted to produce such changes. The in-depth interviews and other survey data we collected will be used. Based on this analysis, we will attempt 3) to compare the two cases with respect to the relative strength and weakness of the new urban experiment. Finally, 4) an attempt will be made to assess the significance of action-theoretical approach and explore further tasks to be investigated.

Keywords: community reconstruction, action theory, *Sungmisan community*, *Qinghe Y community*, push and pull factors

Previous Studies on Social Governance

Discourse on neighborhood community reconstruction has rapidly boomed in China since 2014 when a new policy goal of social governance was officially declared. In the annual conference of the Chinese Sociological Association, for example, several hundred papers were presented each year on the related topics. Various experiments of community reconstruction have been spreading throughout China. In Korea, likewise, the public concern with social governance has increased remarkably as a response and answer to the increasing gap between threats from risk society and the failure on the part of government and political parties as well. In this regard,

Seoul metropolitan city has gone ahead to promote the new experiment of neighborhood community reconstruction by accepting and supporting as many proposals from the citizens as 4,978 from 2012 to 2015. For this reason, numerous experiments of social governance are going on in all districts and lower administrative units of Seoul. There seems to be good reasons why we should compare Korea and China, particularly Seoul and Beijing in this regard.

To begin with, neighborhood communities exhibit such characteristics as locality, residents, and social interactions. These communities are distinguished from “villages” since village is just a simple residence while neighborhood community includes the interaction among its members while managing community life (Jeon Daeuk, Park Seunggyu & Choei Insu, 2012:10). In China, the reason why this issue draws public attention is related to the dismantling of the urban “Unit System.” The traditional *Unit System* gradually lost its competitiveness in the market system as China had pursued reform and opening from the late 1970s. As *Unit System* was dismantled, its primary function of providing social safety net for individuals disappeared. As a result, *community system*(社区) which had survived despite the collapse of *Unit System* became an alternative model to fill the void (吴群刚 & 孙志祥, 2011:11). Various approaches have since been explored depending on the concerned disciplines. So far previous researches often paid attention to (1) the relationship between government policy and community reconstruction, (2) typology of community governance model, and (3) case study. Chen Guang-Jin (陈光金, 2015), for instance, described urban community in China showing a structure in which the government and residents act as the agent of social unity under an unequal relationship. His analysis has been supported by series of researches by Mao Shui-Juan (毛水娟, 2013), Zhang Wei & Cheng Jing (张伟 & 成婧, 2013), Xiong Li-Juan & Li Rui & Wang Li (熊利娟 & 李睿 & 王力, 2015), Wang Zhen-zhen (王桢桢, 2010), and Mao Zi-Dan & Chai Yan (毛子丹 & 柴彦, 2013). They divided the types of urban community governance by strength of government administration, market, and social autonomy and showed that the power of the residents was the weakest. However, most of these studies did not provide solid empirical evidence. Li Qiang (李强) is an exception since he provided empirical evidence and classified governance models by conducting empirical researches. Generally, case studies have revealed that the extent of the resident’s autonomy is low because of the power imbalance between the government and the residents (王春苏, 2013), and uncertain role and responsibilities built into this new experiment (张红霞, 2014).

In Korea, the public perception of risks arose sharply from the middle of the 1990s as the uncertainty in economic growth rose and many episodes of catastrophic disaster broke out as unintended negative consequences of rush-to development (Jo Han Hye-jeong, 2013). *Beyond Risk Society: Ulrich Beck and the Korean Debate* which came out in 2017 from Seoul National University Press shows well how the concept of risk society was constructed out of the discursive confrontation with various types of risks that stroke Korea. As a response to this public anxiety, Seoul metropolitan government began to formulate a new policy program of neighborhood community reconstruction from 2012. This has given rise to many studies on social governance initially paying attention how neighborhood community can be revitalized

in connection to this policy change. The focus was frequently on the local government policy (Park Byung-chun, 2012) and strengthening community capacity (Byun Miri, 2011). While some studies were primarily concerned with external conditions of community revitalization, other studies with its internal conditions. By and large, the residents' community consciousness and community participation drew hot attention, together with the impact of the internal conditions of community consciousness on community activation (Seo Jae-ho, 2013; Yong Kab Sik & Yong Joon 2014; Cha Dong-pil 2006).

As a general trend, researches done so far paid attention to the major factors involved in the experiment of neighborhood reconstruction, such as the political, economic, regional, and technological factors as well as the historical change of the governance structure of urban life. Identifying different patterns of this experiment and their salient characteristics have also received attention frequently. Because of the close relation of neighborhood community with many disciplines, analyses have overlapped with such research areas as urban development, housing policy, city planning, population, social work and welfare, and community organization. Many researchers attempted an analysis of the process of community formation from a policy perspective or suggesting ways to revitalize communities through community participation. There are very few studies analyzing their interrelationships as the main subject of community reconstruction. In particular, it is rare to find a solid empirical analysis.

Against this backdrop, this study begins with the recognition that neighborhood community reconstruction understood as social governance cannot be reduced to a problem of urban or residential development and policy but gains significance as a new development towards more participatory and reflexive governance with rich practical implications. Furthermore, this study hinges on the previous study of the role of community leaders in revitalizing communities (Kim Yisu, 2015; Jeon Dae Wook et al, 2012) and takes an action-theoretical perspective going beyond the conventional historical perspective or macro-structural explanation with no human actors and in this way attempts to demonstrate clearly who has done what and how in this historical transformation of neighborhood community.


Action-Theoretical Approach

The purpose of this study is to examine social governance related to community reconstruction from the viewpoint of action-theoretical theory. We want to propose that an important shift of policy with profound repercussion and the resulting transformation can be studied in terms of driving force at the level of social action and that this driving force can be identified as push and pull factors empirically. Furthermore, we want to distinguish the two actor groups, that is, leader and residents and examine how they perform their role and how they interact to each other at the different stages of neighborhood community reconstruction.

From the action-theoretical perspective, the push factor usually works behind the actors enforcing them to get out of the danger and risks threatening their safety. Examples are the

experienced or anticipated fear, anxiety, despair, frustration, deprivation, isolation, and catastrophe. The pull factor usually works in front of actors motivating them to move towards a better society or a new vision of the future. What is important here is not simply anger and frustration but hope, aspiration, desire, ideology, and morality. In the case of neighborhood community reconstruction, the push factors are related to the everyday life experience of the residents about what they feel as absent, lacking, depriving, deteriorating, and discriminating despite the fact they want it strongly. In contrast, the pull factor refers to the enabling energy that leaders and residents share to promote the common objective. It can also mean the specific capacity of leaders in organizing the group with trust and solidarity.

Figure 1. Action-theoretical Model



With this model, we want to 1) show the concrete development of social governance experiments in the *Sungmisan community* in Seoul and the *Qinghe Y community* in Beijing, 2) examine the push and pull factors involved in these experiments analytically, 3) pay attention to the role of the leader group and their patterns of interaction with resident citizens, and 4) use the empirical data we collected as survey questionnaires and in-depth interview.¹ Finally, these two cases of social governance experiment will be compared to draw out commonalities and differences.

Short History and Key Projects of the Two Communities

(1) *Sungmisan* Community in Seoul

Sungmisan community is located at Sungsan 1 Dong, Mapogu District of Seoul. The community is at the foot of the Sungmi-Mountain, it began to be known and called *Sungmisan*

¹ we have conducted in-depth interviews with the people related to the two communities. A total of eleven people¹ responded to the interview request, and an extra interview with the Seoul city official through email. For the *Y community* in Beijing, we participated in the community meetings and we could observe and analyze the contents of the meetings. Also the inner circle meeting memoranda were provided by the community authorities.

community since 2003 when the “*Sungmisan* Committee to Save *Sungmisan*” was successful. However, it is rather a community of network, than a community of neighborhood. The range of the community is approximately 10 to 15 minutes-walk from the mountain. And the *Sungmisan community* is known for its successful community reconstruction by their residents.

The start of the *Sungmisan community* leads back to the childcare problems during 1990s. The parents who were not satisfied with the existing childcare services formed their own cooperative childcare with independent financial basis. As a result, the first cooperative childcare center was opened in *Sungmisan community* in 1994. From then, other cooperative activities such as local after-schools and local resident cooperative to build the community culture emerged. And since the 2000s, the *Sungmisan community* has undergone major changes. The collaborative topic that was previously limited to the childcare center expanded to residents’ daily lives. As the children grew up the childcare center was no longer the connecting point for the parents to interact. Therefore, there was high demand for a new connecting point to be set. As a result, the “Mapo Durae Cooperative” was launched in 2001. The formation of this cooperative also reflected the local social concerns on food safety. Since then, the development of the *Sungmisan community* has evolved along with the *Durae Cooperative*, and *Durae Cooperative* took the central role in the community. And the identity of community was strengthened by implementing various education programs, sports competition, community festivals, and etc.

In other words, the *Sungmisan community* started with the concerns about the government’s childcare policy and the food safety in their community. It was the beginning of a community reconstruction that residents themselves tried to solve these problems together in the community when they were not satisfied with the goods and services provided by the government or the market. This is consistent with the analysis of Jo Han Hye-jeong (2013) who emphasized the significance of the local community movement in the “risk society” where uncertainty and anxiety is heightened. The movement against the construction of the water-supply reservoir in *Sungmisan Mountain* provides a vivid example of this. The anti-construction movement of the Sungmi-Mountain reservoir is one that was initiated by the local residents who opposed to indiscriminate regional development and destruction of the ecology. This movement was not led by local politicians or civic activists. Instead, the local residents organized and led the movement themselves to solve the problems and promote the needs and values of community. And this movement played a decisive role in helping the people unite and create community values, which will be discussed in more detail later.

This can be demonstrated in relation to the anti-construction movement of *Sungmisan* reservoir. The internal consistency, coherence, and solidarity of this governance experience were significantly upgraded through this collective experience.² The construction plan for the Sungmi-Mountain reservoir was announced in July, 2001 together with a construction of an

² Based on the interview with W, P, N, J. Exact date is from 마을하기, *Sungmisan community*의 역사와 생각 (2012).

apartment complex. The reservoir is water tank-like facility for the stable supply of tap water. The construction plan was originally made in 1997 to supply stable tap water due to the growth of the population and outdated water pipe lines. However, the population of the region was declining and old water pipes had already been replaced in 2001. There was no obvious reason for an additional construction. But the residents did not know that. At first, therefore, they were suspicious and cautious. The real purpose behind this construction plan was revealed when a university foundation, which owned a private land near Sungmi-Mountain, suddenly began asking the residents for their consent to the “District Unit Plan.” It now became clear that the construction plan is, in fact, to build an apartment in Sungmi-Mountain. It made the residents worried that Sungmi-Mountain would be destroyed in the development process indiscriminately. In August 2001, the residents organized the “Citizens Solidarity to Protect Sungmi-Mountain” under the leadership of *Mapo Durae Cooperative*, and signed a protest and submitted residents’ petition to the Seoul City and Mapo District. Despite this opposition movement, the waterworks headquarters continued to carry on the development plan. As a result, “Citizen’s Solidarity for the Protection of Sungmi-Mountain”, which formally represented the local residents, expanded to “Sungmi-Mountain Countermeasures Committee”, with participation of civil society groups such as the *Seoul Environmental Movement Union*, *the Democratic Labor Party of Mapo-Eul District*, *National Union of Public Employees of Mapo District*, etc.

On the dawn of January 29, 2003, the waterworks business headquarters suddenly started to cut down the trees at the top of Sungmi-Mountain. The incident raged the anger of local residents, and the opposition movement became more aggressive. On the following day, the “*Sungmi-Mountain Countermeasures Committee*” went into 24-hour sit-in demonstration on the summit of Sungmi-Mountain despite the cold weather.³ To support the sit-in, various cultural activities and residents’ rallies were held every Saturday at the top of the mountain. Protest calls were given to Seoul Mayor, Chief of Mapo District, Mapo District Congressman, and protesters held candlelight vigil around the subway station every Saturday. In addition, a second resident signing campaign was held and several administrative petitions related to the suspension of construction were submitted to Mapo District. Meanwhile, some of the residents were reported to the judiciary. The opposition movement was mainly carried out around Mapo District office and Sungmi-Mountain area in the beginning, but as the opposition movement became more and more serious, the residents meeting and the press conference were held in front of Seoul city hall. With this effort, the Mapo District office held a special public hearing on May 17, 2003. On this hearing, the waterworks headquarters did not provide accurate answers to the residents about the purpose in constructing a reservoir. The district office conducted a public poll for two days and announced that 93 percentage of residents voted for keeping the woods to protect environment (Yoo, 2010: 81). As a result, the Waterworks Project Headquarters in Seoul had to suspend construction and the movement against reservoir

³ The 24-hour sit-in demonstration on the top of the *Sungmisan* Mountain was decided at the community meeting on the day of surprise logging, that is, January 29, 2001 and lasted for 120 days despite the cold weather. Three groups took turns; at nights, a group of three men stand sentry, in the morning, a group of the elderly, and during the day, a group of women (Yoo, 2010: 60).

construction was successfully completed on October 16, 2003.

After this dramatic experience of solidarity among residents and civil cooperation from outside, the *Sungmisan* experiment of social governance became even more prominent owing much to open communication and close relationship among the residents during this period. Thus a repair shop co-operative was established, and community-owned food shop also opened. The community held the *Autumn Festival* and a community gathering for the introduction of an alternative school was established. And a local NGO, *Mapo Solidarity*, was established as well. The biggest influence on this trend was the success of the Sungmi-Mountain preservation campaign. Through this experience, the *Sungmisan community* movement, led by a handful of people, has provided an opportunity for a wide range of people's participation. In addition, the values learned from the Sungmi-Mountain preservation movement influenced the residents and allowed the community values to be strengthened. The residents clearly committed to valuing ecology, restraining against irresponsible local development, providing public nurturing system, and strengthening the local business by creating community-owned enterprises.

(2) *QingheY* community in Beijing

Qinghe is located at the northern part of Tsinghua University. It covers an area of about 10 square kilometers with 28 communities and has a population of about 200,000 people, including the 100,000 residents without *hukou* (residential registrations, 户口). *Y community* refers to a small community under the jurisdiction of *Qinghe* in Haidian District in Beijing. The residential Community (社区) is the basic unit of city administration, similar to “Dong” in Seoul, but smaller in size. If there are 9,200 households in Sungsan 1 Dong, where the *Sungmisan community* is located, about 2,000 households live in the *Y community*. *Y community* is one where the “New *Qinghe* Experiment (NQE)” is being implemented. NQE is an experiment related to the local community governance in *Qinghe* area. The experiment started in 2014 and was led by Professor Li Qiang(李强) and his research team of Tsinghua University who are usually called the NQE project team.

As mentioned earlier, the need for a new social governance system has risen as the *danwei (Unit) System* - the traditional governance system in China - collapsed with the reform and opening. The core of this system is to operate the governance system based on the interaction of government, market, and society. Theoretically, as the governing bodies, “Sub-district Offices (街道办事处),” “Property Management Company (物业管理公司),” and “Residents’ Committee (居民委员会)” are supposed to do their role in the community governance system, representing the government, market and society, respectively. However, in reality, most of the Residents' Committees often play the role of transmitting, promoting and implementing the order of the government to the residents, rather than playing the role of initiating the citizenship autonomy (吴群刚, 孙志祥, 2011). The NQE was meant to be an attempt to change this problem.

The NQE project covers three communities of *Qinghe* area. More specifically, it has attempted to bring back society to the governance model⁴. Included in the program are such attempts as holding election, establishing procedural rules, articulating discussion topics, etc. Though each of the three communities has established such development plans, our joint study focuses on the *Y community* because there is a “Resident Council” in this community which differs from ‘Resident Committee’. Because the capacity of residents in *Y community* is relatively low and insufficient, NQE project team has shown special effort to increase its self-governing capacity by establishing an independent organization called the “Resident Council”. Currently, the council is composed of ten members elected directly by the residents and they are trying to collect and represent the opinions of *Y community*. In other words, *Y community* was able to complement the lack of local autonomy by getting help from the professionals of NQE project team. This can be shown in the following interview with L.

“...There was no (residents’) organization... I did not think the residents were important, because they lacked public strength. Why would we hold a meeting? The Members of the Resident Council have been not well distinguished from the Property Management Company (another agent of community governance). (But) we had to create an organization and put institutional pressure...”

An interesting case in point is related to the “delta redevelopment project”. The delta was originally a vacant space on one side of the *Y community* entrance. It was considered a useless land because nobody cared about its value and maintenance. However, change began to take place when some residents came up with an idea of using this land as a public space for various activities. In February 2015, the *Resident Council* accepted this idea and began to formally discuss how to use this land. After the “delta redevelopment project” became the agenda of the meeting, the NQE team asked the Tsinghua University School of Architecture for the design of the delta. The residents also participated in the designing process and expressed their opinions. In addition, referendum, resident assembly as well as *Resident Council* meetings were held. Over all, the residents showed great interests and thus this project became a big issue in the community. The delta design was continually revised through the coordination with the residents, and the final design was adopted with their consent.

However, the actual process of construction was not smooth. Though it began in October 2016 after more than a year since it had been decided, the construction was further delayed until spring 2017 due to the cold weather. In the spring 2017, design changes had to be made for the safety reasons, and this required modifications of the cost and process of construction. Eventually, the construction resumed and was completed with successful outcomes in June 2017.

“...The Resident Council’s members asked me why the construction was postponed. So I responded that there are 28 communities in the *Qinghe* areas, not just ours ... And maybe the

⁴ 李强, 我国城市社会社区治理的四种模式 (from “社会治理与社区建设研讨会”presentation, 2016.12).

leaders of the *Qinghe* area have many important things besides ours... the delay is probably caused from supporting other communities. I also passed on what the leaders of the *Qinghe* area said, that the plan is not postponed, and they are always thinking about the Y community project, mentioning that the plan will start next year.....(After that, the residents feel satisfied with the construction process) People are currently very satisfied.”

Even though there were some ups and downs in the process of construction, the residents were generally satisfied with the result, as the interview with the chairman of Resident Committee of *Qinghe* Y community reveals. There is no doubt that the residents participated in raising issues, seeking solutions, and creating alternatives. The project was not organized by residents themselves. The *Resident Council* and the NQE project team cooperated together. The residents expressed their opinions being deeply engaged in requesting for a redevelopment and voting for the design alternatives. And the residents experienced some aspects of organized power of the community during the process. On the other hand, the NQE project team intervened in the redevelopment project from the selection of the delta remodeling agenda. Particularly when the construction stopped, they tried to connect the residents with the upper government. Also, they helped the residents realize the organized power led by themselves through the process of fulfilling the local agenda.

The Analysis of Push and pull factors

(1) *Sungmisan* community Reconstruction in Seoul

Having described the two cases, we now want to move further towards the analysis of push and pull factors of neighborhood community reconstruction. Usually, push factors refer to the experience of disaster or anticipatable risks which drive people to get out from this negative state of deprivation. These factors originate from the objective-structural conditions, like risk society from which disappointment and frustration arise. The pull factors, in turn, are mostly cultural-discursive energy leading people to move toward a better future with positive energy. In this context, we will discuss the push and pull factors in *Sungmisan* community, including the role of the leader group and their interaction with the residents.

At least three types of push factors can be identified: They are dissatisfaction with existing childcare service, concerns with food safety, and worries about the destruction of *Sungmisan* Mountain as the ecological foundation of community life. All factors are directly related to salient aspects of risk society.

The dissatisfaction with existing childcare service shows the gap between public policy of early education and citizens' expectation. Because the parents are exceptionally sensitive to the issue of education, this particular frustration was directly related to the formation of the early *Sungmisan* community movement. The *Sungmisan* community was first established through the communal childcare or co-parenting among the residents. Co-parenting emerged as an alternative to the existing childcare services and education. The parents attempted to gather and

solve these problems by themselves. As a result, co-parenting created bonds between the parents. Such bond continued and eventually developed in forming a resident cooperative association.

The demand for safe food was meant to be a critical confrontation with the contamination of food stuffs. The parents wanted to provide safe food as well as good childcare services to their children. This prompted the residents to establish and use their own local cooperative association whose value was gradually realized. In other words, the *Sungmisan* community was meant to be the space of social governance in which they participate to solve the everyday life problems and anxieties they face.

The third driving force was the environmental deterioration they anticipated from the plan to construct a water-supply reservoir at the top of the *Sungmisan* Mountain. The residents were worried that the mountain that their children enjoy every day will be destroyed. The movement against the *Sungmisan* Mountain reservoir construction led to explosive growth of the movement of the local community and provided a new turning point for the reconstruction of the *Sungmisan community*. The anti-construction movement brought participation of a wide range of people. Many of founding members of the community came to join this movement because the destruction of *Sungmisan* Mountain was felt like the destruction of their hometown (Yoo, 2010, 48). During such process, the residents became more united as they overcame various difficulties. And as the Sungmi-Mountain campaign ended successfully, it provided them with the identity and solidarity as members of the *Sungmisan community*.

As pull factors, we can also name three: They are the shared conviction of the value of *Sungmisan* Mountain as the ecological basis of community life, practical know-how about organization of common interests, and trust in the leader group. The first is the discovery of the importance of *Sungmisan* Mountain. With the news of the plan to construct reservoir at the top of the mountain, the residents suddenly realized the ecological value of the mountain, as well expressed by a participant in a meeting to explore the residents' demonstration.

Sungmisan mountain is a place the children go every day on a sunny day. Children designate some secret places and name them nobody knows but themselves. *Sungmisan* mountain is a place which keep children's dreams and memories. In this sense the mountain should not be destroyed. If it is destroyed, a storage keeping our children's dreams and memories will disappear forever. Furthermore, *Sungmisan* Mountain is not only a place for children's dreams and hopes, but also an important symbolic place, its meaning being different from any other place. (Haegi, in an emergency meeting at the Dotori After-School, quoted from Yoo, 2010: 47)

Thus, the residents began to organize to confront the city of Seoul to save the mountain. Confronting the local government is not an easy decision. At first the number of the participants was small. But with their devoted efforts and persuasion, participants increase, leading to successful movement.

The second pull factor is confidence in problem-solving know-how accumulated from previous experiences. When the movement started in 2001, they already had accumulated a lot of knowledge and techniques about how to solve the problems at hand. Confronted with the childcare problems, they started with communal childcare program in 1994; to protect their children from the food unsafe quality, they organized a *Durae* Cooperative.

The third is trust in the leader group and good communication among the residents. This is the core condition for the success of the movement and thus will be discussed in more detail in the following.

In this context, the push and pull factors of the *Sungmisan community* reconstruction can be summarized as the following table 1.

Table 1. The Push and Pull Factors for construction of the *Sungmisan community*

Push Factor	Dissatisfaction with the Existing childcare service Concerns with the safety of food. Worries about the Destruction of <i>Sungmisan</i> Mountain
Pull Factor	Conviction of the ecological value of <i>Sungmisan</i> Mountain Accumulated Confidence in Solving the Problems at hand Trust in the Leader Group

(2) *Qinghe Y community* reconstruction in Beijing

In the case of *QingheY community*, it is less clear than in the case of *Sungmisan community* in Seoul how to grasp the push factors because community reconstruction was not driven by bottom-up energies. Many issues and problems originating from the rapid growth of Beijing metropolitan city are latent or become only implicitly expressed. Of course, some issues like the migrant workers' complaints have been broken out demanding a new framework of social governance. But many issues become interlocked behind the surface. Granted that, however, two push factors can be identified. The first is the lack of common space within neighborhood community in which the residents can meet each other freely, exchange views, and get services and consultations they need. The second is related to the negative consequences of the top-down way of decision making and administration in China.

As for the pull factors, we can name the driving energy from NQE project team who introduced the election system, institutionalized village council, held meetings, and helped the residents find ways to reflect the will of the residents. Thus the people elected by the local referendum, which is part of the NQE's main project, formed a *Resident Council* and played an active role in carrying out social governance at the level of neighborhood community. The residents' demands were decided through meetings and started to be implemented. This means that NQE provided the opportunity for residents to actively participate during the process of community reconstruction. From this we should note that it wasn't that the residents didn't have any

demands for change, but it was the NQE team who opened the pathway to express such demands.

Through the redevelopment of the delta, the residents experienced their opinions being presented, discussed, and practiced during the decision-making process. This can be viewed as relocating the residents' roles in a way different from the past. This made the residents feel a sense of accomplishment. In this context, confidence and self-esteem from community movement capacity can be seen as another driving force of the *Y community* reconstruction.

Table 2. The Push and Pull factors behind the *Y community* reconstruction

Push Factor	Dissatisfaction with the top-down way of decision making The lack of common space for the residents
Pull Factor	The energy from NQE project team

The Role of the Leadership and Interaction with the Residents


(1) *Sungmisan* Community Reconstruction in Seoul

It has been well known that *Sungmisan* community reconstruction was led by the group often called as '386 generation' in Korea who referred to the college students during the 1980s. They display distinctive characteristics associated with the educated young middle class who were deeply engaged in democratization movement and reform initiatives during the 1980s. They show more progressive than conservative political orientations. At the same time, while they were college students, they supported the value of living together defending the rights of the workers and the urban poor discriminated against in the process of rapid economic development. Thus they were against authoritarianism in support for political democracy and committed themselves to the welfare of the grassroots popular people. The college students that time were seen as the likely members of the middle class in the near future after graduation. Yet there were quite unique in that they openly expressed their debt to the poor for the reason that their success had been made possible at the sacrifices of poor people structurally. Consequently, they often involved themselves in community service in various places like the rural area, urban poor district as well as industrial sectors. Of these two contrasting orientations the latter provides abundant energy for *Sungmisan* community reconstruction movement in Seoul.

For instance, according to the most recent 2017 survey study over the graduates from Seoul National University during the 1980s, the politicized group with no interest in community service (group C) occupies 44.6 percentages while the group actively involved in community service with no interest in political activities (group B) occupies 11.5 percentages. The group who share both orientations (group A) is about 24.2 percentages. The group D is interested in neither politics nor community service. As to the question how the group difference in terms

of value orientation affects their views of minority groups, such as the disabled persons, foreign worker, AIDS patient, homosexual, and the North-Korean defectors, as Figure 2 shows, group C is most inclusive, followed by group A. Contrastingly, the politicized Group C is the least inclusive.

Figure 2. Inclusive Attitude toward Minority Groups



In this context, we can say that the members of group B, together with the members of group A, have led *Sungmisan* reconstruction movement from the beginning. The interview with P shows this clearly.

“(Who were the parents that settled co-parenting in the early days of the *Sungmisan* community?) ... I would say it was the 386 generation. They were the students who protested during the 1980s, then got married, gave birth, and worried about their children's education; eventually they started co-parenting. They were a political generation and I would say a little bit more awake ...”

The “386 generation” refers to those who were born in the 1960s and participated in the democratization movement while they were college students during the 1980s. Furthermore, they tend to be more politically and ideologically progressive than the previous generations.⁵ As they became parents with children, however, they became sensitive to such issues of life politics as education, childcare, and urban ecological environments, etc. Some of the 386 generation, who used to live in Seoul and its vicinities, went down to the provinces and led the local community movements. However, they had to learn how to adjust themselves to the

⁵ 21st pop culture terminology dictionary <https://www.krm.or.kr/krmnts/link.html?dbGubun=FRBR&metaDataId=4b76f6dd220ff5ee01223a5bc6e90a3f>

environments of local community. Some were more successful than others. Those with strong political orientation, like group A, particularly group C were often criticized like “they are still activists only, not residents”.

However, the members of the 386 generation of the *Sungmisan* co-parenting movement, group B plus group A, were quite different. In fact, most of the members of the “Co-parenting Research Society” were women in their thirties, with occupation such as college lecturers, newspaper reporters, broadcasting station writers, and publishing staff (We Seong-nam et al., 2012). The co-parenting movement was made with the consent of all the participating couples, but most of those who participated and led the meetings were women who were more interested in child education. In other words, the early stage of *Sungmisan community* was formed by the active participation of women. This characteristic is similar to that of women’s prominent role in resident cooperative activities. Many of the initial members of the *Sungmisan community* shared their memory of student demonstration while nurturing their moral energy for a healthy and flourishing community life. In this sense they represent the “people-based community-oriented 386 generation”.⁶ The following quotation is an example.

I was an activist when I was in the college. I was sentenced to one year and half in prison for soliciting a demonstration in the university in 1983 and came out in 1984.....Since then I was involved in various mass activities. Through these activities, I realized that movement is also a “life”. Whether it is a student movement, labor movement, or social movement, whatever it is, everybody has a taste, has likes and dislikes, and an aptitude. For me I was best fit for the mask dance activities. Through this I conjecture that I am best fit to breathe among the people and together with people. Probably that might have been the root of my long life at *Sungmisan*. (Yoo, 2010: 32-34)

The people-based community orientation of the *Sungmisan* 386 generation probably was one of the key reasons why the leader group was successful in transforming the daily experience of dissatisfaction into a social activity and solving the fundamental problem by mobilizing the residents. The ordinary residents participated in the community activities organized by this leader group as the daily-matter issues could easily draw their attention. If the leader group just shouted ideology, they would not have gotten the residents’ participation as they had. The food safety movement led more people to participate. The role of their leadership was maximized in the movement against the construction of the *Sungmisan* Mountain reservoir. In particular, the two types of role deserve careful attention.

⁶ A recent study by Professor Han Sang-jin on these groups routed to the 386 generation provides a clearer definition of them. Professor Han named these groups the “service-oriented 386 generation”, and the “politicized 386 generation”. According to Professor Han, the “386 generation in the public” are non-political, pragmatic, and are more life-oriented than the “politicized 386 generation” (Han, 2017). And the fact that the *Sungmisan community* started with daily issue such as co-parenting, supports Professor Han’s argument. And the following resident cooperative movement was able to get residents’ support as it responded the residents’ demand for safe food. At the same time, the 386 generations of the *Sungmisan community* took a step further to learn and promote eco-environment, and fair trade network for safe food supply. This can be attributed to the political sensitivity that they were exposed of being a 386 generation. We were able to understand that although the beginning of this community started with a daily life issue, it was their attitude of life which they have learned from living in Korean society that has eventually influenced them to thrive for the deeper meaning and the practical resolution of the fundamental problems.

First, the leader group led the residents to experience an organizational power. To be sure, the residents were worried about the destruction of *Sungmisan* Mountain, their regional asset. But the leader group played an active role in mobilizing and organizing a movement to prevent the construction of the reservoir. Thereby they have provided a window for residents to voice their opinions on local issues of the community. Furthermore, they organized public hearings, publicity campaign, and cultural festivals for the success of the movement.

Second, the leader group contributed significantly to raising the identity and self-pride of the residents as members of community through the shared experience of common activities. For some, this was not just a simple anti-construction movement, but also an ecological and communal movement. And in this process, a virtuous circle was formed, which helped some residents to become the key members of the movement.

“There was an expert among the residents who were opposing the development. He did personal studies on the matters and then came to the hearing to professionally argue about the project. When he challenged “it is not good to build the reservoir here as planned; the project doesn’t have to be as planned, right?” the Mapo District Office said ‘Yes, it is true’. So he became the star among us...” (Interview with J, An Active Participant of *Sungmisan* community)

The *Sungmisan* community was first formed through the co-parenting movement of the residents. When they started communicating with each other, the *Mapo Durae cooperative* functioned well. However, the scope of communication was still limited to those who use the cooperative. The real interaction between the *Sungmisan* community residents and the leader group began from the anti-reservoir construction movement. Various options of communication were used including signing petition campaign, publicity campaign, cultural festivals, and public hearings. The activities were necessary in order for the leader groups to mobilize the residents. In particular, a series of physical clashes caused by unexpected logging without the agreement of residents became a decisive moment for the community unity. As a result, more than 600 residents participated in the tree planting event for restoration after the surprise logging (Wui et al., 2012: 62). In this process, leader group was able to get the support and response of many residents, and recruit residents who were wanting to be deeply engage and to actively participate. In other words, the leader group obtained sympathy of the residents successfully by using the local agenda that is closely related to the residents’ life.

The interaction between the leader group and the residents were democratic. They practice dialogue in a way respecting each individual’s voluntariness. They do not force any one for the collective unity. They are very “communal” in cooperation, but they are also very “individualistic” in respecting the voluntariness of the individual. This is an interaction based on trust and respecting each individual choice.

In this sense *Sungmisan* neighborhood community is fitted to the age of individualization and can be called an “individualized community”. This respect of individuals is found in the process

of decision making. “They never impose or force one’s own opinion to other people” (Wui, 2011: 56). They do not follow the majority rule which they think is a very violent way of enforcing the position of the majority, but try to talk it out until everybody understands or agrees (Wui, 2011: 56). Of course, this process takes a longer time, but they think it is eventually a better way of leading to the consensus. In this sense it can be called an “individualized community.” (Shim, 2017)

(2) *Qinghe* Y Community Reconstruction in Beijing

In the case of *Qinghe* experiment of neighborhood community reconstruction as an example of social governance, it is necessary to draw attention to the role of sociology professors and researchers at Tsinghua University who not only observed and studied this experiment but actually carried out an ‘intervention-based community experiment. They played the crucial role of designing and implementing a model of social governance, thus they in fact led the experiment as publicly engaged sociologists. An interesting fact is that this is not the first time. The active model of intervention can be traced back to the period from 1920s to 1940s when Tsinghua University was a center of sociological research and many prominent sociologists were deeply engaged in academic field researches of rural reconstruction and the advocacy role of social reform as well. Yan Ming, an expert of the history of Chinese sociology before the communist party took over China, describes these tendencies exceedingly well.

Regardless of the division among themselves concerning theoretical orientation and methodology, sociologists in China shared a strong commitment to social reform. In fact, to them, social reform justified the existence and stimulated the growth of the discipline. Thus, besides publishing their research, almost all of the leading Chinese sociologists played extensive roles in social activism. Many assumed administrative or advisory positions in the government relevant to their specialty, and occasionally some were invited to lecture to officials, thereby influencing policymaking at the top. Others were deeply engaged in the Rural Reconstruction and Mass Education movements, thereby promoting social reform from the bottom

A clear example was the activities of Wu Jingchao (1901-68) who was a student of Robert Park and served as professor at Tsinghua University. He also served as secretary of the prime minister in the 1930s and “plotted a detailed analysis on the combination of economic planning and market mechanism which he called the ‘new economy’ or the ‘New Way.’” Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005), Wu Wenzao (1901-1985), and Liang Shuming can also serve as a good model of public sociology with dedication for social reform and particularly rural reconstruction at the time.

Originating from this distinctive tradition of Chinese sociology, department of sociology at Tsinghua University exhibits two contrasting orientations. One is the type of academic engagement politically oriented toward a radical change by defending the rights of the working class, particularly the full citizenship of the urban migrant workers. The main figures seeking this model of academic intervention with practical intent are Shen Yuan, Sun Liping, and Guo Yuhua who have attempted to combine a critical social theory and the research on ‘the real

problems of Chinese society” such as urban migrant workers and disintegration of communities. Sun conducted the research on the transition from the work unit system to the reconstruction of community with the aim at showing how a total society becomes a post-total society. Shen is more revealing. He distinguished two types of sociological intervention, strong and weak. The sociological mission for him is “to help resist [against] the pressure from the state and the market, on the one hand, and assist society to emerge and grow, on the other.” They have developed this practical intent explicitly, representing a radical than moderate confrontation with the problems China faces today.

Equally owing much to this tradition of academic engagement, another group has also emerged from Tsinghua University with Li Qiang as leader. Their orientation is more pragmatic than political and thus requires extensive empirical researches to find out the concrete problems and solutions as well which can be practically valuable. A number of young researchers working closely with Li are concerned with the problems of urban transformation, risks of various kinds which result from the rapid process of economic modernization, social inequalities embedded into the class structure of Chinese society. Together with a radical approach outlined above, they represent another significant stream of Tsinghua University today, that is, a reform-oriented pragmatic approach to the main problems China faces in this age of fundamental change.

Seen in this way, NQE project team is made up of intellectuals and experts who are committed to transmitting their knowledge to the grassroots people in order to create the space for mutual dialogue and practical learning. In the tradition of China, the intellectuals frequently took the role to enlighten and lead the general public (焦璐, 2008). As a matter of facts, the *Qinghe* project team organized the direct elections in the *Y community* and helped to produce a self-governing organization called the *Resident Council* to strengthen the lacking power of the residents as part of community. The NQE project team was in charge of educating the members of this council, so that they could play a role as the residents' self-governing organizations. Although they were elected by the residents, most of them, in fact, came from the previous group of leaders like community representatives or resident representatives. But they were not prepared how to speak at the meeting of Resident Council. The NQE project team provided the needed manuals, education, and instruction about how to evaluate their own performance.

The NQE project team's success could be traced to their endeavor and enthusiasm which made the residents to trust them. The team motivated residents to participate in the community reconstruction processes in the first place. When the project was getting started in 2014, Chinese government highlighted nationally about the significance of community governance. Soon after, numerous researches began to be produced in the academic world. Particularly, theoretical research was getting heat at this moment and the field researches were conducted in various parts of China. And the *Qinghe Y community* became a model of sociological intervention by experts. As the experiment progressed, the project team under the leadership of Li showed more and more enthusiasm and dedication. The interviewees of T and M of the project team mentioned that their main goal was to strengthen self-sufficiency of the residents in the community governance by strengthening residents' self-consciousness and their

voluntary participation.

However, social governance experiment found in *Qinghe Y* community was not smooth all the time, as revealed by construction delay. One of the project members, T who came to the *Y community* office almost every day, responded to the interview with a very cautious attitude, especially when regarding government-related issues. She said the contents she communicated with the government could not be shared to even her own project team. She seemed to very cautiousl and worried that this experiment may be portrayed as a place or an opportunity where the residents complain about the government. She told: *“I cannot tell you much (about why there were so many delays even after the confirmation of the design plan). This is the matter of how I behave towards them (the upper government). There are things that I cannot tell to the government and even to my own project team. And because of this, I cannot tell you much more about this issue any more.”* This attitude resonates well with another observation from M, a member of Residents’ Council.

“(The reason for the construction delay) is usually because of administrative process. And some of the government officials did not clearly understood the NQE...They didn’t really support the NQE, instead they seemed to worry. And that is why the administrative process was delayed even more... The related official never said he is opposed to our plan, but for some reason the plan was continually delayed...When he left this summer and a new official came, the construction began.....One thing for sure is that some of the government officials did not agree with the development (of delta) which led the delay of development in this community. I don’t know how they (project team) are communicating with the upper government. (The member of project team) T is in charge of the communication with the government. She went through so many difficulties while communicating with the government.

It is clear that the residents of *Qinghe Y community* in Beijing remained relatively passive compared to the residents of *Sungmisan* community in Seoul. In the case of the delta redevelopment, the residents easily accepted the higher government’s decision to delay construction. The entailing attitude was something like “there is nothing we can do”. As a NOE project team member, T, reveals:

“The residents asked me (about the construction being delayed). They always asked in the Residents’ Council meeting...They asked again and again... And I explained the situation at the meeting... However, if someone asked whether there was a loud or radical action about the delay or the process of the project, I would answer that it has never happened.”

The experience of *Qinghe Y* community reconstruction was initiated by the expert group of sociologists, not by the residents. For this reason, the residents remained relatively passive. However, this does not mean that they had no complaint or demand for change. The passive attitude means just that the residents were not familiar with being the agent of community governance and has not yet adapted to the idea of expressing and carrying out their will through regular meetings and discussions. This passive attitude began to change with the efforts of NQE team. The following interviews indicate that there have been continuing demand and

suggestions for improving the environment. And these untold demands made the residents to actively participate in the community reconstruction projects when the NQE started.

“...The first thing I did after becoming a Residents’ council member was the delta redevelopment. (To figure out what is the most urgent problem of our community), we continuously opened the meeting, and there was a big meeting that included not just the Villager council member but also the representatives of the party members and the apartment representatives... A few dozen people gathered in four groups. And then we shared the pen and wrote down what was the most urgent on the big paper. And the delta was the first thing that needed to be solved.” Interview with L, A Member of Residents’ Council

Trust in the NQE project team seemed to have played a major role in making people more actively participate the project. Initially, the residents did not expect much from the project team. They believed that the team came just for an academic purpose and recognized them as temporary visitors who would leave when the study was over. However, as times goes by, the community members began to trust the project team.

“(What was your impression of the Tsinghua students when they came in?) I did not see them positively... (When NQE started) They told me that they study sociology. So I thought they would stay here for a while and leave after the study is done... I thought since the students have to graduate, they would leave the community once they did some research or write some paper. But actually it was very good to have them here... They completely blended in.” Interview with L, A Member of Residents’ Council “(Member of NQE project team T) always gives us good opinions and good ideas. So we trust this project team very much.” - Interview with C, A Member of Residents’ Council

These changes were also found within the project team. Projects were originally planned for academic purposes; however, as the duration of experiment exceeded two years, the project went beyond the nature of formal academic experimentation. In particular, as shown in the previous interview, the devotion of the team brought the residents’ heart and formed a new relationship between the project team and the community. The residents fully trusted the project team and a bond were built between them. The NQE member M said, the project is no longer just an academic experiment, since the members of the team now have a stronger sense of contribution towards the community for its reconstruction. And this way of feeling is once again found in the answers of some of the residents and the team members about whether to continue the *Residents’ Council* or not.

Comparative Analysis

Having analyzed the push and pull factors leading to community construction in the two cases of *Sungmisan* and *Qinghe*, we will ask questions why the two community movements started at first and why they were successful? The first is a more fundamental question putting the problem in the historical and political context. The second is a more practical question to give

tips to community movement activists. We will compare the two cases in these two terms.

(1) The historical background

The development of the community movement in *Sungmisan* can be understood in the context of the development trajectory of the Korean society. Korea underwent rapid industrialization since the 1960's and reached an affluent society in the 1990's. However, this rapid, compressed development has brought about serious side-effects and Korea became a risk society. Various large-scale accidents and the financial crisis which led to economic crisis in the 1990's demonstrate this. The discourse of "risk society" was already prevalent in the 1990's ((Han, 2017)⁷. Not only these accidents and crisis, but also negative consequences of individualization such as family disorganization, the breakdown of neighborhood community, fragmented relationship, and loneliness and isolation also pervaded as a social phenomenon. Community reconstruction movement in Korea can be put in this context. *Sungmisan* community movement can be put in this context. In a risk society where individuals have to take responsibilities and they confront various social and everyday life problems, some try to solve the problem together in a community by themselves (Shim, 2017). In this sense it is more like a bottom-up model.

The situation is not so different in China. Since the establishment of New China in 1949, the basic organization of the management of urban areas in China has been "*danwei*" (Unit). In urban areas, *Units* were formed much like a business organization. The members of the community were able to participate in the production activities through the units and participate in the distribution of the public resources. In other words, the unit has a function similar to that of the government's minor organization, and played the role of a "substitutionary agency" of the state to communicate with the individuals (Jang Jing & Kim Dookyung, 2015). As these *Units* were dismantled along with the Chinese economic reform, and faced with new risks, the Chinese government was looking for a new Chinese social management organization to replace the *Unit* and to countermeasure the risks of a changing society. This was a region based community.

However, it was very difficult for the residents who had lived as "a part of unit" to suddenly become a "community member", organize communities, and to act as an agent of community governance. Such drastic change needs a long time and effort to settle down, and a lot of effort. In fact, the *Residents Committee*, which was built to reflect the will of the community, was not a place where the residents' self-governance was realized. Rather, it allowed the reveal of the practical limitations of the Residents committee since it functioned as a medium of presenting the decisions made by the government rather than functioning as the place where the residents can share their ideas and thoughts freely to form an autonomy (吴群刚, 孙志祥, 2011). So what if there is a guide to self-governance for people who are already familiar with top-down management? To answer this question, NQE was started. Thus it is more like a top-down model with expert intervention.

⁷ The special issue of Korea Journal Spring, 1998 "Korea, a Risk Society" is a good example.).

These attempts to reconstruct the community in Korea and China started from different historical and political backgrounds. However, we can find common ground between these two cases. That is, both of them were attempts to respond to the risks from the changing society. And the dissatisfaction, anxieties, and demands of the two communities could not be resolved within the existing governance organization. In the *Sungmisan community*, there were dissatisfaction with the existing childcare services, concerns about food safety, and worries with the destruction of ecology. On the same line, in the *Y community*, the suppression of the residents' autonomy was found. These, however, were problems that could not be solved by the existing governance structure. Thus community leaders and residents began to agonize about the ways to solve the problems, and community reconstruction was suggested as a new alternative.

(2) The role of the leader group

The community leader groups in the two cases have completely different characteristics. This is due to the different historical and political backgrounds in which community reconstruction took place. In the case of the *Sungmisan community*, the community was first formed by the 386 generation, and who joined to solve the everyday life problems together in the community. On the other hand, in the case of the *Y community*, the external elite groups came to the community for the goal of community reconstruction and served as resident leader group, playing a mediating role between the government and the residents.

Despite these differences, the leader groups in two communities, Seoul and Beijing, have a lot of similarities regarding their goals. One of them is cultivating community consciousness through strengthening the residential governance capacity of the community. And an interesting fact is that each of the two leader groups used a different tactic to accomplish the same goal. For the *Sungmisan community*, the 386 generation won the bargain with the government by persuading and combining with the residents. On the other hand, the project team in Beijing became the channel that connected the residents with the government. And this reveals the different perspectives towards government of these two leader groups as well as the cultural and regional difference of two cases. In a Chinese model, in which the government overwhelms the other governance agents, it can be said that the project team saw the relationship between the government and residents as the logic of "zero-sum", which means decrease in government power leads to strengthening the capacity of residential governance.

However, we can also find some common characteristics between the two. First, the leader group was successful in building trust with the residents, through enthusiasm, and hard work. Through this they could have played the role of representing and advocating the dissatisfaction, complaints, concerns, and demands for the community. Without trust, the leader group could not have solved the problems they faced. Second, the communication and decision making process was important to make the residents willing to participate and unite with the community identity. In the process of community reconstruction, residents went beyond the solving of the problems, but started to share community identity. In the case of the *Y community*, although residents' perception might not have gone to sharing the community identity, they

have reached to a point where residents felt unity and self-esteem. The community identity could have reached with the mutual trust between the residents and the group leaders through education, conferences, and participation. This shows that the community leader group played a catalyst role in community reconstruction, based on the continuous interaction between leader group and residents.

The above comparative analysis in the two cases of *Sungmisan* and *Qinghe* can be summarized as in table 3.

Table 3. Comparison of *Sungmisan* and *Qinghe* community

	<i>Sungmisan</i>	<i>Qinghe</i>
Historical Background	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Coming of a risk society and individualization *Problem of welfare service delivery due to the risk society *Problem of fragmented relationship due to individualization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Collapse of danwei system *Problem of welfare service delivery due to the collapse of <i>danwei</i> system *Problem of authoritarian government
Push factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Dissatisfaction with the existing childcare service *Concerns with the safety of food. *Worries about the destruction of <i>Sungmisan</i> mountain 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Suppression of Autonomy *Problems of the local environment, lack of common area
Pull factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Discovery of the Importance of <i>Sungmisan</i> Mountain *Confidence in Problem-Solving from Previous Experiences *Trust in the Leader Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Works of NQE *trust in the leader group
Characteristics of Leadership and interaction	Trust building Democratic communication and decision making process	Trust building Democratic participation

Conclusion

As the world change over time, the existing governance system no longer solves the concerns and complaints from the outside, or act as a social safety net. A real life example of such idea is found in both the case of Seoul and Beijing, as community reconstruction came up as an alternative solution for its reconstruction. Therefore, this study examined the subjects related to reconstruction of community in terms of behavior theory. For this purpose, we reviewed the background of why community reconstruction took place in two areas.

We then divided the factors regarding residential participation into the push and pull factor, and analyzed the reason behind such active engagement. And we found that although there is a certain degree of disparity between Seoul and Beijing, but there was similarity in the

unresolved demands in the existing governance system which made the residents of the two regions to feel dissatisfaction, anxiety and worries. This study analyzed these as the push factors which worked as a driving force. And the factors which made the residents participate in community activities, the trust in the leader, discovery of the importance of the mountain, e.g., we analyzed these as the pull factors. As a result, the community consciousness and self-esteem was formed, and the community bond became even stronger.

The role of group leaders greatly influenced the residents' perception of community reconstruction from "for what" to "in order to". The group leaders were those who gathered the residents as a whole in order to perform the real power during the process of community reconstruction. The group leader of *Sungmisan community* was the 386 generation, and the NQE project team consisting of Tsinghua University's academic experts was group leader of the *Qinghe Y community*. The residents were interacting with the group leaders in various ways, and by that, participated in the community reconstruction process. This is also coherent with the existing study of the explanation of the existence of devoting leaders in a successful communities (Cha Chulwuk et al., 2011, Jun Daewuk et al., 2012). In the case of *Sungmisan community*, we have seen the virtuous cycle of the devotion and trustworthiness of the leader groups transforming the ordinary residents into another group leaders. And this kind of cycle is the driving force behind continuous community reconstruction. On the other hand, the *Qinghe Y community* had the expert groups leading the community reconstruction. And the interaction between the residents of *Y community* and the project team, based on mutual trust, successfully introduced the community reconstruction. However, the expert group should consider having the residents to lead their own community for the sake of long-term sustainable community reconstruction.

Appendix I In-depth Interviewee in South Korea and China

Location and Time	Interviewee
Seoul, South Korea 2016.10 -2017.05	P : Resident of <i>Sungmisan community</i>
	N : Resident of <i>Sungmisan community</i> (now) Sungsan 1 dong residents' association
	W : Active participant of <i>Sungmisan</i> protection campaign (now) Secretary to the Seou Mayor for Politic Affairs
	S : Active participant of <i>Sungmisan</i> protection campaign (now) Member of Seoul Social Cooperation Innovation Committee
	J : Active participant of <i>Sungmisan</i> protection campaign The president of NGO called "People's House" in Mapo District
	G : Public servant at Sungsan 1 Dong Community Service Center (Email Interview)
	Z : Chairman of Residents Committee at <i>Y Community</i>
Beijing, China 2016.10 -2017.05	L : The Members of the Villager Council of <i>Y Community</i>
	C : The Members of the Villager Council of <i>Y Community</i>
	X : Social worker at <i>Y Community</i>
	M : NQE Project team member
	T : NQE Project team member

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The End of Modernism and the Deconstruction of the Social Forms of Life - Death and Birth of Family and Local Community in Setagaya, Tokyo-

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Abstract

Network society is a metaphor of post-industrial society. But it is also a methodology (network analysis) for sociology of postindustrial society (Cavanagh Allison 2007). Of course, it is conceptualized as network society of global level. It is useful and important to use network as metaphor, methodology and global order. But this is a kind of isomorphism. Therefore a critical problem remains. It is necessary to explain and understand how to transfer network from metaphor to methodology and from methodology to global order.

We have had several attempts to explain these transfers. One of them is Allison Cavanagh's. But few attempt can reach the groundless ground (Lash Scott 1999) of human being. This paper is an attempt of explaining and understanding these transfers from groundless ground of sociology and human being.

This paper starts by trying to investigate these transfers by using Talcott Parsons' general theory of action. His theory is the best theory of relatively stable industrial society. It also tell us points and range of our discussion.

Next, we try to understand change from industrial society to information society. Information society is networked society from individual to global mainly as a result of interface of science-technological revolution with society. The network of the social becomes global social network. Therefore, this paper has to investigate what is spirit or ethics of informationalism in informational capitalism in Silicon Valley.

But this is one sided understanding of information society. We have to examine another side of information society. Namely we have to pay much more attention to the technological forms of life. Scott Lash (2002) thinks information as technological forms of life. In information society, everything including human being works by a logic of operationality rather than meaning. This is a big challenge to human being as organic body with organ.

We are in ambivalent situation now. We cannot lose both meaning which comes from relations of organs and science-technology. In the last part of this paper, we discuss about how to solve this ambivalence. The first attempt is ecology of mind, cybernetic approach. But this was not final approach. The paper claims, following Albert Melucci, investigation of inner planet which consists of biological, emotional, and cognitive structure.

Key words: individualization, the end of modernism, death and birth of family and community ontological turn, singularity, social capital, community power

1. Introduction

As many researchers have acknowledged, when asked to assign a characteristic to sociology as a discipline, a significant number of sociologists answer “praise for community.” Since its inception, sociology has recognized community as the foundation for solidarity, trust, and autonomy. Sociology has also demonstrated that community has been supplanted by society throughout the modernization process. It cannot be denied, however, that a strong desire for a community remains in the background, even in the modern age. There is no doubt that the relationship between community and society is like a thick red thread that weaves throughout sociology.

In the late-modern, post-modern, and globalization eras, people began to explore the concept of community once again. As a result of the globalization-triggered crisis faced by modern states, which has enabled the “loss of society” that is a consequence of modernization, attention is once again focused on the community that once provided solidarity, trust, and autonomy. This stands to reason. But, due to the departure from the traditional culture, customs, morality, and associative principles of community, that which is sought cannot be the old, traditional form of community. The new form of community should be formed by global processes, such as technology, knowledge, images, and the like. This being the case, communication in the new form of community is conceptual and non-verbal, which makes it impossible to fulfill the role that community once played. Moreover, this new theory of community fails to address the theory of the state. This is due, in part, to the unknown impacts of globalization on the modern state and questions surrounding the creation of a political society.

In short, a new theory of community needs both context and meaning in present times (G. Delanty, 2000, 2003). This thesis is an attempt to examine the various theories of community presented today and to provide them with meaning and context.

2. Community of Consensus

In sociology and other fields, when considering community problems, it is common to investigate examples found in regional communities or urban communities. In this paper, however, we have selected the university community, often regarded as a model for regional and national communities, as the subject of consideration. With regards to this issue of university community Bill Readings, a Canadian English literature scholar, has conducted a basic inquiry. Using Readings’ inquiry as a base, we have developed our discussion.

J. G. Fichte, F. Schelling, F. Schleiermacher, and K. W. Humboldt developed the concept of the university community theory, which forms the foundation of the modern German university. Readings defines the university community as the “community of consensus.” He chose this definition because the university community is formed from pure social ties manifested through the pursuit of ideas without concern for private interest. Although it was not a model for the

local, urban, or national community, the university community envisaged in this way was actually considered to potentially be a model of community as a whole.

Thus, in modernity (a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilization, according to Anthony Giddens), the university was a model for social ties linking individuals that have a common relationship with the nation state. The essence of this community can be seen in I. Kant's judgment and Fichte's communication and transparency, which enables ties between students and lecturers. Community, as defined in modernity, was based on individual's autonomous decision to communicate with each other as the subjects of the state, that is, as civilians (Bill Readings, 1995, pp. 180-183).

Furthermore, characteristics of "community based on consensus" can be broadly divided into the following two categories: first, the freedom of a subject to participate in a community when the autonomy of a subject is conditioned by the fact that the subject is subordinate to the state. In other words, all interactions are mediated by the abstract concept of the state. Secondly, the ground level of consensus, which is the guiding principle of the modern community, is such that the characteristics of the social ties are subject to rational discussion and are guaranteed by agreement between subjects.

However, it goes without saying that the discussions, disputes and agreements that were necessary for modern communities were absent and inadequate in reality.

3. Singularity and Community of Dissensus

In the post-modern era, many writers have criticized the theory of a "community based on consensus." Such individuals include J. Derrida and J.F. Lyotard (J.F. Lyotard, 1984). They fundamentally objected to the premise of community theory. That is, they argued that communication is not transparent and that communities are not strengthened by or founded on a common cultural identity.

J-L Nancy's theory of "La Communauté désœuvrée" (The Inoperative Community) (J-L. Nancy, 1983) was also symbolic. Therein, he made the criticism that "[c]ommunities inevitably collapse on their own due to the self-assertion of their members and conflict among members who try regulate the community. The members of the community experience it as an obstacle to their direction" (Nancy).

In this way, many philosophers have stated that "community is the experience of losing community." As a result, community theory has naturally undergone fundamental reexamination of the basic concepts and the epistemology that has supported the discussion of community, such as individuals, subjects, communication, and social ties. The main idea that has arisen from this reexamination is that community is not created by individual subjects, but rather, it is created by "singularity" (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 185-193).

The concept of “singularity” has been used by G. Deleuze (Gilles Deleuze, 1968), F. Guattari (Felix Guattari, 1996), Derrida, Lyotard, Jean-Luc Nancy, A. Badiou (Alain Badiou, 2004), and K. Karatani (Kojin Karatani, 1984). Singularity is now used in sociology in France and the UK and getting recognition in social science. This concept assumes that “there is no longer a subject-position to function as a site of consciousness synthesis of sense-impression” (Bill readings, 1996, p.115) (Descartes's “I think, therefore I am”; the thinking individual being the subject; the subject as a self-awareness that considers itself in contemplation). This is already impossible, and the assumption of a universal recognition, which is not marked by ethnicity, gender, or class, is an error that tries to treat existence in a new form.

The term “Singularity” now has a variety of meanings and methods of use, but Deleuze and Guattari use it in the sense of “capacity to consider the transversal emergence of entities as the result of a relation of forces.” They called the process of “response to and redirecting of standardized, entrenched habits towards new, different modes of living” as singularization (Birgit Mara Kaiser, p. 157). What is produced is not a single individual or a unique object. It is a “singular” that resembles nothing else and is not pre-determined.

Thus, the concept of “singularity” arose to question the category of subjects and ascertain individuals in different ways. In other words, “singularity” is a concept that recognizes the individual, not as the subject, but as having fundamental heterogeneity. Singularity does not assume what individuals share with one another beforehand, but rather, it attempts to grasp “agglomeration of matter, history and experience, whatever, you just are not someone else” (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 115). Therefore, singularity can be said to be “minimal node of specificity” (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 116), neither sharing independence by communication nor being self-aware. It cannot be said that it is “free radical” in and of itself. It may become the subject, but it has so far been homogenized in popular culture and can now only become the subject for the first time (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 116).

If community is perceived using the concept of singularity, community cannot assume subjects, self-awareness, shared independence, transparent communication, or the sharing of cultural identity. Therefore, negotiation of individuality, conflict, confrontation, and miscommunication is perceived, and community can only be perceived as a minimal knot of individuality. Readings calls this community the “community of dissensus” in contrast with “community of consensus.”

However, the concept of “singularity” as explained above risks inviting the misunderstanding that it is only for denial of understanding and analysis on the premise of subjectivity or that singularity is a negative concept that does not have positive and autonomous function. In order to avoid this misunderstanding, it is necessary to emphasize the concept of “singularity” is “captured in a network of obligations that individual cannot master” (Bill Readings, 1996, p.185), and that the idea of “a network of obligations is not entirely available to subjective consciousness.” According to this idea, a social tie is considered not to be a property of a

subject made by the subject, but rather, a social tie is something constantly new that transcends the individual and is created by complex social relationships, including the process of “singularization,” negotiation, and conflict.

In short, according to this idea, the social ties in today's community go beyond the awareness of the modern rationalist subject, and because there is no consciousness of it, individuals cannot overcome the liabilities, responsibilities, and subordination they experience in an appropriate manner to be completely released and become free. For example, J. Agamben states that the community of today's “whatever-singularity” (J. Agamben, 1990, p. 8, 27-33) is a “temporary” community that has been accumulated according to the conditions of things, although it has no commonality. The human subject is no longer a unique reference point; rather, it is believed that the condition of things has become that.

To summarize thus far, there are two contrasting communities according to Readings. “Community of consensus” is intended to create social ties through the rational communication of human subjects. It is intended to create a self-justifying, autonomous society using unified concepts of nation and identity. On the other hand, “community of dissensus” casts doubt on the social ties itself and aims for a society tolerant of differences without resorting to the unified concepts of nation and identity.

4. The University as a [community of dissensus]

Next, I would like to discuss the university as a representation of a community of dissensus in order to clarify the characteristics of such a community, discuss problems typical of such a community, and deepen the understanding of community of dissensus.

Given (1) Kant's modern university theory, whereby a university is founded on communication based on reason and, at the same time, protected by the state because it provides human resources to the state, which creates conflict between the two, and (2) Heidegger's university theory, and (3) the presentation of an alternative to such a communicative and modern university while learning from Derrida's unique modern university theory, which discusses the problems of modern universities, Readings questions whether the alternative to modern, communication based university is a world of an “inability to speak to one another” (Lyotard), whether it is a “world of atomistic subjects who clash by night in absolute ignorance of each other”(Bill Readings, 1996, p.185). This is not the case. Questioning the alternative to modern communication based university today should frame the issue as a new social tie that differs from social ties, such as kinship, land, control, and contracts.

Universities do not comprise subjects. Rather, they comprise “singularities.” The university has conditions placed on it by various systems and, at the same time, is primarily composed of teachers and students. The members of the university are always beside other members, pledging to tell the truth and constantly inquiring into the relationship between the “inside” and

“outside” of the university. In addition, the university must be a “university without condition” (Jacques Derrida, 2001, p.13), characterized as “a venue where nothing can escape reconsideration.” Furthermore, while modern universities have tried to achieve a unified purpose, such as the “production of a universal subject of history, to the cultural realization of an essential human nature” (Bill Readings, 1996, p.185), they must be considered as “communities with loose objectives.” Thus, universities comprise “singularities.” A “singularity” cannot be conscious of all its liabilities. In other words, it is not possible for everyone to be an autonomous free model individual. A relationship in which the lecturer is always the speaker and students are unilaterally taught as listeners is not possible. An interpersonal or social relationship in which teachers and students are equal peers must be considered. The social ties in the university are not a property of the subject and must be fundamentally reconsidered.

The social ties formed and derived from “singularity” and “singularization” are generally perceived to be diluted, temporary, or fragmented. However, according to Readings, singularization may conversely be perceived to “deepen” social ties. Because forming agreements and giving answers to the questions surrounding social ties leads to loss of difference, heterogeneity, and diversity, maintaining the questions surrounding social ties without reaching consensus results in continuing to question social ties without “creating a dominant power or authority in an authoritarian manner” (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 187). According to this way of thinking, the community comprises “uncertain experiences that exist together” (Bill Readings, 1996, p.188), and it is not determined or shut in by any authority. These experiences may bring about historically new social ties. Alternatively, extending these arguments may be related to creating another rationality (Scott Las, 1999) that is different from the objective rationality that has been dominant thus far.

5.

Network society is a metaphor of post -industrial society. But it is also a methodology (network analysis) for sociology of postindustrial society (Cavanagh Allison, 2007). Of course, it is conceptualized as network society of global level. It is useful and important to use network as metaphor, methodology and global order. But this is a kind of isomorphism. Therefore a critical problem remains. It is necessary to explain and understand how to transfer network from metaphor to methodology and from methodology to global order.

We have had several attempts to explain these transfers. One of them is Allison Cavanagh’s. But few attempt can reach the groundless ground (Lash Scott 1999) of human being. This paper is an attempt of explaining and understanding these transfers from groundless ground of sociology and human being. This paper is trying to investigate these transfers by using Talcott Parsons’ general theory of action.

6.

The ground of T. Parsons’ action in his theory is behavioral organism. Components of action

are behavioral organism, personality, culture and the social. Parsons' behavioral organism inherited E. Durkheim's organism "in which all parts serve a function" (Cavanagh Allison 2007: 25). This is a metaphor of society as a body. According to Parsons (Parsons Talcott 1966: 6-7), "the primary structural reference" is the "species-type". It works through genetic constitution" of individual organisms. The environmental factors can be divided into two categories. The first one is non-hereditary elements of the physical organism. The second one is learned elements of behavioral systems. By active interaction of organism with environment, individuals and groups can develop learned cultural behavioral systems which Parsons calls his personality.

Parsons clearly takes the position of positivism. Parsons thinks that "as humans, we know the physical world only through the organism. Our minds have no direct experience of an external physical object unless we perceive it *through* physical processes and the brain 'processes' information about it" (Parsons Talcott 1966: 8). His position is natural, reasonable and common one in positivistic tradition. But if we pay attention to a different important tradition and understanding of organism, his position is problematic. One of the most important challenges to his position is the one of vitalism or phenomenology.

Vitalism came from the tradition of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy, Lebens (life) philosophy, George Simmel's sociology and phenomenology. One of the most important understandings of vitalism is that organism has its own source of energy and "no need to be acted from without" (Lash Scott 2010: 6). Therefore organism or life is not mechanical but vital and dynamic for vitalism. As there is no sharp, boundary between organism and physical environment, smooth interface between organism and technology will be developed.

7.

Parsons' theory of action departs from conception of the differentiation of action systems. His general theory of action means that "behavior tends to have four distinct, symbolically organized emphases: (1) a search for psychic satisfactions, (2) an interest in decoding symbolic meanings, (3) a need to adapt to the physical organic environment, and (4) an attempt to relate to other member of human species" (Parsons Talcott 1977: 4). He gives them the label, personality system, cultural system, behavioral organism and social organism and social system. He maintains that each system cannot exist without the others. He also thinks that below action there is physical-organic environment and above action there is "ultimate reality"-Max Weber's problem of meaning. He regards social evolution as differentiating process of 4 systems from one another. But his main interest is in differentiating process within societies (the most nearly self-sufficient type of social system vis-à-vis their environment). This process consists of more clearly differentiated pattern maintenance system (separation of family from economic and political participation), polity, economy and societal community (greater specialization of an integrative subsystem). He defines a society again as "a special type of social system, one characterized by the highest level of *self-sufficiency* in relation to its environment" (Talcott parsons, 1977, p.6). The value, social system and the condition are cybernetic hierarchically ordered.

We can clearly understand that a key of his theory is function of family. Local community It is

located in the center and linked with economy, polity, societal community. When family and local community closely related with family are in crisis, his theory is also in a danger of destruction.

8.

It is necessary for us to compare Parsons' theory of social system as the process of social interaction with Radcliffe-Brown and his followers' social network approach. In his study of social structure, Radcliffe-Brown concerned "the set of actually existing relations, at a given moment of time, which link together certain human being" (Radcliff-Brown 1940: 224). He thinks that it is necessary and essential for a science to analyze observable, general and constant things. That is a reason why he concerns the forms of the social, the networks of connections and the structure of networks. In this sense, he is a father of network approach as methodologies.

Radcliffe-Brown's attempt of concerning the forms separated from the content was a breakthrough of network approach. His successor like Siegfried Nadel described the structure mathematically. He also introduced the idea of role to the center stage in order to solve "the conceptual difficulties of identifying and separating out a society or social grouping as distinct from other entities within a similar locality" (Cavanagh Allison 2007: 27-28).

Comparison of Parsons and Radcliffe-Brown makes us clear that both have similar and different orientations. Parsons and Radcliffe-Brown belong to same theoretical tradition of functionalism. Both of them concern society as social system. But Radcliffe-Brown focuses on social networks of the social. Parsons defines a society as a self-sufficient special type of social system. The theory of Radcliffe-Brown is positivistic and formal. And Parsons' theory is a complex system theory which has to overcome the problem of order.

Radcliff-Brown's theory was succeeded in Manchester school of social network approach and Social network analysis was inherited and developed in the United States. In the process, "this involved a new revision of the core metaphor, from the structural network metaphor/ of the Manchester school to a more spatial, geographical metaphor (Cavanagh Allen 2007: 31). A leading theoretician was M. Granovetter. Now Bruno Latour's Actor-Network Theory which pays attention to the relationship between network and technology is becoming extremely influential in the age of internet.

But Parsons' theory is better equipped to explain transfer of network from metaphor to methodology and from methodology to global order.

9.

We are facing to the end of modernism and that we have to deal with unresolvable social issues such as deconstruction of the social forms of life (family and community), ecology, risk and so on. The end of modernism means that individualization or individuation in the process of rationalization reached the extreme point and that nuclear family and community as bases of social order have been broken down. But it is necessary for remaining functions of family and

community to be carried by different social groups. Thus the end of modernism means deconstruction of social forms of life, death and birth of family and community.

The end of modernism can be clearly seen in the global risk society and global network, information society. Nuclear family has been a basic institution of the modern society. But we have been seeing nuclear fission of nuclear family and the rise of new types of family like childless family, same sex family, stepfamily, single parent family, grandparent family, single family and so on. The number of nuclear family is only near 50 percent .today and still decreasing. According to a Japanese sociologist (Takatoshi Imada: 1996), we will be forced to choose the way of death of family or revival of family. The death of family means to externalize function of reproduction and socialization from family. The revival of family is to leave these functions to family and to explore new human relations not contaminated by instrumental social relations.. Probably we are going to choose the way of revival of family. It does not mean that we go back to the traditional forms of family. We will return to the origin of family which is caring for others. Namely it is a singularization of family.

10.

It is useful to return to Parsons and to explain more fully Parsons' conception of social system. As it was explained earlier, for Parsons, a social system is one of four aspects of human behavior, and a subsystem of society which has the highest self-sufficiency with respect to various environments.

Physical-organic environment "implies sufficient control over the economic-technological complex" (Parsons Talcott 1977: 7). By controlling over it, food and shelter can be obtained. By shaping personalities through the socialization process, all societies get a favorable personality environment. Personalities learn adequate motivation for participation, values and norms. Polity concerns with "selection, ordering, and attainment of collective goals". "The development of autonomous legal system" is the most important indicator of differentiation (Parsons Talcott 1966: 25) between societal community and polity. The symbolic environment of a society, cultural system includes "empirical knowledge, expressive symbol systems, religious ideas and practices that define the society's collective identity, and conceptions of the desirable (value)" (Parsons Talcott 1977: 8). Self-sufficiency with regard to the symbolic environment means that "institutions of the society are legitimated by the cultural system" (Parsons Talcott 1977: 8). A society has a better position to obtain legitimation than more limited social systems., because cultural elements are internalized in personalities in the process of socialization. The social environment of society includes all the envrioning social systems. Self-sufficiency of the social environment means that clear boundaries defining who is a member and who is not a member of the society exist and that stronger solidarity exists among members of the society than between members of the society and non-members of the society.

As previous introduction of Parsons' sociological theory of a society clearly shows that his sociological theory is a theory of an industrial society, So it is necessary to examine and reconstruct his sociological theory in order to be able to analyze radical transformation of a society and to transform his theory of industrial society to the theory of information society.

Following a new understanding of physical-organism, it is necessary to introduce new conceptualization of basic concepts like identity, power, community and cultural system. Parsons thinks the societal community as a core of a society. It is constituted both by a normative order and by statuses, rights, and obligations of membership. It must maintain the integrity of cultural orientation, • • • shared by its membership, as the basis of its societal identity” (Parsons Talcott 1966: 10). It also must meet “the conditional exigencies regarding the integration of member’s organisms” (Parsons Talcott 1966: 10-11). A reconstruction of Parsons’s will be not partial one, but a total and radical one.

11.

As W. Beck told us, risk society emerged as modernity self-referenced to modernity. Risk society as second modernity is a result of self-destruction of modernity. But we have to remember that risk society has the same horizon of time as difference. Time is the horizon on which “we are to come to encounter and understand the meaning of the beings” and “our singularity as human beings comes to have meaning for us” (Scott Lash: 2002, p.129).

We are entering into the age of after time. Time is becoming a dot and losing temporality as a result of science technological revolution. At the same time, the space of difference between inside and outside, death and life, same and other, and so on is fragmented and disappearing. Namely we are living in information network society. The network society comes after the risk society. creates a new order by linking so many things and by creating new walls and boundaries.

I started the following project in the latter half of 1980’s. the main problem is: How do science and technology interact to human being and society in Silicon Valley. As a result of it, what kind of society does emerge”. In order to provide an answer to these questions, I have been conducting a kind of anthropological research in Silicon Valley. My main theoretical framework was taken from Manuel Castells’s *The Rise of Network Society* (Castells Manuel 1986). By using Max Weber’s thesis in *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, he tried to understand what is Protestant Ethics and what is the Spirit of Capitalism in a contemporary society. He replaced the concept of the Spirit of Capitalism by the concept of the Spirit of Informationalism, because he thought a new mode of development was an informationalism mode of development. He found out main factors which made the third science-technology revolution, a new economy and a network society. They were business network, technological tools, global competition, state and network enterprise. According to him, “Weber’s writing is still operating as the dominant economic form”. “But while all these elements seem to account, together, for the cultural sustainment of renewed capitalism competition, they don’t seem to be specific enough to distinguish the new agent of such capitalist competition: the network enterprise” (Castells Manuel 1986: 214). Therefore he asks a question: what glues together these networks? His answer is cultural glues, a common cultural code made of many values and projects. It is a culture of “the ephemeral” and “each strategic decision” . He also calls this as the ethical foundation of the network enterprise and the spirit of capitalism. The network enterprise connected by the spirit of capitalism, to him, is the best representation of informational society.

I have been trying to find empirical and historical individuality of the spirit of informationalism by collecting various data of engineers working in information industry and interviewing with them. This research gave us slightly different conclusions of Castells's. I thought Protestant Ethics in contemporary society as engineer's desire of solving risks. Engineers in information industry were working consistently in order to solve various problems of the risk society. Their ethics was given by theology of suffering in contemporary society. I also concluded that spirit of informationalism is like Franz Kafka's "letters as a pray" or H. Bergson's "elan vital". But this spirit was overruled by the products of the spirit. Therefore instrumental rationality finally prevailed

12.

An English sociologist, Scott Lash analyzes information or information society from the perspective of "the technological forms of life" (Lash Scott 2002: 13-25). We understand the world through technological systems. We operate interfaces of humans and machines. We are combination of technological systems with organic systems. Without technological systems we cannot function well. We are a man-machine interface.

When life, form of life, social form of social life becomes technological, form of life becomes life "at-a distance". More importantly, form of life becomes "nature at-a-distance". S. Lash gives us an interesting example of "nature-at-a-distance" as follows. "The Human Genome Project and the various human DNA databases are nature at a distance. What was previously internal and proximal to the organism is stored in an external and distant database as genetic information". In technological forms of life, body which was relatively closed systems becomes open systems. Unless body is open, body cannot interface with technology. Body cannot make social body.

"When individual or social bodies open up, their organs are often externalized at a distance". Then what follows? S. Lash understands that technological form of life changes form of life, social form of social life it is flattened. It becomes non-linear. It becomes lifted.

The technological form of like is changing radically from the physical-organism, personality, politics, economy, societal community and cultural system. It is changing even the ultimate reality and theology. I cannot get into details of this change except his concept of power and politics. As the technological form of life is flattened, and non-linear and lifted out, "power works through less exploitation than exclusion". Intellectual property is the best example of a power in information society. Access to means of invention and means of production is the most important source of power. In the technological form of life, power is no longer pedagogical or narrative but performative. Nation works through performativity of information and communication rather than through ideology and reflexive argument.

In conclusion, according to S. Lash, the technological form of life means a shift from "the register of meaning to the register of operationality". Beings reproduce. Beings involve meaning. The social transmits meaning from one generation to the next generation. The symbolic has meaning. Ideology has meaning. Discourse has meaning. "The reproduction of the social and the symbolic are dependent on meaning". But what happens when the symbolic is in fragments? What happens by the big shift from meaning to operationality? The question

is not what does it mean but how does it work. In the end, human being and technology work the same logic of operationality.

13.

Even if technological forms of life become dominant in society, a human being cannot help being a body, an organic time and space, and language. Albert Melucci described reality which we are analyzing and facing today as follows.” Daily life is scored by marks of an unresolved tension between, on the one hand, the dynamic impulse to continuously create the new space and contents of experience, and, on the other hand, the need to observe the natural confines of experience itself” (Alberto Melucci 1996, p.2). We are living in tension between global field of social action and its physical boundary.

How to challenge to this unresolvable ambivalence, conflict, contradiction? According to Melucci, it is necessary for us to pay attention to the inner planet. The inner planet consists of “the biological, emotional and cognitive structure”. To do so is not for solving the problem, but for changing the way of we look at the things. The reason why ecology has become an issue is that environmental destructions are visible on all sides and that “profound change in our cultural and social perception of the reality in which we live in” (Albert Melucci, 1996, p.58). The ecological issue is “a systemic problem.” It reveals “the phenomenon of planetary interdependence and creates “new frontiers of human consciousness.” We must include in our field of observation “the purposes, the affects, and the fragility of the observer (Alberto Melucci, 1996, p.58).

As Alberto Melucci told us, ecological question is cultural dimension of human action. The ecological issue clearly shows that the key of survival is no longer the system of means based on purposive, instrumental rationality. We culturally construct our reality. Culture also has capacity to give meaning to objects and relations. The symbolic codes organize everyday life. It is an ability to alter the symbolic codes that produces effective action on things.

Alberto Melucci points out two more dimensions of ecological issue. The first one is individual dimension. That is, ecological issue affects individual qua individual.” It means that ecological issue affects individual “not as a member of a group, a class and a state” (Alberto Melucci, 1996, p.59). The second dimension is physiological dimension. When we face to ecological question, we immediately understand that “conflict is a physiological dimension of complex systems.” Therefore “Conflict cannot be eliminated but only managed and negotiated” ‘Alberto Melucci, 1996, p.60).

14.

What is a basic structure of question on our analysis of community and family today? After investigating various phenomena of revival of community today, G. Delanty gave us the following conclusion: “these new kinds of community---have not been able to substitute anything, other than aspiration for belonging, for place” (G. Delanty, 2003, 2010, p.158). Therefore, “whether community can establish a connection with place, or remain as an imagined condition” is an important question for community (reflexively organized social

network) for research. Our previous investigation leads us to accept his conclusion.

Our previous investigation also gives us an analytical focus of our community research. We cannot start from the concept of subject or individual. We better use the concept of singularity as “minimal node of specificity”, “agglomeration of matter, history and experience, whatever, you just are not someone else.” We have to deal with singularization of community and family. In order to establish community with place other than aspiration for belonging for place, local community has a special advantage. It can concerns with the following issues: (1) basic issue, taking back of natural time, space and language, (2) need and identity issue, giving radice of identity, (3) body issue, dealing with health and sick. (4) care issue, caring other, (5) difference issue, understanding difference and solidarity with other, (5) environmental issue, inhabiting with earth and so on.

Local community has had a long history in Japan. Originally it was a part of domination structure of ruling classes. Ruling classes did not live in the territory which they rule. They ruled people through representatives of local communities in the territory. It was extremely functional during emergency periods like war times. Local community today is a part of communication channel between local office and residents. Local offices provide necessary news to residents. Local communities bring claims and problems to local offices. Some residents do not feel necessity of local community and do not want to join local community. Local community has not have law status, although all residents are supposed to join local community. The most important function of local community today in everyday life is to take care of garbage of residents. Residents must classify garbage into cane, PET bottles, glasses, dangerous materials incombustible materials, combustible materials. Residents must throw away specific category of waste on specific day, four days a week. Local community provides a role of governing the process. Local community is also taking a role of clean up the neighborhood. Local community will support summer festival. Local community usually has a community center where residents can meet and have cultural events.

There are so many voluntary groups, NPOs, social welfare organizations and movement organizations in the region. The relation of local community with these organizations is a very important issue today. The local community is dealing with issues which are necessary and essential for all residents. It is not functional for special issues which are special concerns of some residents. How to combine between two is an important and difficult problem in the region.

The most important another problem around local community today is democratization of local government and local community. They must recognize independence and autonomy of each other. Local government must accept resident's participation in the decision making process. Local community must activate its organization by collaborating with soft resources (social capital) from local community and by trying to deal with ecological issues.

Based on these problem settings, so many empirical researches have been done on local community in Setagaya.

Kiyoshi Morioka, the head of Setagaya Policy Research Institute is conducting various empirical research on Setagaya. He has investigated the collective effects of social capital to local community. It was a statistical sample survey which was carried out for 10000 residents in Setagaya-ward in 2009. The hypothesis was that social capital held by residents is a resource

to make desirable community.

This research gave us four important points. First, he determined the components of social capital. He thought that social capital of residents were composed of bonding network, amount of bridging network, amount of supportive network, amount of local participation, and amount of community reliance. Five elements were converted to quantitative variables and social capital was calculated by adding up scores.

Second, he examined the relationship between social capital scores and community morale, voting behavior, intention of mutual aid to resolve community problems. Analytical investigation suggested that social capital heightened community morale, accelerated the voting behavior, and enhanced the intention of residents trying to resolve common community problems by mutual aids.

Third, he pursued the relation social capital with community characteristics. Setagaya-ward has set 27 district centers corresponding to the junior high school district throughout the ward, and he calculated the average scores of social capital of residents for each district center. He found that 3 centers characterized by relatively wealthy middle class, traditional family type which includes three generations family and established good residential area got the highest scores of social capital.

Finally he concluded that his hypothesis, that is, social capital held by residents is a resource to make desirable community, was verified.

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**Bringing the Society Back in:
the New *Qinghe* Experiment and Social Governance in China**

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Abstract

With a population of 1.4 billion people, China is undergoing perhaps the largest scale urbanization in the human history and is experiencing a great transformation toward modernization. Against this background, a multidisciplinary research team from Tsinghua University initiated a social governance experiment in *Qinghe* sub-district in Beijing in 2014. This expert-led social intervention and research project has been known as the New *Qinghe* Experiment (NQE), to distinguish it from an earlier *Qinghe* experiment with a focus on rural development by a group of *Yenching* sociologists in the period of 1928-1937. The goal of NQE is to identify and solve social problems existent in urban communities, and to explore a new governance model for urban communities in highly populated mega-cities such as Beijing. In this paper, we layout the challenges faced by local communities in urban China and introduce pilot projects and working mechanisms in NQE. We conclude that NQE is of important theoretical and practical significance as an innovative model of social governance.

Key words: *Qinghe* Experiment, Social Governance, Social Intervention, Urban Communities in China


I. Introduction: What is the “New *Qinghe* Experiment”?

Compared to the government and the market, the civil society is the weakest pillar of the tripartite system of contemporary China. To bring out the vitality of the society and the potential of various social actors, a multidisciplinary research team from Tsinghua University, including the authors, initiated a social governance experiment in *Qinghe* sub-district in Beijing in 2014. This expert-led social intervention and research project is as known as the New *Qinghe* Experiment. Through community reorganizing and community improvement programs, we try to explore a new governance model for urban communities in highly populated mega-cities such as Beijing.

As shown in the Map of Beijing today (see Figure 1), *Qinghe* area refers to the lot of land that is shaped roughly in parallelogram under the jurisdiction of *Qinghe* Subdistrict Office of Haidian District, Beijing Municipality, extending northward to Xibeiwang, southward to North 5th Ring Road, westward to Beijing-Xinjiang Expressway, eastward to Beijing-Tibet Expressway, with an administered area of 9.37 square kilometers, a resident population of

approximately 170,000, of which 74,000 have Beijing household registration, also known as Hukou, and 94,000 are migrants without Beijing Hukou. The *Qinghe* sub-district oversees 28 neighborhood committees which are coexistent with some rural villages due to its location in an urban-rural fringe zone.

Figure 1. The Layout Map of Communities in *Qinghe* Subdistrict of Haidina District, Beijing



The “New *Qinghe* Experiment” is a combination of academic research with social experiment on social governance and social development conducted in the *Qinghe* area of Beijing by the research group headed by Professor Li, Qiang of Department of Sociology, Tsinghua University. It is intended to explore social governance innovations at grassroots level in urban China. Community study have a long tradition in sociology and was considered as an important methodology for sociological studies. The earlier community studies such as the Middletown case by American scholars Mr. and Ms. Lynd (1929) have won a widespread acclaim. The series of studies on the city of Chicago by Park and his associates known as the Chicago School are deemed as community studies, and later came other cases of community studies that are too numerous to enumerate and have been influential in academic circles. As to community experiment, the garden city by Howard (1898) in early days, even Robert Owen’s earlier pilot

project in Indiana of United States, can be seen as testaments of community experiments. The “New *Qinghe* Experiment” also bears the features of community experiment. It is not only a simple academic research, but also a kind of “intervention-based community experiment”. That is to say, against the backdrops of China’s dramatic social transformation and modernization, we chose *Qinghe* as an experiment site for policy intervention of social governance, which shall be used for academic research, exploring solutions to numerous social problems and advancing a harmonious society in the community. This project is of important significance for the Chinese society that has long attached importance to social management and social governance.

Why is our *Qinghe* experiment named the “New *Qinghe* Experiment”, with a word “New” added to it? It is because that in modern history of China, some sociologists conducted an “old” *Qinghe* experiment, which we deemed as the historical origin of our project. The sociologists of older generation, such as Yang Kaidao and Xu Shilian, started their field research in *Qinghe* town in 1928 and established the *Qinghe* Experiment Zone in 1930 for exploring and advancing rural construction. Their work was interrupted due to Japan’s seizure of Peking in 1937.

The *Qinghe* experiment back then was conducted in the background of incessant foreign invasions and civil wars in the late 19th century and the early 20th century. The rural China was trapped in deep economic depression, and faced a worsening situation where the people lived in destitution. A group of Chinese elites emerged and advised on strategies and policies for rural economic and social development of China. Famous sociologists like Yan Yangchu and Liang Shuming initiated and carried out the Rural Construction Movement in Shandong, Hebei and other places in China (Wei, 2016). In the same period, sociologists from Yenching University like Yang Kaidao and Xu Shilian selected *Qinghe* as an experimental site to promote rural production and development. Therefore, the *Qinghe* Experiment had the characteristics of academic research as well as community intervention and social governance from the very beginning. An important task of the *Qinghe* Experiment in 1928 was a complete survey on the history, geography and environment, population, marriage and families, economic organizations, politics, education and religion of the area. The research team published the survey report titled *Qinghe, A Case of Sociological Analysis* (coauthored by Yang Kaidao, Xu Shilian, Bu Jishi, Zhang Hongjun and Yu Wan). This report depicted and analyzed the basic social, economic and political conditions of *Qinghe*, and underscored the significance and value reflected by the *Qinghe* Experiment Zone in terms of rural social services (Yan, 2008). The *Qinghe* Experiment Zone was officially established in February 1930. In the following seven years, it achieved a range of results. It not only improved the conditions of social governance in rural community and the living standard of local people, but also accomplished the academic purposes and cultivated practical and research ability of the then students from the Department of Sociology of Yenching University (Ma, 2009).

The *Qinghe* experiment in history was operated as follows. The faculty and students of Yenching University conducted pre-assessment of *Qinghe* Town prior to the experiment, and then they publicized to the *Qinghe* residents the pre-assessment results and offered some

recommendations. Locals took the initiative for active cooperation and social improvement. The *Qinghe* experiment focused on economic, social, health and other projects, and delivered impressive results. Economically, it increased the output of agriculture by promoting agricultural technology adoption, established a cooperative fund to reduce economic pressure on farmers, and developed cottage industry to increase farmers' income. Socially, it built up local educational facilities, enhanced the education level of local residents, and boosted welfare for women and children. In terms of health, it improved healthcare and sanitation conditions, developed grassroots healthcare talents and established the preventive healthcare system. Academically, it expanded the empirical studies and theory of rural development. Unfortunately, the old *Qinghe* Experiment was disrupted and came to the end because of the Japanese invasion into Peking in 1937. The *Qinghe* Experiment in the old days left an important legacy shared by the new experiment today in terms of combining academic research with social governance and community intervention.

Starting in 2014, we restarted the *Qinghe* Experiment. The *Qinghe* today is very different from that of 1930s. It has become a major urban development area of Beijing, consisting of business centers, hi-tech and cultural industries as well as numerous residential communities. The fact that *Qinghe* area was once again selected by the research group for the experiment lies in two aspects. Firstly, it has something to do with carrying the heritage of the old *Qinghe* Experiment. Secondly, and more importantly, the area features a complex social structure constituted by cutting-edge hi-tech parks, upscale residential complexes, and urban villages settled mainly by migrant population. It has both medium- and high-level commercial residential communities and traditional, even declined old "danwei (work unit) communities". Correspondingly, this area has a diversified demographic composition, ranging from high income earners like business owners and high-tech talents, low income groups like migrant workers, relocated settlers of urban redevelopment projects, retired or laid-off state-owned enterprise workers, to even local farmers.

Located in a sprawling urban-rural fringe zone, *Qinghe* area features obvious disparity in development and consists of diverse, complex urban spaces. Over the 38 years of the reform and opening era, all communities in China have registered tremendous changes, and types of community gets diversified. Therefore, it's safe to say *Qinghe* is a miniature of the social transformation of China for the last a few decades. All problems that arise from such reform and social transformation can be traced in *Qinghe*. The New *Qinghe* Experiment on the one hand follows the scientific principles, academic concerns and pursuit of improving well-being of the people from the old *Qinghe* Experiment in the 1930s, on the other hand explores new organizational designs and social governance innovations based on the changed conditions. It's an experiment of comprehensive social governance and social intervention.

China, with a population of nearly 1.4 billion, is now undertaking an experiment of urbanization that is the most massive ever in human history. Up to date, China's reform and opening up endeavor is also an experiment of the most massive modernization in the world. In such a context, the initiation of the New *Qinghe* Experiment is intended to discover and solve social problems in sizable urban communities and explore the urbanization and modernization

path for the society of a large and dense population. Unlike the old *Qinghe* Experiment that focused on rural development, the New *Qinghe* Experiment focuses on communities in cities (which of course include urban-rural fringe zones and rural areas under urbanization) and explores the new path to urban social governance. It will adhere to the methodology for community studies and go deep into community so as to explore and solve the community governance problems arising from rapid urbanization in the unique social context of China.

The New *Qinghe* Experiment is based on the following theoretic premise. If we consider government, market and civil society are the three pillars of a modern society. A prominent problem in Mainland China is inadequate development of civil society and inadequate participation of community residents. Therefore, one major task of the *Qinghe* Experiment is to stimulate social vitality. The Experiment has so far focused on two dimensions of community governance, namely social organization and community improvement. The experiments concerning social organization system reform and community improvement have been conducted in a few communities of *Qinghe*.

II. Social Context of the New *Qinghe* Experiment

The New *Qinghe* Experiment is carried out in the context of drastic changes that have taken place in local society and communities of Chinese cities during the past 38 years in the reform and opening era. The social organizations and institutions established before are unable to adapt to such changes, which results in many grassroots governance problems, and demands the reform of the previous organizational framework and operating system to adapt to these changes. For academic purposes, the social change and transformation in China also provide a great opportunity and an empirical site for conducting community study. We need to understand what changes have taken place in the grassroots communities in the cities since China's reform and opening up? And what problems have emerged from the mismatch between the institutions and reality? To this end, we identified five problems evolving the social governance of local communities.

First, residents' needs overlooked in grassroots community governance. There exists obvious mismatch between the current community administrative system and the real needs of local residents. One of the defining characteristics of China's government is the top-down organization and management system. The sub-district government and neighborhood committees are mainly committed to accomplishing the assignments from their upper-level governments. Neighborhood committees that are supposed to be residents' autonomous organizations are compelled to execute the government's directives instead, and are too busy to fulfill the intrinsic functions to reflect residents' will and organize their participation. In such circumstances, residents' daily needs are often missed out.

Second is institutional drawbacks. Some of the existing institutions have long lagged behind the needs of community development today. For instance, the work-unit communities that were

developed during the planned economy and account for a sizable share of urban communities in China are in clear decline today. Such *danwei* compounds are plagued by antiquated facilities, poor environment and unreasonable physical space layout unable to match the living patterns today, and the 5-6-storey buildings equipped with no elevators making it difficult for fast-aging senior citizens to go downstairs. Although even some small changes in physical space layout could help improve the situation, government's red tapes often prevent such improvements from being approved.

Third, overburdened neighborhood committees fail to perform the function of residents' autonomic body. All neighborhood committees in China are defined in the Constitution as residents' self-governance organizations, yet they de facto act as an executor of local-government orders. As neighborhood committee staff are listed on government payroll, they are obliged to fulfill heavy workload assigned by the government, and are too occupied to fulfill the function of an autonomic organization. Compared with the situation before the reform and opening up, the neighborhood committee members back then were the residents of respective neighborhood and were largely committed to activities of self-governance. It is in sharp contrast to the situations faced by neighborhood committees today.

Fourth, market mechanism remains incomplete. Since China adopted the market-oriented housing reform at the turn of the century, commercial residential communities have become the dominant form of urban housing in China. The housing market has developed in such a rush and resulted in many loopholes in the system. Lots of commercial residential communities have quality problems. After developers sold the housing, they left housing quality problems to property management companies who were unwilling or unable to solve such problems. Moreover, shortcomings in basic community services and lack of cultural facilities were created during the property development stage. While developers were only held accountable for planning and construction of buildings, they left many unsolved problems in community life. The shift of subsequent problems to property management companies leads to strained relations between the companies and community residents. All in all, unclear definition of the rights and responsibilities among stakeholders in community governance results in fragmented functions and weak autonomy.

Fifth: A highly-concentrated population poses huge risks. China has a population of nearly 1.4 billion. The big wave of migrants to big cities and megacities, particularly to the city clusters in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta regions have created unprecedented concentration of population settlements in human history. The catastrophic explosion accident that occurred in Tianjin Binhai New District in 2015 warned us of the social risks brought by a highly concentrated population. According to Giddens (1999), the modern world is a world full of opportunities as well as manufactured risks produced by human beings. Modern society is often accompanied with a high level of risks. Due to a high population density, some local or sudden events in megacities may cause huge disasters to the society. The risk society theory states that the risk is endogenous and accompanied with human decision making and behavior, and is the joint outcome of normal operation of various social systems,

particularly the industrial system, legal system, technologies and applied sciences. Risks often go beyond geographical and social culture boundaries and have lasting impacts. The society today poses higher risks than those in any other historical period (Beck, 1992).

In order to examine the great changes in grassroots society and neighborhood and to address the formidable problems arising from the governance of grassroots society and communities, we restarted the *Qinghe* Experiment not only to inherit the heritage of the previous *Qinghe* experiment, but more importantly, to explore new and innovative models for grassroots social governance of China.

III. The Operations of the New *Qinghe* Experiment

To jump start the New *Qinghe* Experiment, we started from two aspects: one is “social organization system experiment”, and the other is “community improvement experiment”. The “Social organization system experiment” is to promote social governance innovation and stimulate social vitality through the reform of grassroots organization system. Starting with the reform of the existing neighborhood committee, it is designed to elect “representative councilors” to broaden the neighborhood committee’s representativeness. The councilors are supposed to collect and represent residents’ will and have deep involvement in communities’ decision making. “Community improvement experiment” is mainly to come up demand-oriented community improvement proposals through representative councilors’ coaching residents in democratic deliberation and decision-making, and realize community improvement and upgrading through integrating different resources like relevant experts and designers with the help of the research group as well as through residents’ participation and process supervision. Our work can be summarized in the following three steps.

Step One: To select three pilot communities

After we had an overall understanding of social governance problems of *Qinghe* area, we chose three different types of communities to carry out the work, namely an antiquated community, a commercial residential community, and a mixed community. Through electing representative councilors, the residents' participation in the community governance has improved significantly.

The first community we chose is “Maofangnan Community”, a residential compound of the former state owned woolen mill. It is an old and rundown community consisting of 34 residential buildings and 3,275 households. As the residents are all employees of the mill, they are familiar with each other and have frequent interactions. However, the community shows signs of declination due to the poor financial performance of the woolen mill which cannot provide much support for the community as it used to do. The residents face interwoven problems such as poor living conditions, antiquated buildings, garbage-polluted environment, and an aging population where 560 are aged above 80 and 50% are aged above 60. It is very difficult for the community to maintain normal operation due to severe shortage of funding and

residents' refusal to pay property management fees.

The second community is “Oak Bay Community”, a decent commercial residential community in *Qinghe* area. It is chosen as the representative of commercial residential communities. Among its residents are university professors, executives of IT companies and business owners, most of whom are well educated. However, because it is a newly formed community and the residents have just moved in, they remain new to each other and are inactive in community participation. Therefore, our efforts target at creating an acquaintance community and, particularly promoting the coordination and cooperation between the neighborhood committee and the owners' committee, the two residents' autonomous organizations, and therefore promoting integrated residents' and owners' autonomy. The *Qinghe* Experiment is intended to broaden the ways to participate and the scope of consultation of the owners' committee which is no longer limited to property management, but is extended to community culture and community service, etc. At the same time, the experiment will try to increase the legitimacy of the neighborhood committee, so as to gain more recognition and support from the owners.

The third community, “Sunshine Community”, is a mixture of different housings. It is chosen as a prototype of mixed communities. It consists of six residential sections, including 2, 000 households, of which 1700 are indigenous households and 300 are migrant family. The so-called mixed community also features combination of different types of management mechanisms and different types of residents. Some are commodity housing, some are company-owned housing, some are one-storey houses and some are high-rise buildings, and yet some are shanty towns waiting for demolition and renovation. The residents in the community are a mix of farmers and urbanites, including relocated households and move-back households. The differences of the six living quarters make it difficult to align interests among them. In some living quarters, residents are active in interpersonal communication and community participation. Such quarters stage frequent recreational activities, such as Moms' hip-hop dance, spring and autumn fun sports games so on. The director of the neighborhood committee has been quite dedicated to the community and has done a lot of things for the residents since taking office ten years ago. The leaders of recreation and sports teams are also active members of the community, and very cooperative and supportive to the work of the neighborhood committee. They became natural and suitable candidates for the representative councilor of the community.

Step Two: the social organization system experiment: electing representative councilors. So far, the above-mentioned three communities have completed the election of representative councilors. The purpose of establishing the representative council is to stimulate social vitality, increase community participation, and cultivate the self-adjustment capacity of the community so as to achieve the goal of “positive interaction between government governance and social self-adjustment & residents' autonomy”.

First, the election of representative councilors was based on a detailed and thorough research of local situations. From January 16 to 23, 2015, the resident representative assembly and the

election of representative councilors were held simultaneously at the three experimental communities respectively. In total, 34 representative councilors were chosen through competitive elections with a margin of 38%. More than 200 people attended the meeting, including heads from relevant work units, neighborhood committee members and resident representatives. Over 30 residents who have been paying close attention to the *Qinghe* Experiment attended the meeting voluntarily as non-voting attendees. The meeting stressed the importance of supporting residents' participation and promoting residents' autonomy to those who attended, and solicited their opinions and urged them to discuss on various community issues, including sanitation, public security, services to seniors and children, and organizations of recreational and sport activities, etc.

Second step is to establish the rules for discussion. According to the basic idea of the experiment, the reorganized neighborhood committee would act as the platform for “consultation” as well as “execution”. The newly elected representative councilors would hold regular meetings to discuss community affairs. The topics for discussion are determined by surveys on residents' needs. A mechanism of deliberation is established to avoid aimless and groundless discussions. To achieve such goals, capacity building and training is needed for the newly elected representative councilors. They have learned how to apply some techniques to conduct surveys on residents' will and needs, and to analyze community problems. Such techniques include survey research, interview, focus group, and town-hall meetings. Only when representative councilors join in the discussion with residents' needs and opinions in mind can they have true representativeness. Besides the consultation mechanism, the council also specifies a mechanism for decision-making. After the consultation, the delegates of the decision-making body are elected, and the implementation will be supervised collectively throughout the process.

Finally, the main issue on the representative councilor's agenda is how to make the use of “public welfare fund” really meet the needs of residents. That so-called “public welfare fund”, 200,000 yuan for each community per year, is provided by the Beijing Municipal Government for community improvement. In the past, the funds were often not spent and remained on the government's budget account; and for some local governments, such funds have been stocked up for many years. The reasons lie in the fact that grassroots governments do not know what improvements a community need and residents are generally not aware of such funds. Therefore, the *Qinghe* Experiment takes the issue of how to spend the “public welfare fund” as a core topic for the representative councilors. It is through the discussion about the public welfare fund that a neighborhood committee establishes its deliberation mechanism. After a new neighborhood committee is properly organized, the core work is to discuss community public affairs and to explore the mechanism for participatory deliberation so as to attract more stakeholders to participate in community building. The guideline is to let the needs be determined by the community which in turn supervise how the work is done through joint efforts by the government, market and society. It is to safeguard residents' rights for information, participation, expression and supervision. The reorganized neighborhood committee, based on the survey on residents' needs, conducts in-depth discussions on how to

spend the community public welfare fund in a scientific and democratic manner, pays attention to the risk control of expenditure, and puts mass supervision in place to guarantee scientific, rational spending of public welfare funds. In the course of discussion, residents' consultation mechanism and rules of order are developed and established to improve the deliberative capacity of neighborhood committees. Under the guidance from the sub-district government and our research team, the reorganized neighborhood committee is to train and organize residents for deliberation as well as to set up a pragmatic and efficient organizational system and a mechanism for participatory deliberation. It is stipulated that only when the discussion and implementation are deemed effective and are highly recognized by residents, will a sub-district government will allocate the public welfare funding.

In the process of the experiment, we identified the key problem is lack of deliberation in community governance. Our Experiment is intended to increase residents' participation in community decision-making through representative councilors' discussion on the use of public welfare funds, to enable residents to participate in community affairs through consultative and decision-making processes, and to stimulate their democratic awareness and passion for participation in community affairs.

The third step is what we call community improvement experiment. For a long time, strong administrative intervention in grassroots community organizations has impeded the development of diverse participating forces. Therefore, the goal of the community improvement experiment is to make grassroots communities a community of "mutual assistance and shared interests" (Zhang and Qin, 2001). To achieve the goal, it is necessary to improve the skills and capacities of the residents to serve their own needs and participate in community governance. Only by doing this could residents improve the living environment and public space and enhance public service and overall well-being of the community. We believe that any community has much room for improvement. In the case of *Qinghe* area, there are many aspects to be improved such as the hygienic environment and public facilities in the antiquated *danwei* communities. Even for modern, decent commercial residential communities like Oak Bay, there is also room for improvement. Although Oak Bay is well endowed in terms of physical facilities and public spaces, the neighborhood faces the problem of lack of personal interactions and low level of resident involvement in community activities.

Therefore, the research group offered advices on different community improvement programs according to each community's conditions. It is representative councilors and neighborhood committees who mobilize residents to participate in the activities for community improvement. In this process, the parties concerned, such as residents, representative councilors and neighborhood committees join in consultations and negotiations, which has not only enhanced mutual understanding and respect between community residents and organizations, but also inspired residents' enthusiasm to participate in the community public life.

The *Qinghe* Experiment takes Sunshine Community as the pilot site for community improvement. Through rounds of discussion, a consensus was reached that landscaping is the

urgent problem that most residents are concerned about. The research group along with the neighborhood committee held the “Sunshine Community Landscaping Consultation Meeting” with the presence of representative councilors and landscaping designers brought in by the research team. The latter later provided professional landscaping design for the community. Based on discussion, communication and cooperation with the community property manager and resident representatives, the landscaping renovation project in Yangguang Beili was carried out smoothly and has been completed. Many residents participated in tree planting activities voluntarily, and each tree has a nameplate attached to it showing a volunteer’s name as the care giver of the tree. With improved landscape in public spaces, more and more residents spend their leisure time outside.

We have just accomplished another physical space renovation at the Sunshine Community, with residents, government and market playing their respective functions. This renovation provides the community a public activity space of about 750 square meters, which significantly improves the environment for residents’ public activities. This case has clearly demonstrated the correlation between residents’ vitality and public space expansion.

In a word, the new *Qinghe* Experiment is an experiment that helps stimulate social vitality, cultivate residents' participation, instill the value of deliberative democracy, and realize residents' supervision and autonomy. It has greatly improved the quality of life in the communities.

IV. the New *Qinghe* Experiment and the Four Modes of Grassroots Social Governance

As mentioned above, the basic theoretical framework of the New *Qinghe* Experiment is that government, market and society serve as three most important mechanisms in the operation of a society. Although the focus and function of the three mechanisms vary across countries and cultures, the three mechanisms work together in any society. China, a country with a population of nearly 1.4 billion and with prominent geographical and social disparities, has seen its social governance model being shifted from traditional “unitary governance” to “multi-party governance” and its governance pattern changing from traditional “top-down” to “two-way interaction” or “multi-party interaction”. In recent years, new ways of community governance have been explored across the Mainland China.

From a theoretical point of view of the three above-mentioned mechanisms, the community governance innovation in China can be divided into three types: the government-dominated mode, market-oriented mode and social autonomy-oriented mode. Of course, these serve as ideal types. In reality, government, market and society are coexistent and indispensable forces in the operation of any kind of community. When one specific mode is emphasized, it just implies that particular force, be it government, market or society, is playing a more distinctive, prominent role, and never means that the other two forces have no role to play. At the same time, we define the “New *Qinghe* Experiment” as the fourth type, namely, expert-involved

community governance mode where experts' guidance is just to allow the three mechanisms of government, market and society to perform better. We explain the four types of social governance modes in order.

Government-dominated community governance mode

The “government-dominated community governance mode” referred hereto is the paradigm of government-dominated innovation in community governance. In fact, a government acts as the most powerful force, and its dominance is the most prominent feature in China's grass-roots social governance. This is largely subject to the prevalent institution and culture of centralized government in China since the Qin and Han dynasties. So, in a sense, all kinds of community governance in China is government-dominated. Moreover, the directives of the Chinese Communist Party always emphasize the social governance should be under “the Party’s Leadership and the Government’s Dominance”. In practice, however, the governance performance and results are far less perfect as stated in the party documents. Instead, the governance of lots of communities remains sluggish. Some grass-roots governments care more for the commands of their superiors, showing no concern about grassroots community governance. Some have not recognized what are the problems that residents need to solve urgently. These are failure cases of this type of governance mode in that empty talks never make a difference like real actions.

There are some excellent benchmarks for successful government-dominated community governance across China. One case is the “co-founding” mode of grassroots community governance in Xiamen, Fujian, which has achieved the social governance pattern of co-construction and sharing initiated by the Party, where local residents participate in construction, decision-making and evaluation, in a bid to build a beautiful Xiamen together. Another case is “Ruiquan Xincheng” in Chengdu, Sichuan, which is also a typical government-dominated paradigm. It is a residence-centered, grid-patterned fine governance mode, featuring coordinated governance by four committees (namely, the community consultation committee, neighborhood committee, owners’ committee, supervision committee), and three-level co-management by the neighborhood committee, courtyard committee and building supervisor, in a bid to promote residents’ participation and give full play to the able persons of the community.

These successful, excellent government-dominated paradigms share some common features. First, local leaders really take the needs of community residents and community problems as their priorities, and serve as the engines of community governance. Second, the government's administrative system is very efficient. Third, it has realized the extensive participation of residents in community governance. Fourth, it has mobilized the enthusiasm of various stakeholders and realized the integration of various community resources.

In fact, the government-dominated community governance should be the responsibility of every grass-roots government. If the leaders at the grass-roots level could be active in taking their due responsibility, the social governance pattern of co-construction and sharing as

abovementioned could be realized. Sometimes, a capable leader can lead a region to advanced grassroots community governance. One case is the “Tiancun Sub-district” in Haidian, Beijing that we studied recently, where the community governance is vivid and full of energy. All of this is owed to the passionate leader Feng who took office at the Tiancun Subdistrict Office two years ago. As an idealist, Feng devoted to numerous social governance programs of the community. For example, he proposed the Green Home initiative and built over 100 “miniature gardens”. Besides, he developed a “Mountain Soccer Park”, and reintegrated the resources of the antiquated community and built “Tiancun Fusi Courtyard” as a community center. Therefore, it is not difficult for any financially resourceful grass-roots government to improve community governance provided that government officials would heed to people’s needs and take serving community residents as the purpose of their work, rather than only heed to the superiors and chase after “promotion”.

Of course, the government-dominated mode can easily fall into the situation that a government takes on all things and bear unlimited liabilities, which makes residents develop the habitual mentality of taking everything for granted and asking the government for everything. As a result, the government will be overburdened due to excessive duties, while the society loses its vitality. This is what the government-dominated mode has to avoid.

Market-oriented community governance mode

After the market-oriented housing system was established in Mainland China, commercial residential communities have mushroomed all over the country. In these communities, the market-oriented community governance mode has generally taken the shape. The operating model that owners pay property management fees and property management companies take responsibility for delivering all community services reflects the principle of market exchange. When we analyzed the problems arising from urban community governance in the foregoing paragraph, we mentioned the problem of “imperfect market mechanism” in the community. In other words, the market may fail. In community life, many affairs are associated with “public goods” and cannot be solved by market exchange. Therefore, among the community governance cases we have studied, the successful and well-functioning cases of market-oriented community governance are those where entrepreneurs, real estate developers and property operators also fulfill the function of public services and shoulder lots of social responsibilities while doing business.

In Mainland China, there have established a number of outstanding market-oriented community governance modes. One case is the Taoyuanju Community in Shenzhen. Currently, the Community has 12,840 household and 53,633 residents. The innovation of the community governance in Taoyuanju of Shenzhen lies in its establishment of the Community Welfare Foundation. Ms. Li, the chairman of Taoyuanju Group and the developer of the community’s housing, donated RMB 100 million yuan to found the first community public welfare foundation in China. The foundation provides funding to all kinds of public welfare undertakings of the community, including elderly care, culture, education, sports,

environmental protection, etc.

We must emphasize again that the market itself is just an platform for transactions. All communities that are successful in applying market governance mechanism are those whose builders also bear many public service functions while pursuing market returns. So this kind of mode is also known as “market plus public welfare mode”. Without public welfare input, the operation that simply depends on property management fees paid by residents often causes disputes between the two parties involved. Therefore, although the market-oriented mode frees the government from multiple burdens, the government must guide and participate in the market-oriented operation of the community, especially get involved in the management of the matters related to community public goods.

Social autonomy-oriented community governance mode

As we know, China's neighborhood committees are grass-roots autonomic organizations in accordance with the “Organic Law of Urban Residents Committees of the People's Republic of China “. The community governance is supposed to adopt the social autonomy mode by nature. As analyzed above, the basic characteristic of China is the government domination, and the present situation is that the neighborhood committee is busy with executing the commands from the superior government, which makes it difficult to fulfill the goal of autonomy. Among the three above-mentioned modes, social autonomy is the most difficult one, and therefore good examples of the social autonomy mode are very few. A case of reference is the Cui Zhu Yuan Community in Nanjing city, Jiangsu province, China. Located in Yuhua Subdistrict, Yuhuatai District of Nanjing, Cui Zhu Yuan covers an area of 413,000 square meters and homes about 3,036 households or more than 8000 residents. It is a typical middle-class community, and has set up Cui Zhu Yuan Community Mutual Help Association, a community public welfare organization that manages 50 community clubs. Through broad community participation to activities organized by the association, community-wide trust and identity are gradually built up. The success of the community autonomy mostly relies on the community leaders. Public-spirited figures like “A Gan” and Mr. Lin in the community, by taking advantage of their charisma, have raised “public welfare funds” to support the community public welfare programs.

We believe that after China becomes a middle-class society in the future, more public-spirited community leaders will emerge in middle-class communities, so the social autonomy mode is promising in the future.

Expert-involved community governance mode

We attribute the New *Qinghe* Experiment to the expert-involved mode, that is, the innovation in community governance facilitated by experts and scholars. From the perspective of the three mechanisms of government, market and society, the expert and scholar group is originally a part of social mechanism, but this mode is different from the social autonomy mode, because

scholars participate in community governance as external forces. The essence of this mode is that scholars, by providing consultation or direct involvement in community affairs, provide legitimate discourses and reform momentum for innovation of community governance, and bring a lot of institutional and social resources for community development. The scholar-involved community governance mode has profound value appeal and some resource mobilizing capacity in China whether it is for practical research needs, stems from long historical tradition of “Chinese Literati Spirit” or the social transformation and social intervention tradition that has been gradually taken root in modern China. As mentioned above, the “New *Qinghe* Experiment” conducted by the Department of Sociology of Tsinghua University follows, in terms of academic inheritance, the “Old *Qinghe* Experiment” carried out by the sociologists in *Qinghe* area in the 1930s. The advantage of this mode lies in the fact that scholars are familiar with the development trend of social governance, so they can make better institutional design and top-level design in particular, and their objective stance is also conducive to the exploration of reform direction. Yet the disadvantage of this governance mode is that community operation is prone to dependence on external experts, and once experts withdraw, the sustainability of governance will be weak and questioned by the public. This is also what we should pay special attention to and avoid in community governance practices.

V. Conclusions

In the course of the New *Qinghe* Experiment, we feel more and more strongly that the grass-roots society of China is undergoing dramatic social transformation and social change. There are lots of things to do for the reform experiment. And even more community problems to be solved. This kind of reform experiment provides abundant materials for academic research of sociology.

As shown in the New *Qinghe* Experiment, there are two aspects coexisting in community life. On the one hand, Chinese people still hold the belief and consider that all community matters fall into the responsibility of governments and have nothing to do with themselves. In result, they show prominent dependence and passiveness as well as less enthusiasm in community participation. On the other hand, among community residents, there really exist many proactive social factors, social forces and social momentum. There are various social actors that are full of vitality and strength, including a variety of social organizations and community organizations, as well as the labor unions, the Youth League and the Women's Federations with Chinese characteristics, community leaders, hobby groups, and WeChat groups and so on. These forces represent a huge potential, and will produce tremendous energy once they are brought into play in consideration of a population of nearly 1.4billion. Therefore, the New *Qinghe* Experiment is targeted to discover and nurture these positive social factors to allow the society shift from a passive one into a dynamic one (Li and Huang, 2011).

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Social Serving or Mobilizing? -NGOs and Civic Participation in Urban China

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Abstract

NGOs and their impacts on civic participation are essential to the theory and practice of “social governance” in China. In theory, NGOs may have multiple paths to influence community engagement, such as creating social capital, providing service, and mobilizing public. Based on these theoretical perspectives, this study uses a national representative survey dataset to analyze the impact of NGOs on community participation of urban residents. The study found that providing services is the most effective way for Chinese NGOs to promote civic participation. Property management companies, although the main function is to provide safeguard and maintenance services, can improve almost all types of community participation. Social capital which is enhanced by NGOs also has a significant effect. Yet indigenous NGOs do not necessarily have a positive effect on social participation.

Keywords: Social Organization, Community Participation, Social Capital, Mobilization, Governance

社会组织是社会的重要组成部分。就公共参与而言，社会组织既是影响公共参与的重要因素，本身也是公共参与的重要渠道。托克维尔曾对美国的民间结社推崇备至，写道，“美国人不论年龄多大，不论出于什么地位，不论志趣是什么，无不事实在组织社团。在美国，不仅有人人都可以组织的工商团体，而且还有其它成千上万的团体。既有宗教团体，又有道德团体；既有十分认真的团体，又有非常无聊的团体；既有非常一般的团体，又有非常特殊的团体；既有规模庞大的团体，又有规模甚小的团体。……我认为，最值得我们重视的，莫过于美国的智力活动和道德方面的结社”(托克维尔, 1997)⁶³⁵⁻⁶³⁹。

在西方对公共参与的讨论中，相当一部分文献是从社会组织角度进行的。有的学者是从社会资本的角度，认为公民的自组织与网络能够消减社会成本，提高制度绩效(罗伯特·帕特南, 2011)。有的学者则是认为社会组织能够填补国家与市场之间的空白，促进公共事务的有效解决(埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆, 2000)。

在中国，社会组织也被认为是推进社会建设的一个重要途径。政府试图通过政府购买服务等方式，推动社会组织提供公共服务，促进社区建设。除了这种通过社会组织增加服务供给的方式，近年来，也出现了一些社会组织试图通过社会的再组织，来推动居民的公共参与。这其中既有类似业主委员会等居

民自发产生的组织，也不乏政府、学术机构主导的社会组织(李强, 2015; 赵罗英 & 夏建中, 2014)。

综上，可以看出，社会组织是居民公共参与的重要影响因素和重要渠道。社会组织影响公共参与主要的途径有促进社会资本、提供服务、社会动员三种机制。那么就我们所关心的社区参与而言，我国社会组织到底起到什么样的作用呢？到底是通过增加社会资本、提供服务的方式，促进社区参与，还是起到社会动员的作用？在这方面的研究，尚比较缺乏。这正是本文试图回答的问题。

一、文献综述与研究假设

（一）社会组织的主要理论

无论对于社区，还是对于社区参与而言，社会组织都起着非常重要的作用。学术界的共识是，社会组织在当代中国社会发展中具有重要功能。

学者们认为，社会组织能够弥补政府和市场的不足，提供各类社会服务，提高服务质量和效率(葛道顺, 2011; 景天魁, 2012; 王名 & 孙伟林, 2010)。社会组织被看作是国家、市场之外的第三部门，在市场和政府双重失灵的情况下起到了弥补缺位，满足社会诉求的作用。当市场和政府双重失灵的情况下，社区内弱势群体的需求催生了社会组织的诞生与成长(Weisbrod, 1988; Wolch & Geiger, 1983)。所谓市场失灵理论(Ferris & Graddy, 1989; Johansson, 1991; Stevens, 1993)是指市场面临公共属性商品难以定价、需求量不足，以致商品供应商获得利润较少，无法向消费者提供某些商品服务的情况，而市场是基于人们的支付能力而做选择的，对于弱势群体而言，市场在其面前是失效的。政府出于政治原因，可能需要对弱势群体进行救济或通过资助社会组织机构来提供服务(Salamon, 1987, 1989; Stevens, 1993)。但是，政府失败理论(Weisbrod, 1977, 1986, 1988)认为，政府所提供的服务，在民主社会往往是大多数投票人意志的体现，可能会忽略少数群体或弱势群体的需求。政府在权衡社会成员相互冲突的多元需求时，无法将有限资源投向所有人群，必然面临取舍问题，因而对于某些社会群体来说，政府在提供公共服务时，可能会出现失灵(Douglas, 1987)。社会组织正是在社会多样化需求无法得到满足的情况下应运而生。弱势群体由于缺乏社会、经济资源，可能无法受益于政府或市场提供的服务，而社区内外较为富裕的群体可能会通过捐款、志愿行为、成立社会组织来帮助弱势群体(Wolch & Geiger, 1983)。“公共治理”理论也认为，引入市场和社会的力量，能够有效地降低政府管理成本，提高效率；同时能够促进服务以民众为导向，加强对民众需要的响应能力；此外能够结合特殊的服务内容、性质和社会需求，采用针对性的服务供给方式，提供公共服务的质量(理查德·博克斯, 2005)。

社会组织的发展除了满足社会需求外，也受到政府因素的影响。除了上述的社区需求与资源供给因素外，政府支持对社会组织发展也至关重要。在讨论国家与专业人士的关系时，三种理论模式经常为人们所引用：国家主义，多元主义和法团主义，国家主义是指国家直接参与组织专业服务并雇佣专业人士，又称之为全能主义；而多元主义指的是，民间力量作主导，国家参与在其中只起辅助手段。处于中间的称之为法团主义，它的特征主要为，国家积极参与民间活动。法团主义又可细分为社会法团主义和国家法团主义，二者的区别在于政府的干预程度，前者较为开放，后者往往受制于中央官僚权力的干预(顾昕 & 王旭, 2005; 纪莺莺, 2013)

政府控制着社会组织发展所需的资源，包括财政资助，税收减免等。国外的研究发现，政府对非盈利组织的资助超过其收入的一半以上(Corbin, 1999)。资源依赖，加上社区需求，刺激了非盈利性组织专注于贫困问题，社会组织只有在解决好资金来源问题后，其才能有能力去解决贫困问题(Eberts & Gronberg, 1990)。当然，社会组织也会接受其他私人捐赠和其他非政府资助(Corbin, 1999)，而对转型期的中国而言，社会组织的典型特征是，活动经费主要来源于国家(顾昕 & 王旭, 2005; 黄晓春, 2015, 2017; 黄晓春 & 嵇欣, 2014)。政府主要通过购买服务对社会组织进行资助。政府购买服务兴起的原因是政府以“经济人”为导向，以竞争为原则，促进资源的合理利用，目的在于通过鼓励第三部门的参与，精简国家机构和减少国家的福利开支(珍妮特·V·登哈特 & 罗伯特·B·登哈特, 2004)。政府实行购买服务之后，对社会组织而言，是一次发展的大好机会。管兵发现，2002年政府购买服务实施之后，上海的社会组织开始迅速发展，购买服务为社会组织提供更好的发展机遇。此外，政府还为社会组织提供组织支持。如社区干部担任社会组织领导，这对那些政府孵化的社会组织而言，影响极大，社区干部担任社会组织领导的数目越多，该社区社会组织的数目可能会越多；此外，社区内部的党政机关数目越多，可能会巩固该社区的组织基础，从而为促进社会组织的发展奠定基础(管兵, 2015)。

在中国社会组织的发展受到政府的较强管理。《社会团体登记管理条例》规定，“国务院有关部门和县级以上地方各级人民政府有关部门、国务院或者县级以上地方各级人民政府授权的组织，是有关行业、学科或者业务范围内社会团体的业务主管单位”。县级以上的机关还充当着监督者的角色，社会团体发展受制于国家政策的导向。国家主要从两个方面对社会组织进行制约和控制，除了上面提到的资金来源，县级以上的政府还对社会组织有监管的职责。国家对公民社会采取防范的态度(顾昕 & 王旭, 2005)，间接会对社会组织的发展造成影响。但是，政府对社会组织的态度并不是千篇一律，对待不同类型的社会组织，政府采取“分类控制”的策略，不同类型社会组织拥有不同的自主性，例如，针对自上而下建立的工会组织和社区居委会，政府不仅控制其建立与否的权力，还有权为其指定业务主管部门，其部门的领导人由业务主管部门确定。其中，居委会的经费也由政府支付，实际上，工会和居委会是政府部门的延伸；其次，针对协会、商会、以及官办NGO，政府采取鼓励支持的态度，在人事和资源上不同程度提供支持；而对于草根NGO和其他非正式社会组织，政府的采取基本是放任自由，不过多干预，有较大的自主性；而针对宗教和政治反对组织，前者主要是控制发展，后者是禁止成立(康晓光 & 韩恒, 2005)。

有学者通过分析三个社区个案，发现城市的政府结构会对社会组织发育产生影响，那些除了市政府之外，仍然有更高行政级别的多级政府结构为社会组织提供了较为宽松的环境，因为市政府的权力会受到一定程度的制约；而对于那些市政府就是当地最高行政机关的城市而言，市政府有强大行政能力，社会组织的发展可能会遭到约束(管兵, 2013)。

（二）社会组织的分类与功能

在国际上，由于各国在文化传统和语言习惯方面存在着不同，社会组织在不同的国家和地区有多种不同的称谓。如非政府组织、非营利组织、公民社会、第三部门或独立部门、志愿者组织、慈善组织、免税组织等等。这些叫法在内涵上区别不大。与政府、企业相区别，社会组织具有非营利性、非政府性

、独立性、志愿性、公益性等基本特征。

2007年，我国开始正式用“社会组织”代替“民间组织”。“民间组织”的“民间”是与“政府”、“官方”相对应的，反映了传统社会政治秩序中“官”与“民”相对应的角色关系，容易让人误解民间组织是与政府相对应甚至是相对立的。因此在新的形势下，党的十六届六中全会和党的十七大把民间组织纳入了社会建设与管理、构建和谐社会的工作大局，对传统的提法进行改造，提出了社会组织这一称谓。

社会组织称谓的提出和使用，有利于纠正社会上对这类组织存在的片面认识，形成各方面重视和支持这类组织的共识。我国将社会组织分为三类，即社会团体、基金会和民办非企业单位。

社会团体是由公民或企事业单位自愿组成、按章程开展活动的社会组织，包括行业性社团、学术性社团、专业性社团和联合性社团。基金会是利用捐赠财产从事公益事业的社会组织，包括公募基金会和非公募基金会。民办非企业单位是由企事业单位、社会团体和其他社会力量以及公民个人利用非国有资产举办的、从事社会服务活动的社会组织，分为教育、卫生、科技、文化、劳动、民政、体育、中介服务和法律服务等十大类(新华网, 2010)。

在中国的社区建设当中，社区自治组织是最受关注的社会组织。社区自治组织对于社区参与、社区建设也非常重要。社区自治的基础正是“对一个由某种共同性统合而成的群体的共同成员感情”(列奥·马修, 1999)，从而能够整合居民的集体目标，引导居民之间的合作，并促进居民对公共事务的参与。因此，根据不同种类的公共利益可以划分社区自治组织的类别。考虑到当前中国社区组织的发展现状，可以划分为两类。第一类是业主委员会，它的产生源自于业主对于自身财产的集体关注(Fu & Lin, 2014)。购买商品房的居民获得了“业主”这一身份，同时也面临了与以往不同的居住状态。商品房小区中关于停车场、商业用地、电梯等公共产权的使用和维护将不可避免地带来邻里之间的争吵(Pow, 2007)。除此之外，业主的产权也经常受到来自外部力量的侵犯，例如物业公司毫无预兆的物业费涨价或是物业服务水平的下降，再例如房地产开发商对共有产权如车库的占用(张紧跟 & 庄文嘉, 2008; Shi & Cai, 2006; Tomba, 2005)。汉娜·阿伦特认为，占有财产让一个人潜在地成为一个自由人，这是个人进入公共生活的前提条件(郭于华 & 沈原, 2012; 郭于华, 沈原, & 陈鹏, 2012)。正是在对财产的关注和争执中，这些居民形成了以共有财产为纽带的利益共同体。除了业委会之外的社区自治组织名称繁多，负责共有财产以外的公共利益的协商和参与，例如本研究在田野调研中观察到的居民议事小组（定期讨论社区生活问题）、居民消防队（自我管理社区安全事务）等。

有学者按照发起人员的构成将社区社会组织划分为居民参与型和非居民参与型，其中居民参与型社区社会组织主要是由社区居民自发成立的，非居民参与型社区社会组织是由一些具备某一方面专业知识的非社区居民成立的，主要包括社会工作者、具有一定专业技能的人员及其他非居民成员(陈洪涛 & 王名, 2009)。因此社区自治组织也可以按照发起人员的构成分为两类，第一类是社区内部自组织形成的社区自治组织，第二类是在社区外由专业人士成立的社区自治组织，它们一般通过政府购买服务进入社区帮助社区居民进行自治。

以业主委员会为代表的社区自治组织在社区开展的主要工作就是组织居民议事、开展自我维权和自我管理活动等。在理想状态下，其工作的过程中，这样的组织能够赋权给居民，使其有自由和渠道来表

达自己的意见和需求(D H. Smith, 2000; Howard, 2003; Read, 2007; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004)。因此，社区自治组织的发展对居民公共参与的影响存在一定的内部合理性。

与此同时，大量国内外研究也表明社区自治组织能够促进居民参与社区公共事务。有学者将美国的非营利组织分为三类，其中公民的非营利组织(civic nonprofits)能够聚集和分析信息，帮助公众更有效地参与到政治过程和社会管理中(Ferris, 1998)。周运清则提到国外流行的社区董事会模式，一半以上的董事会成员由居民选举产生，主要负责与政府机构进行协商沟通，增进本社区福利，同时制定社区的资金使用计划和发展规划(周运清, 2001)。国内的社区自治组织也起到了类似的作用。徐林、许鹿和薛圣凡从社会资本的角度出发，认为社区社会组织可以通过建立“复杂的水平和垂直网络”来连接社区内外资源，提升社区社会资本，从而有助于促成居民自主自发的参与社区事务、促成社区的集体行动(徐林, 许鹿, & 薛圣凡, 2015)。李雪萍和曹朝龙则从公共空间的生产的角度出发，认为社区社会组织能够参与社区公共空间的生产，形成公共议题，带动居民参与，表达社区的共同利益(李雪萍 & 曹朝龙, 2013)。郁建兴和金蕾在杭州市的研究则直接描述了本文所研究的“内生自治组织”的工作过程，杭州市的“邻里值班室”、“和事佬协会”等社区自治组织在工作过程中能够整合公共利益，集结公众意愿，推动居民参与社区重大项目的决策(郁建兴 & 金蕾, 2012)。

关于“外生自治组织”，这类组织大多通过政府购买服务进入社区，崔正、王勇和魏中龙的研究指出政府购买服务可以为社区社会组织提供更广阔的活动空间和更多的资金支持(崔正, 王勇, & 魏中龙, 2012)。因此“外生自治组织”能够有更丰富的支持来促进居民的公共参与。赵罗英和夏建中则进行了关于“外生自治组织”的实证研究，他们发现在北京市的研究发现由外来专家发起的“社区参与行动服务中心”进入社区之后，对原本社区社会组织的骨干成员进行培训，推广参与理念和方法，最终提升了社区社会组织骨干和居民的参与意识和能力，帮助社区社会组织脱离了对社区居委会的依附(赵罗英 & 夏建中, 2014)。关于业主委员会，一些学者认为业主们通过业委会质问房地产开发商或物业公司的侵权，影响政府的决策以及协调邻里内部的矛盾，可以推动基层民主(Shi & Cai, 2006; Zhang, 2008)。有学者通过对中国4个城市23个社区案例的研究，认为业主委员会不仅吸引着想要降低物业费的那些居民的参与，也带动着追求更广泛的政治改变的居民的公共行动(Read, 2007)。韦朝烈和唐湖湘在广州市的研究也认为业主委员会是促进居民民主参与的好机会(韦朝烈 & 唐湖湘, 2007)。

尽管许多学者认为，社会组织能够促进多元社会的整合，推动社会管理创新，促进居民参与(冯钢, 2012; 高丙中, 2006; 关信平, 2011; 刘振国, 2010)，还是推动中国国家与社会关系转型的重要力量(高丙中, 2008; 王名, 2009; 郑杭生, 2011)

然而也有学者对社会组织的发展和对社会建设的作用表示担忧，指出社会组织在中国社区建设与社区服务当中，受到政府“模糊发包制”的治理，因而对自身的发展定位和前景并不明晰(黄晓春, 2015)。同时在开展活动的过程当中，社会组织虽然有“自主性”，但其发展策略却往往是尽量揣摩政府职能部门的需求，争取政府的项目和经费，使得社会组织的服务主体并不是社区居民的需求，而是政府部门的任务(黄晓春 & 嵇欣, 2014)。政府购买服务往往并不是以社区、居民的实际需求为准，而是以“体制内需求”为导向，具有“就近圈内购买”以及悬浮于社区治理网络等特征，这使得社会组织来一发展的重要制度条

件处于缺位状态，要真正实现社会组织的高水平发展，政府必须超越“技术治理”的既有逻辑(黄晓春, 2017; 李友梅 等, 2012)。

(三) 社会组织的发展

社会组织是一个内涵丰富的概念。有的学者从非政府组织的角度进行定义。有的理论则强调社会组织是政府、市场之外的社会力量，因此也有称作“非营利组织”。具体而言，在当今西方存在的社会组织类型非常多样，甚至有些企业也被称作“社会企业”，被作为社会组织的典型代表。

在中国，社会组织的历史可以说很长。例如，自古以来，中国就有非常强大的家族和宗族组织，对中国社会的影响甚至不逊于政权的作用。除此之外，宗教、民俗等社会力量也对于社会具有很大的影响(李培林, 2013)。

建国以来，相当长时间以内，社会组织被瓦解掉了，所谓“社会”的角色和功能很大程度上被政府、单位承担起来，工会、青年团、妇联等虽然也被称作社会力量，但在中国的现实当中，显然更加带有政府延伸的特点。

近年来，中国的社会组织开始得到重视和扶持。民政部提出，“社会组织是参与社会治理的重要主体，是改革公共服务提供方式的重要载体。改革社会组织管理制度，促进社会组织健康有序发展，鼓励和支持社会组织在社会治理中发挥积极作用，有利于强化社会协同、扩大公众参与、增强社会活力，有利于转变政府职能、降低社会治理成本、提高公共服务供给效率，有利于巩固党的执政基础和社会和谐基础。”各级政府部门也提供了多种措施，例如政府购买服务的方式，鼓励、引导社会组织参与社会治理和社区建设。

但另一方面中国的社会组织又受到政府非常强的管理和引导。中共中央办公厅发布的《关于进一步加强社会组织党的建设工作的意见（试行）》，要求“切实加强由民政部作为业务主管单位的社会组织党建工作，积极配合中央党建工作机构开展全国性社会组织党建工作，确保社会组织沿着正确的政治方向发展”，并且长期以来对于社会组织的注册、发展、评估都有非常具体甚至严格的规定。

(四) 社会组织影响社区参与的机制

在西方的情境下，社会组织的社会功能主要体现在提供服务、丰富社会资本两个方面：

“公共治理”理论认为，引入市场和社会的力量，能够有效地降低政府管理成本，提高效率；同时能够促进服务以民众为导向，加强对民众需要的响应能力；此外能够结合特殊的服务内容、性质和社会需求，采用针对性的服务供给方式，提高公共服务的质量。

社会资本理论则认为，社会组织的发展能够促进社会资本的丰富、增强个体之间的信任、合作、互惠，有利于集体行动，促进有效的公共治理以及提供制度绩效。

在中国，社会组织在社会建设当中的作用主要是提供服务，民政部提出，“要积极推动公共服务提供方式创新。能由政府向社会组织购买服务提供的，政府不再直接承办。能由政府和社会资本合作提供的，广泛吸引社会资本参与。在发展基本公共服务中，推动加大政府向社会组织购买服务力度。凡由政府向社会组织购买服务的，或政府和社会资本合作提供的，都应通过竞争性选择方式进行。”

也有相当多的文献关注中国社会组织发展中体现的国家与社会的关系，许多学者从“公民社会”、“法团主义”分析了中国社会组织的自主性以及和政府之间的关系(详细的综述可参见纪莺莺, 2013)。总的来说，学者们普遍认同，中国的社会组织很大程度上受到政府的管理和引导。社会组织除了“服务”，还起到“动员”的作用。

这也可以从两方面来理解。一方面一些社会组织受到国家、政府的引导和管理，在提供服务的同时，起到将“后单位时代”的社会民众再组织起来，并进行社会管理的作用。另一方面，确实有一些社会组织，特别是草根产生的社会组织，起到了动员居民参与集体行动的作用，例如一些业主委员会主导的业主维权、环境抗争运动(管兵, 2010; 肖林, 2011)。事实上，社会组织的这种“动员”作用，在西方社会也并不罕见。在西方社会当中，社会组织也是很重要的社会动员力量，一些社会组织甚至对选举投票、议会立法有非常强的影响力。

(五) 文献评述与分析框架

综上，我们可以看到，理论上，社会组织对于社会建设主要的作用可以总结为提供服务、促进社会资本以及社会动员三个方面。但已有的研究主要在关注社会组织对于社会治理的作用，以及在社会组织管理上国家与社会之间的关系角度，但实际上并没有非常深入的研究社会组织对于社区建设，特别是社区参与到底起到什么样的作用，以及发挥作用的机制是什么？到底社会组织在社区当中的角色是仅仅提供服务，还是能够促进社区社会资本的增加，促进社区团结，实现社区自我治理，还是政府通过购买服务实现社会动员和治理的助手？这些问题并没有得到很好地回答，特别是缺乏利用全国性的数据进行的深入分析。

综上，根据社会组织的作用和发挥机制，考虑到我们国家的现实，我们就社会组织对社区参与的影响提出如下命题：

命题1：“提供服务”命题：社区组织通过向社区居民提供有针对性的社会服务，填补政府、市场的空白，因此促进居民的社区认同和满意度，因而促进居民的社区参与。如果社会组织的作用是“提供服务”，那么社区社会组织主要应该影响的是接受这些服务的居民的社区参与，并且主要是“自主式”的参与。也就是说提供服务的社会组织，只影响特定类型的社区参与，例如社区文体组织只影响社区居民的社区文化休闲参与情况。

命题2：“促进社会资本”命题：社区组织进入社区，有助于拓展社区的社会资本，促进社区居民的人际关系和信任，因而促进社区居民的社区参与。社会资本的作用被认为是整体性的、潜在的(罗伯特·帕特南, 2001)。因此促进社会资本的社会组织应该对所有类型的社区参与都有影响，对“自主式”、“动员式”的参与都是如此。

命题3：“社会动员”命题：社区组织在社区当中，起到将社区居民重新纳入社区组织和管理，参与社区建设的“动员”作用。起到“社会动员”作用的社会组织，主要影响“动员式”的社区参与。

这三个命题是我们根据理论提出的，但实际比较难以直接进行验证。我们试图结合社区社会组织的具体类型等情况来进行分析和验证。根据不同的维度，我们可以将社区社会组织进行如下分类。

首先，在社区当中，非常重要的一类社会组织是业主委员会，与之对应的是物业公司，虽然物业公

司实际属于企业，但在社区当中，物业起到了非常重要的作用，在这里我们将物业公司也纳入对社会组织的分析当中，一方面是考虑到物业在社区管理和服务中的重要地位，另一方面，也作为市场作用的一种体现。已有的研究对社区党组织、居委会的作用已经有所分析，但一直没有对市场的力量进行研究。在这里，将物业纳入分析，有助于我们比较国家、市场和社会因素在社区建设当中的作用。

我们假定物业属于提供社区居民服务的社会组织，则按照命题1，提出

假设1a：物业作为提供服务的社会组织，主要影响居民的“自主式”参与。这里的编号“1”对应的是前面的命题1，以下的命名也沿用这一规则。

同时一般认为业主委员会主要的作用进行业主维权，则按照命题3，提出：

假设3a：业主委员会作为进行居民维权和动员的社会组织，主要影响居民的“动员式”参与。

其次，在中国区分社会组织非常重要的一个维度是是否注册，由此可以划分出三类社会组织，包括在民政部门登记注册的社会组织、经过备案的社区社会组织、未经过任何登记或备案的社会组织。

我们假定在中国的情境下，经过登记注册的社会组织更加体现政府的管理和引导，因此一方面带有提供服务的作用，另一方面也扮演社会管理和动员的角色，因此按照命题3，提出：

假设3b：经过民政部门登记注册的社会组织、经过备案的社区社会组织主要影响动员式的参与。

同时，未经过任何登记或备案的社会组织，则带有比较强的草根性，更多体现的是“社会资本”的作用，因此按照命题2，提出：

假设2a：未经过任何登记或备案的社会组织对所有类型的社区参与都有影响，对“自主式”、“动员式”的参与都是如此。

第三，根据社会组织的业务职能，可以将社区社会组织分成如下几类：社会服务和公益慈善类、群众性文体类、协助社区管理类、群众自我管理与服务类。其中，我们认为社会服务和公益慈善类、群众性文体类都属于“提供服务”类的，而协助社区管理类、群众自我管理与服务类则带有较强的社区管理和动员的特点。因此参照命题1、3，提出

假设1b：社会服务和公益慈善类、群众性文体类社会组织主要影响自主式的参与，特别是根据服务的内容，他们应该分别主要影响“参与社区公益”、“参与社区文体休闲”活动。

假设3c：协助社区管理类、群众自我管理与服务类社会组织主要影响动员式的参与。

第四，根据社会组织成立的情况，可以区分为在社区内成立的组织、在社区内活动的外部社会组织。我们假定社区内部成立的社会组织，主要体现社区内部社会资本的作用，而外部的社会组织由于是从外部进入社区的，主要起到服务或者动员的作用，由此参照命题2、3我们提出：

假设2b：社区内部成立的社会组织对所有类型的社区参与都有显著的影响。

假设3d：在社区内活动的外部社会组织主要起到提供社区服务的作用，因此仅对“自主式”的参与有影响，特别是只对与其业务有关的社区参与有影响。

假设3e：在社区内活动的外部社会组织主要起到提供社会动员的作用，因此仅对“动员式”的参与有影响。

二、 研究设计

（一） 数据

本文使用的数据是民政部政研中心2015年在全国开展的“社区治理现状综合调查”当中的城市部分数据。该部分调查分两部分进行，在特定社区有两份调查，一份是居民层面的“社区治理中的居民参与调查”，抽取若干名居民填答；另一份是“城市社区治理现状综合调查”，由社区干部填答。调查采用的多阶段的分层抽样，具体的调研实施由北京大学社会调查中心团队负责设计与实施，实地访问采用计算机辅助系统执行，数据质量较高。完整的数据包括4229个个案，分布于151个社区。由于缺失值的存在，本文实际使用的数据个案数为3029个。

之所以有这么多的缺失，首先是因为有220个受访者所在社区没有进行社区层面的调查。其次是因为我们使用到的变量非常多，因此导致丢失掉的不完整个案数较多。笔者试着对数据进行了插补，但是由于涉及的变量确实较多，使得插补的结果并不稳定，因此在本研究中汇报的结果是未进行插补的、完整个案的情况。

（二） 变量

1、 因变量：

本文将社区参与分为“动员式参与”、“自主式参与”两类。

“动员式参与”主要有两类，分别是参加居委会换届选举、参加社区创建。两个变量都是参与过赋值为1，否则为0。

“自主式参与”分为五类，分别是参加社区事务监督、参加社区文化活动、参加社区公益活动、参加社区公共事务、参加社区网络互动。六类变量也都是参加过赋值为1，否则为0。

2、 解释变量

是否有物业公司，及社区内物业公司的数量。前者为虚拟变量，后者为连续变量。

是否有业主委员会，及社区内业委会的数量。前者为虚拟变量，后者为连续变量。

社会组织的总数，为连续变量。笔者将其另外转换为“社区内有无社会组织”的虚拟变量。

社会组织的注册情况。具体而言包括：在民政部门登记注册的社会组织、经过备案的社区社会组织、未经过任何登记或备案的社会组织。调查询问了社区是否有这些社会组织，及其数量。前者为虚拟变量，后者为连续变量。

社会组织的功能类型。具体而言包括如下几类：社会服务和公益慈善类、群众性文体类、协助社区管理类、群众自我管理与服务类。调查既询问了社区中是否有这些社会组织，并进一步询问了具体有多少个。以及分别有多少是在社区内部成立的，有多少是“在社区内活动的外部社会组织”。

社区内宗教设施数量、社区内志愿者活动组织数量。两个变量为连续变量，笔者将其另外转换为“社区内有无宗教设施”、“社区内有无志愿者活动组织”两个虚拟变量纳入模型。

3、 控制变量

（1） 个人层面

对社区服务的满意度，包括对体育设施满意度、文化设施满意度、公共服务满意度¹、便民服务满意度²、社区安全满意度³、社区环境满意度⁴。

社区认同，由四个问题的量表构成，包括“在小区有家的感觉”、“喜欢我的小区”、“告诉别人我住在哪里很自豪”、“愿意在这个小区长期住下去”。信度检验表明这四个问题的测量较为一致，Cronbach's alpha值为0.91，因此我们将这四个问题进行加总平均，汇总为“社区认同”这一指标。

社会资本，包括认识居委会人数、打招呼邻居数、拜访居民数、可倾诉邻居数、拜访邻居次数、被邻居拜访次数、能否委托邻居收件、向邻居借东西是否能借到等问题。

个人层面其他的控制变量还有性别（女性为参照）、年龄、婚姻状况（未婚为参照）、文化程度、党员身份（非党员为参照）、个人年收入（纳入模型时取对数）、是否接受社会救助（未受救助为参照）、主观家庭阶层地位、是否为业主（参照类：租户）。

（2）社区层面

社区动员能力，包括：社区内党政机关数、社区内事业单位数、社区党组织类型、社区党员人数、党建经费（纳入模型时取对数）、社区党组织开展的社区服务项目类型数、居委会成员数、居委会办公面积、居委会办公经费（纳入模型时取对数）。

社区资源是否源于社区，包括：社区服务收费是否居委会主要资金来源之一、社区办营利性企业是否居委会主要资金来源之一、社区资产经营是否居委会主要资金来源之一。

社区社会资本，包括：社区内社会组织数、社会服务和公益慈善类社会组织数、群众性文体类社会组织数、协助社区管理类社会组织数、群众自我管理服务类社会组织数、社区内宗教设施数目、社区是否开展邻里互助活动。

社区层面其他的控制变量还有：社区建立年份、社区城区位置（城区、城乡结合部、城镇，其中城镇为参照）、社区常住人口数（纳入模型时取对数）。

（三）分析策略

本文主要使用的是多层logit模型。

分析表明，我们的数据应该使用多层分析技术，并且使用社区作为层级是恰当的。“组内相关系数”

1 调查询问了受访者对九项社区公共服务（包括社区再就业服务、最低生活保障服务、残疾人社会救助服务、计划生育服务、流动人口管理与服务、社区矫正服务、社区公共安全维护、社区居家养老服务、社区医疗卫生服务）的满意度。信度检验表明这九项的测量较为一致，Cronbach's alpha值为0.89，因此我们将这九项进行加总平均，汇总为“公共服务满意度”这一指标。

2 调查询问了受访者对七项便民服务（包括供排水服务、水电气费用收缴、物业管理服务、家政服务、邮政、快递代收、社区便民超市）的满意度。信度检验表明这七项的测量较为一致，Cronbach's alpha值为0.70，因此我们将这七项进行加总平均，汇总为“便民服务满意度”这一指标。

3 调查询问了受访者对五项社区安全指标（包括社区民警服务、社区保安服务、社区消防设施、社区技防设施、社区治安环境）的满意度。信度检验表明这五项的测量较为一致，Cronbach's alpha值为0.86，因此我们将这五项进行加总平均，汇总为“社区安全满意度”这一指标。

4 调查询问了受访者对五项社区安全指标（包括社区绿化、社区保洁（垃圾清运）、社区公共设施维护、社区照明（路灯、楼道灯）、社区车辆停放）的满意度。信度检验表明这五项的测量较为一致，Cronbach's alpha值为0.82，因此我们将这五项进行加总平均，汇总为“社区环境满意度”这一指标。

(Intraclass Correlation Coefficient) 是判断层级划分是否恰当, 是否需要做多层分析的一个统计指标 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2007)³⁵。这一系数实际反映的是在因变量的方差当中, 组间 (层级单位之间) 差异占的比例。实际就是说, 分组或者分层, 能够多大程度上解释 (也就是影响) 因变量的差异。

如下表, 可以看出, 以社区作为层级, 不同参与行为与意愿模型的组内相关系数都超过20%, 也就是说因变量在不同社区间的差异占总的差异的比重超过20%。可见社区对于居民的社区参与行为与意愿有着突出的影响, 我们采用社区作为分析层级是正确的, 同时也是应该的。

表1-0 多层logit模型的组内相关系数 (ICC) 情况

社区参与类型	ICC
社区换届选举	0.3184
社区事务监督	0.3012
文体休闲活动	0.3907
社区公益事业	0.3446
社区创建活动	0.3359
社区公共事务	0.2458
社区网络互动	0.3282

为了分析的简便, 我们首先把社会组织单独放进模型, 进行分析。然后再统一放入模型, 做完整的模型分析。

三、研究发现

首先, 在所有变量当中, 是否有物业服务公司对于居民的社区参与影响是最为突出的, 对除了社区公共事务之外的所有社区参与类型, 物业都是显著的促进作用。可见物业提供社区服务, 不仅能够促进居民的自主式参与, 对动员式的参与也能有所帮助。但物业的数量也不是越多越好, 研究发现随着物业数量的增加, 居民参与社区文化休闲、社区公益、社区创建、社区公共事务的可能性都下降。这可能与这些小区规模较为庞大, 经济条件较好有关系。

而业主委员会作为居民自我管理和维权组织, 对于居民的社区参与并没有明显的影响, 并没有对居民的自主参与或维权参与有显著的作用。有业委会社区的居民参与社区居委会换届的可能性更低, 并且业主委员会数量越多, 参与社区监督的可能性越低, 仅仅是对居民参与社区网络互动有一定促进作用。可见业委会对居民的社区参与并没有积极和普遍的影响。

表1 社会组织对社区参与的影响

	(1)投票	(2)监督	(3)休闲	(4)公益	(5)创建	(6)事务	(7)网络
有物业	1.966*	2.841***	2.665*	2.780**	1.849+	1.606	1.574+
	(0.616)	(0.862)	(1.076)	(0.937)	(0.604)	(0.501)	(0.421)
物业机构	0.960	0.951	0.893+	0.896*	0.880*	0.873*	0.958
数量	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.043)

	(1)投票	(2)监督	(3)休闲	(4)公益	(5)创建	(6)事务	(7)网络
有业委会	0.556*	1.444	0.973	0.917	1.149	1.066	1.282
	(0.160)	(0.389)	(0.357)	(0.282)	(0.346)	(0.299)	(0.313)
业委会数量	1.003	0.954+	1.003	1.028	0.987	1.014	1.085***
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.025)
社区内有社会组织	0.863	0.743	0.246*	1.033	0.599	0.542	0.293**
	(0.365)	(0.308)	(0.137)	(0.468)	(0.266)	(0.230)	(0.134)
有注册社会组织	0.775	1.775+	1.090	0.857	1.283	1.550	4.303***
	(0.246)	(0.548)	(0.439)	(0.287)	(0.422)	(0.492)	(1.445)
有备案社会组织	1.326	0.763	2.103	0.868	1.016	1.200	1.061
	(0.496)	(0.268)	(1.017)	(0.343)	(0.396)	(0.440)	(0.384)
有未登记备案社会组织	1.983+	2.404*	1.911	1.209	2.065+	2.643*	0.823
	(0.794)	(0.866)	(0.987)	(0.514)	(0.847)	(0.999)	(0.344)
内生公益类	1.487	0.678	1.006	1.053	0.879	1.316	1.074
	(0.417)	(0.178)	(0.361)	(0.314)	(0.253)	(0.349)	(0.274)
内生文体类	1.230	1.760+	2.473*	1.510	1.355	1.987*	1.706+
	(0.381)	(0.534)	(0.989)	(0.511)	(0.440)	(0.587)	(0.521)
内生协管类	0.680	0.466**	0.516+	0.846	0.711	0.503*	1.298
	(0.190)	(0.124)	(0.186)	(0.253)	(0.206)	(0.139)	(0.352)

续表1 社会组织对社区参与的影响

	(1)投票	(2)监督	(3)休闲	(4)公益	(5)创建	(6)事务	(7)网络
内生自我服务类	1.260	1.324	1.696	1.122	1.533	2.081**	1.336
	(0.355)	(0.350)	(0.606)	(0.336)	(0.452)	(0.570)	(0.339)
外来公益类	0.702	0.634	0.813	0.710	0.597	0.626	0.594
	(0.262)	(0.218)	(0.384)	(0.286)	(0.229)	(0.224)	(0.194)
外来文体类	1.664	0.961	1.748	0.816	0.964	0.564	1.230
	(0.853)	(0.489)	(1.137)	(0.446)	(0.519)	(0.291)	(0.614)
外来协管类	1.438	2.842*	0.973	1.139	0.713	0.805	0.360+
	(0.735)	(1.374)	(0.669)	(0.632)	(0.379)	(0.403)	(0.194)
外来自我服务类	1.282	1.361	0.673	7.265*	11.037**	3.272	1.978
	(1.048)	(0.985)	(0.686)	(6.498)	(9.188)	(2.439)	(1.511)
宗教设施	1.612	1.556	1.304	1.879+	1.241	0.898	0.923
	(0.479)	(0.469)	(0.513)	(0.619)	(0.406)	(0.288)	(0.320)
志愿者活动组织	1.126	2.847***	2.265*	2.038*	0.943	0.790	2.882**
	(0.342)	(0.897)	(0.903)	(0.676)	(0.309)	(0.247)	(1.053)
控制变量	已控制	已控制	已控制	已控制	已控制	已控制	已控制
N	3029	3029	3029	3029	3029	3029	3013
ll	-1516.536	-1068.817	-1388.983	-1589.555	-1323.102	-1127.980	-680.760
chi2	431.729	412.597	335.312	335.599	399.895	375.837	389.340

注：1.系数为指数化的系数（exponentiated coefficients）；2.括号内为标准误；

3. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

就狭义的“社会组织”而言，社区内是否有社会组织对于社区参与并不像预设的那样有显著、积极的作用。反而是如果社区里面有社会组织的话，居民参与社区文化休闲、社区网络互动的可能性更低。

进一步分析社会组织的注册情况可以发现，有正式注册的社会组织，社区居民参与社区监督、社区网络互动的可能性更高。社区内有未登记备案社会组织，社区居民参与社区居委会换届选举、社区事务监督、社区创建、社区公共事务的可能性都更高。这表明，非正式的社会组织对于社区参与有着重要的影响。这可能是因为“未登记备案的社会组织”越多，当地内生的、群众社会组织越多，社会资本越发达，因此社区参与越积极。

分析社会组织的类型，可以看到社区内成立的群众性文体类的社会组织、协助社区管理类组织对于社区参与的作用较为突出，其中社区内成立的群众性文体类的社会组织对于居民参与社区监督、社区文体休闲活动、社区公共事务、社区网络互动都有显著的促进作用。而社区内成立的协助社区管理类社会组织对于社区监督、社区文体休闲活动、社区公共事务都有显著的影响，但都是负面的作用，即居民参与的可能性反而越低。

与此对照的是，社区外成立、但在社区内活动的外部组织对于社区居民的社区参与影响并不突出。从外部进入的协助社区管理类组织对于居民参与社区监督有积极的作用。此外，从外部进入的群众自我管理与服务类社会组织对于居民参与社区公益活动、社区创建有着显著的影响。除此之外，并没有明显的作用

另外，研究发现，社区内有宗教设施对于社区居民参与社区公益有促进作用，而社区内有志愿者活动组织，对居民参与社区监督、社区文体休闲、社区公益、社区网络互动有显著的影响。

四、结论

综上，我们可以看出，中国的社会组织对与社区参与的作用主要体现在如下几个方面：

提供服务是最有效的方式。物业公司尽管主要的只能是提供社区服务，但是却能带动几乎所有类型社区参与。此外，开展社区文体活动不仅有效地促进了社区居民的文体参与，也对社区监督、社区公共事务等有所影响。另外，研究发现真正有差异的并不是社会组织数量的多少，甚至社会组织数量越多，反而居民社区参与越不积极（例如物业数量、业主委员会数量等）。真正有影响的是是否有这些社会组织，可见社会组织在社区建设中最主要扮演的角色是提供服务，而不是增加社会资本。

但是研究也确实发现，社会资本对社区参与有着突出的影响。分析表明，影响社区参与最重要的不是有多少正式、受到政府购买服务项目资助的正式组织进入社区，而是有多少真正从社区内部成立的、特别是未登记备案社会组织的“非正式”组织。宗教设施、志愿者活动组织这些体现社会资本的社会组织也对社区参与有积极的作用。此外，对于社区文体活动组织的研究也发现，社区文体活动不仅仅是促进社区文娱休闲活动的参与，更是促进了社区社会资本，使得居民参与大多数类型社区活动的可能性都有所上升。而这些社会组织所产生的社会关系、社会资本，很明显都是非正式的。

但也要看到内生的社会组织并不一定都对社会参与有促进作用。业主委员会的成立只是对居民参与社区监督有所促进，但对其他类型的参与并没有明显的作用。而社区内部自我建立的协助社区管理类组织，甚至对居民参与社区监督、社区文化休闲、社区公共事务起到了负面的作用。

这也证明社区组织参与动员, 存在一定特殊性。内部成立的群众动员组织起到的是负向的作用。这与对社会资本负面作用的论述相一致(陈捷 & 卢春龙, 2009; 罗伯特·帕特南, 2011; 石发勇, 2010)。同时, 反而是外来的社区协助管理组织、群众自我管理与服务类社会组织对社区参与起到了积极的促进作用, 特别是后者对于居民参与社区公益、社区创建, 有着非常大的影响。前面的研究已经证明这些类型的社区参与带有较强的“动员”性质。这证明, 中国的社区社会组织确实也起到社会动员的作用, 特别是从外部进入社区的群众动员组织作用较为突出。而内部群众动员组织的负向作用, 可能正是为了对抗社区建设中的这种“动员”。

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The Role and Impact of Government Purchase of Social Work Services in Social Governance: with Its Focus on Social Protection for Children at Risk in Qinghai and Anhui Province, China

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Abstract

With the development of economy and rapid urbanization, China is witnessing a large number of left-behind and migrant children in the countryside, while their parents live and work elsewhere. It aroused high attention from the whole country and researchers started to investigate this social problem. China's response to this problem has been the promulgation of a series of policies and regulations concerning social protection for children at risk. In particular, purchase of child care services is a policy tool for the Chinese government to respond to the issue of protecting left-behind and migrant children. With the relatively high proportion of left-behind and migrant children in Qinghai and Anhui Province, this article describes the status of social work organizations providing social services for left-behind and migrant children, and analyzes the role and impact of government purchase of social services in supporting social work organizations to be engaged in social protection for such children. Based on the survey data and research of child-related social work organizations, we found that, the local governments of Qinghai and Anhui Province have proactively increased purchases of social services to promote the innovation of social governance, and to satisfy the basic needs of children at risk. Yet, the research also shows that the children welfare policies of both provinces are mainly the cohesive policies of the central government, lacking relevant policies concerning the protection for children at risk.

Keywords: government purchase of social services, social governance, social work organizations, social protection for children at risk, Qinghai and Anhui province

Introduction

With the development of economy and rapid urbanization, China is witnessing a large number of left-behind and migrant children, which results in a series of social issues. Therefore, Chinese Government has promulgated a series of policies and regulations concerning child welfare to promote the social protection of rural-urban left-behind and migrant children to some

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extent. Nonetheless, influenced by economic, sociocultural and other factors, the interpretation and implementation of national policies vary distinctly from region to region.

²As the prominent urban-rural dual structure has still existed in China at present, the number of left-behind and migrant children features enormous. According to the results calculated by the All-China Women's Federation and Research Group of Renmin University of China in 2012, left-behind children in rural areas was as many as 61,025,500, accounting for 37.7% of rural children and 21.88% of children nationwide. While rural-to-urban migrant children with age between 0 and 17 reached 35.81 million, including those who have rural household register accounting for 80.35%. By this token, China has rural migrant children of 28.77 million in total. Both rural left-behind and migrant children are up to 96,835,500, 34.72% of total children nationwide, which shows that left-behind and migrant children are two primary children groups in China. ³The investigation result released by MOCA in November 2016 showed that China had 9.02 million left-behind children in countryside by then. Among them, 8.05 million of children were not taken care by their parents but by their grandparents, with the overwhelming proportion up to 89.3%. ⁴According to the sixth national census data, China had 239,347,105 children aged 0-15, however, left-behind children in the countryside merely accounted 3.77% of the total children aged 0-15 nationwide, based on the statement from the MOCA. Above discussion showed that the unified recognition has not been formed on the specified number of left-behind children due to different concept definition of the left-behind children and other reasons.

By now, the universal social service for children has not been established in China. Only in recent years, the main targets of social services provided by the Chinese government are collectively called as “children at risk”. They are specifically divided in the following categories: children who have lost both their parents, abandoned children (refer to those who have not guardian, or have lost parent while the other unidentified), disabled children or children affected by the disability, waifs, children affected by HIV/AIDS, prisoners’ children, aggrieved and neglected children and poverty-stricken children. Among all categories, left-behind and migrant children who are mostly orphans, disabled children and poverty-stricken children are facing more serious difficulties compared to other children. Therefore, they may be more possibly included in the government’s project of purchasing of social services from social organizations.

With the relatively high proportion of left-behind and migrant children, Qinghai Province and Anhui Province have conducted beneficial exploration on in the government’s project of

² National Bureau of Statistics, *The Sixth National Census Data*, <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm>, March 13, 2017.

³ According to the *Notice*, investigated objectives refer to rural minors under 16 whose parents are migrant workers or who have one migrant-worker parent and the other incapable of guardianship.

⁴ [www.xinhuanet.com: MOCA: Care and Love Movement to Carry Out for 9.02 Million Rural Left-behind Children](http://news.xinhuanet.com/city/2016-11/20/c_129371011.htm), http://news.xinhuanet.com/city/2016-11/20/c_129371011.htm March 13, 2017; [www.chinanews.com: MOCA: Nearly 90% of 9.02 Million Rural Left-behind Children Not Live with Parent\(s\)](http://www.chinanews.com: MOCA: Nearly 90% of 9.02 Million Rural Left-behind Children Not Live with Parent(s)), <http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2016/11-10/8058359.shtml>, March 13, 2017.

purchasing of social services for children at risk. The paper concentrates on the status of the social work organizations of the two provinces to participate in the social protection of children, and will analyze the role and impact of government policy in providing service for the social work organizations to engage in the social protection of left-behind and migrant children in Qinghai and Anhui Province, China.

Research methodology


The research context

In China, the public (mainly the state-owned) child welfare service organizations and social work organizations are two major units to provide welfare service for children at risk by now. Officially, the government, relying on public welfare institutions, establishes the child-welfare instruction centers and child welfare service stations in sub-districts or towns / townships as well as child welfare supervisors in neighborhood / villages committees. From the top to bottom, the integrated child welfare system at four levels from bureau, institution, station to personnel has been formed to provide efficient services for children and their families by effectively putting related policies into practice. Official child welfare system receives funds and supports from the government and therefore is recognized as a sustainable model. Privately, the social work organizations have been relatively active in China. These organizations also play an important role in offering welfare services for children at risk. In an overall view, however, China's social work organizations are of varying quality at present, the services that social work organizations deliver mainly act as a deficiency of government's services and deemed as the temporary and supplementary services for child welfare service mechanism.

Lack of financial support targeted at children at risk, government procurement of social services becomes a new approach for Chinese governments to furnish social services in the past few years. The main objective of the government's new approach is to provide social service through purchasing of social work from social organizations for children at risk. Its main target refer to orphans, children receiving minimum living allowance (dibao) (i.e., children from households receiving the minimum living allowance), disabled children, children affected by HIV/AIDS and other children. The government's new approach above is by the way of the government providing services for children at risk by funding both official and private child welfare organizations.

Research idea herein centers on government's purchasing of social services from social work organizations. It analyzes the current supply mechanism of government's purchasing of social services and its role and impact on assistance and protection of rural-urban left-behind and migrant children on the basis of reviewing national and local existing policies on government's purchasing of social services, and depicts the opportunity of social work organizations to participate in government's purchasing and the challenges they will encounter (See Figure 1.).

Figure 1. Research Idea and Technical Route



Research Objectives

The reason that both Qinghai and Anhui are selected as the pilots is due to their larger proportion of left-behind and migrant children. Besides, Qinghai also benefits from the agreements signed between by Ministry of Civil Affairs of People's Government (hereinafter referred to as MOCA) and Qinghai Provincial People's Government, to promote civil affairs in regions affected by the Sanjiangyuan Ecological Protection and Construction Project. This will bring forth additional fiscal resources to endorse social governance innovation, service professionalization of social work organizations. Anhui is the pilot province selected by the MOCA to strengthen the juvenile social protection system, and this pilot project support the development of social work organizations to improve the social services for left-behind children.

Since government's purchasing of social services is an important part of child welfare in both provinces, this paper will introduce related policies on government's procurement, in particular of policies targeted to children at risk and will evaluate the effectiveness of government's procurement in improving children's living condition and their overall welfare. It also depicts the status of social work organizations providing social protection services for children in above two provinces, and analyzes the role and impact of government policies on these social

work organizations. Based on the discovery and suggestions concluded herein, pilot programs will also be designed for both Qinghai and Anhui, to facilitate the government's procurement by boosting the participation of social work organizations in providing social services for left-behind children.

Data-collection Process

Three social work organizations for children have been interviewed in Anhui Province, namely Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City, Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City, and Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City. Three social workers have been interviewed in Anhui Province. Five social work organizations for children have been interviewed in Qinghai Province, namely Qinghai Children's Welfare Association, Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province, Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province, Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children, Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province. Eight social workers have been interviewed in Qinghai Province. According to the basic information offered by interviewees, each organization is equipped with very few staff, and even less professionals, and limited annual expenditure. The majority of social work organizations do not exclusively offer services for children, which is only part of their work. The basic information of the interviewed social work organizations in the two Provinces is as follows.

Three social work organizations have been interviewed in Anhui Province, and their basic information:

(1) There are six workers in the non-governmental non-enterprise Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City, which include four professionals. The total revenue of the organization in 2016 was RMB 100 thousand, which came from sale of services purchased by the government. The main sources of fund were government grants, government subsidy, and government project expenditure. During the recent five years, the organizations with which these interviewees work have undertaken one project related to government purchasing social services, and the project was procured by public bidding.

(2) As a professional social work organization, Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City was established in line with the policies of the CPC Bozhou Municipal Committee and municipal government on nurturing and developing social work organizations. It offers services as a public social organization under the guidance and nurture of Social Work Committee. Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City was set up in 2012, and is a non-governmental non-enterprise unit of Bozhou City, Anhui Province. The main scope of business of the organization includes theoretical research, academic research, and technical training of social work, difficulty relief, problem mediation, protection of rights and interests, psychological counseling, behavior correction, relationship adjustment, charity, and social service. There are 5 workers in Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City, including three professionals. The total revenue of 2016 was RMB 125 thousand, acquired from the

services purchased by the government.

(3) Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City is a non-governmental non-enterprise unit of Bozhou City, Anhui Province. There are four workers in the organization, including one professional. In 2016, Department of Civil Affairs of Anhui Province made governmental purchase for its training project for social organization responsible persons (2016-AHMZ-042), which was undertaken by Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City at a price of RMB 57 thousand. On September 5, 2016, the project of “Supporting Plan for Social Work Professionals Supporting Outlying Poverty-stricken Areas, Ethnic Minority Areas in the Borderland, and Former Revolutionary Base Areas” of 2016 was launched in Guolou Village, Xipanlou Town, Lixin County, Bozhou City. Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City also undertook this project. In 2017, Boai Social Work Service Center undertook the “Accompanied Growth” project of Department of Civil Affairs of Anhui Province in Hexie Village, Sunmiao Township, Lixin County.

Five social work organizations have been interviewed in Qinghai Province, and their basic information:

(1) Qinghai Children’s Welfare Association was founded with lawful registration in 2015, and is a non-profit provincial organization dedicated to the welfare of children. There are six workers in Qinghai Children’s Welfare Association, including five professionals. The organization was registered as a social group. The main sources of fund are government grants, government subsidy, government project expenditure, and support offered by relevant foundations. During the recent five years, the organizations with which these interviewees work have undertaken one project related to government purchasing social services.

(2) Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province is among the first professional social work service organizations in Qinghai Province, and is a non-governmental non-enterprise organization. The organization hires six professionals. The main sources of fund are government grants, government subsidy, government project expenditure, and support offered by relevant foundations. The total revenue of 2016 was RMB 360 thousand, secured from the services purchased by the government. Governmental projects undertaken by Leping Social Work Service Center include: “Demonstration Project of Care for Migrant Children of Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province” of projects of state revenue being used to encourage social work organizations to participate in social services, “Demonstration Project of Care for Rural Left-behind Children”, “Sunshine with You” project of care for disabled people of Chengzhong District of Xining City, “Support Project for Minor Children of Prisoners and People under Labor Correction” purchased by the CPC Qinghai Provincial Committee, “Project of Controlling Multi-drug-resistant Tuberculosis Funded by Lilly Endowment”, Project of Helping and Teaching Idle and Delinquent Teenagers named "Caring for the Youth" purchased by the CYL Qinghai Provincial Committee.

(3) Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province was a non-governmental non-enterprise unit

registered in Department of Civil Affairs of Qinghai Province in 2011, and is administered by Department of Civil Affairs of Qinghai Province. The center has engaged in poverty reduction and relief efforts for over 20 years in Qinghai Province, and well knows the poverty reality of Qinghai as a province with multiple ethnic groups, and has accumulated best practices in the poverty reduction work of this region. Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province hires six workers, all professionals. The main sources of fund are support offered by relevant foundations, sponsorship/donation offered by enterprises and individuals, and interest income. The total revenue of 2016 was RMB 720 thousand, all secured from social donation. Projects undertaken by Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province include: “Happy Sports and Healthy Life” donation project of offering sports equipment for schools of rural areas, “A Technology-powered Future” project of Audio-visual Education Room of the Ethnic Middle School of Tongren County, “Open the Window and Watch the World” project of equipping schools with TV&DVD, “Dream Drive” project for senior high school students from poor families of Qinghai Province, “Warm Winter” project supported by groups, and “Happy Childhood” projects for Wanquan Elementary School of Xiabolang Village of Tongren County, and Wanquan Elementary School of Cuogankou Village of Jianzha County.

(4) There are four workers in the non-governmental non-enterprise Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children, including three professionals. The main sources of fund are government grants, government subsidy, government project expenditure, and support offered by relevant foundations. The total revenue of 2016 was RMB 140 thousand, secured from the services purchased by the government. Projects undertaken by Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children include: Project of Helping and Teaching Delinquent Teenagers carried out by Xining CYL community, “Accompanying Children” winter volunteer service, and others.

(5) Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province is a non-governmental non-enterprise organization approved by Department of Civil Affairs of Qinghai Province. It dedicates to the research and development of social work. The main sources of fund are government grants, government subsidy, government project expenditure, support offered by relevant foundations, and membership fees. The total revenue of 2016 was RMB 1,375 thousand, including RMB 1 million government grants and RMB 375 thousand secured from services purchased by government. Projects undertaken by Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province include: “Small Grants Project” of publicity and education of drug control and AIDs prevention for teenagers in 2016, Demonstration project of social work service for old people with special difficulties funded by public welfare fund of welfare lottery of Ministry of Civil Affairs in 2014, and the social work service and capacity building project for the poor nationwide, a project supported by Department of Civil Affairs and Li Ka Shing Foundation, “The Social Protection Project for Migrant and Left-behind Children of Qinghai and Anhui Province of China” was funded by EU and SIDA, and implemented by Plan International (Sweden), Plan International (China), China Association of Social Workers, Qinghai People-oriented Social Work Research and Development Center, Anhui Modern Social Work Development Center, The social service project “Safeguarding the

Future” for children with deviant behaviors in Changjiangyuan village, Tanggulashan Town, Geermu City in 2017, and “Love Stays” caring project for households receiving minimum living allowances and families with disabled people in Xiaodao Community, Hexi subdistrict office, Geermu City.

Discussion of findings

Governmental Policy for Social work organizations in the Two Provinces

In recent years, efforts have been made to encourage governments of all levels to purchase social services in Qinghai Province and Anhui Province, which have contributed to the further development of local social work organizations. According to *The List of Project Approval of State Revenue Being Used to Encourage Social work organizations to Participate in Social Services*, 21 projects in Qinghai Province have been approved, increasing 6 from the previous year. These projects involved fund RMB 8.8515 million, up 83.23% from the previous year, with fund offered by state revenue increasing 70.89%. While the total fund of the whole country has decreased 5%, the fund for Qinghai Province has increased sharply. In 2017, projects funded by state revenue in Qinghai Province mainly involved: elderly care projects, care-for-children projects, care-for-disabled people projects, social service projects, capacity building projects, and training projects. Projects of state revenue being used to encourage social work organizations to participate in social services have been implemented for six years in a row in Qinghai Province, involving a total fund of over RMB 37.3 million.

In order to train local social workers and to enhance the service providing capacity of social work organizations, Qinghai Province has worked out a special plan of social work professionals supporting outlying poverty-stricken areas, ethnic minority areas in the borderland, and former revolutionary base areas. According to *The Guidelines for the Management and Use of Special Funds for Social Work Professionals Supporting Outlying Poverty-stricken Areas, Ethnic Minority Areas in the Borderland, and Former Revolutionary Base Areas*, and *The Supporting Plan for Talents of Outlying Poverty-stricken Areas, Ethnic Minority Areas in the Borderland of Qinghai Province, and Former Revolutionary Base Areas and the Implementation Plan of the Special Plan of Social Work Professionals*(MF[2012]No.170), expenditure of staff involving in appointed work is RMB 20,000 per person per year. In Qinghai Province, a leading group for team building of social work professionals of provincial civil affairs system was set up to guide civil affairs departments to engage in their work, and assess and evaluate services provided to recipient regions. According to the implementation plan, from 2013 to 2020, each year 50 social workers would be selected to work in poverty-stricken counties of Qinghai, and 30 social work professionals would be trained for recipient counties and regions, and RMB 20,000 per person per year offered by the state and RMB 4,000 offered by provincial government would be provided for recipient counties and regions. Each year RMB 1.2 million would be offered to the plan of outlying poverty-stricken areas, ethnic minority areas in the borderland, and former

revolutionary base areas.

There are great efforts made to nourish social work organizations in Anhui. One case of it is the “Internet Plus” Social Work Research and Practice Base set up by Xiyuan Street, Shushan District, Hefei City. The project involves Xiyuan Street, director, associate professors, doctoral candidates, postgraduate students, and other 14 people of MPA Center of Hefei University of Technology. It engages in “Three Concrete Project”, featuring “social workers’ practice base, project incubation and practice center, and community social work study room”. A social work research model of “summarizing, extracting, developing, and promoting” has been explored and established. Powered by “Internet Plus”, a non-profit, interactive social work practice platform has been explored and set up. Efforts have been made to fully tap into the transmission and promotion functions of the Internet and mobile Internet. The public have been encouraged to participate in, and all kinds of service resources have been pooled to promote the social work of Xiyuan Street, and to contribute to the social work of the municipality, the province, and even the whole country, and to social governance innovation. In supporting social work organizations for children in Anhui Province, the government works to purchase services, and support the daily work of children protection cadres (children director) with professional social work organizations. The government has purchased services, and integrated resources offered by professional social work organizations, and provided professional teenager services for 30 villages under trials in Changfeng County, Lixin County, and Shitai County, and guided children protection cadres (children director) in their work.

The Status Quo of Social Work Organizations for Child Welfare in the Two Provinces

According to data of State Statistics Bureau, in 2016, there are 25,709 registered social work organizations in Anhui, including 12,504 social groups, 112 foundations, 13,092 non-governmental non-enterprise units, 14,586 village committees, 3,400 community neighborhood committees, 194 other social service agencies. Among these organizations, there are 36 relief agencies that provide accommodation for children. In 2016, Qinghai was home to 3,583 social work organizations, including 2,241 social groups, 29 foundations, 1,313 non-governmental non-enterprise units, 4,143 village committees, 476 community neighborhood committees, other 19 social service agencies. Among these organizations, there are 9 relief agencies that provide accommodation for children. Among the social work organizations in Anhui and Qinghai, social groups take up the largest share, with non-governmental non-enterprise unit the second and foundations occupy the smallest share. From the overall picture, Qinghai Province has much fewer social work organizations, only around 13.94% of that of Anhui Province (See Table 1.).

Table 1. Categories and Numbers of Social work organizations in Anhui Province and Qinghai Province in 2016

Index	Anhui Province	Qinghai Province
Number of social work organizations	25709	3583
Number of social groups	12504	2241

Index	Anhui Province	Qinghai Province
Number of foundations	112	29
Number of non-governmental non-enterprise units	13092	1313
Village Committees	14586	4143
Community neighborhood committees	3400	476
Other social service organizations	194	19
Relief agencies that provide accommodation for children	36	9

Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China,
<http://www.mca.gov.cn/article/sj/tjjb/sjsj/201702/201702231108.html>, 2017-8-2.

Three social work organizations for children have been interviewed in Anhui Province, namely Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City, Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City, and Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City. Three social workers have been interviewed in Anhui Province. Five social work organizations for children have been interviewed in Qinghai Province, namely Qinghai Children's Welfare Association, Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province, Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province, Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children, Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province. Eight social workers have been interviewed in Qinghai Province. According to the basic information offered by interviewees, each organization is equipped with very few staff, and even less professionals, and limited annual expenditure. Most social work organizations do not exclusively offer services for children, which is only part of their work.

According to interviewees, the organizations with which they work all provide services to related children (See Table 2.). Teenagers are served in five organizations, old people are served in six organizations, disabled people are served in two organizations, and female are served in one organization. Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children serves the most types of recipients, including children, teenagers, old people, disabled people, and female. The second is Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province, which serves children, teenagers, old people, and disabled people. Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province provides services to children, teenagers, and disabled people. Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province offers services to children and old people. Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City and Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City also serve children and old people. We can see that most social work organizations are not purely for children, but also serve other groups. We learned from the investigation that it is difficult for social work organizations to survive if they only serve children. Since projects for the old always bring more income, more often than not, some social work organizations sustain their staff by such projects.

Table 2. Social Services Provided by Social Work Organizations

Organization	Recipients				
	Children	Teenagers	Old people	Disabled people	Women
Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	√		√		
Jinyanguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City	√		√		
Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	√	√	√		
Qinghai Children's Welfare Association	√	√			
Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province	√	√	√	√	
Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province	√	√		√	
Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children	√	√	√	√	√
Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province	√		√		

According to interviewees, since the foundation, all the organizations with which they work have secured average two projects funded by government, including average one project related to left-behind/migrant children. The government funds few projects of the interviewed organizations, so there are fewer projects dedicated to left-behind and migrant children. Jinyanguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City has secured the most government-funded projects for left-behind/migrant children since its foundation (six projects). Whether they have government-funded projects for left-behind/migrant children or not, all these organizations have service projects for children, and they provide services to left-behind children. Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children serves the most types of recipients, including left-behind children, migrant children, disabled children, orphans, middle school and elementary school students, and community children. Other social work organizations in Qinghai Province also offer professional services to children of all types. Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City provides services to left-behind children, migrant children, and middle school and elementary school students. Yet Jinyanguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City and Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City only serve left-behind children. That is because the two organizations are both small in size, and do not have enough professionals, and they can only provide limited types of service projects for children (See Table 3.).

Table 3. Child Services Provided by Social Work Organizations


Organization	Types of Children Recipients					
	Left-behind children	Migrant children	Disabled children	Orphans	Middle school and elementary school students	Community children
Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	√	√			√	
Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City	√					
Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	√					
Qinghai Children's Welfare Association	√		√	√	√	√
Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province	√		√		√	√
Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province	√				√	√
Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children	√	√	√	√	√	√
Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province	√	√				√

Project duration and the number of recipients can reflect the service providing capacity of these organizations to some degree. During the latest children project of each organization, seven interviewed organizations provided services for average 6.25 months, with each serving 114 children on average. Among the latest children projects, the longest one lasted 12 months. But there are also some children projects came with a very short span. The latest children projects offered by Qinghai Children's Welfare Association and Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children lasted only two to three months. The number of children recipients also varied greatly. Among the interviewed social work organizations, Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province has served the most children, 381. Most children's service projects served only dozens of children. Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City served the fewest children, 36 (See Table 4).

Table 4. Social Activities for Children by Social Work Organizations

Organization	Time span of the latest children project (month)	Number of children recipients (person)
Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	10	39
Jinyanguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City	12	45
Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	5	36
Qinghai Children's Welfare Association	3	80
Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province	6	246
Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province	12	381
Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children	2	80
Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province	—	—

Among the interviewed social work organizations that provide projects for left-behind/migrant children, seven social work organizations have offered services related to security and protection, and social participation/integration (seven social work organizations), and five social work organizations have offered psychological counseling, living care, family education, and school education services. Two social work organizations have launched activities related to nutrition and health. Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City has offered learning assistance. We can see that the number of organizations providing services related to security and protection, and social participation/integration for left-behind/migrant children was the largest (See Graph 1.).

Graph 1. Types of Child Service Projects Provided by Social Work Organizations in the Two Provinces

As regard to the types of child services, among the interviewed eight social work organizations, on one organization provides exclusively cash support for left-behind and migrant children, and four organizations provide serves exclusively to left-behind and migrant children, namely Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City, Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City, Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province, and Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children. The other four organizations have provided both cash support and services to left-behind and migrant children.

The professionalism of children services holds the key to service quality. Table 5 Shows the Information about Interviewed Staff Taking Professional Training The interviewees of Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City have received six children service training programs, involving security and protection, early education, psychological counseling, children's rights and interests, and other training areas. This organization offers more training programs and more types of training than any other interviewed social work organizations. Interviewees of Jinyangguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City have received two children training programs, involving security and protection, psychological counseling, and children's rights and interests. Interviewees of Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City have received one children training program, involving early education, psychological counseling, and emotional guidance. In Qinghai Province, interviewees of Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province received four children training programs, which is more than these of any other organizations. The programs involved security and protection, and children's rights and interests. Among the interviewees of Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children, two have received children training programs, and their times and content of training were different. The first interviewee has received one training program related to psychological counseling and children's rights and interests. The second interviewee has received three training programs, involving early education, family foster, special education, and children's rights and interests. The difference between the two people can be explained by the fact that, the former has worked in the organization for only one year, and the second has worked there for two years. Interviewees of Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province have received three children training programs, involving children's rights and interests, and other training areas. Other interviewees of social work organizations of Qinghai Province have received fewer training programs. Generally, all social work organizations participate in professional training programs, which involve a wide range of areas. In the interviews, we can see that many workers are not professional, so it is hard to ensure the service quality if special training is absent.

Table 5. Times of Professional Training Programs Participated by the Interviewed Social Workers

Organization of the interviewees	Times of training	Security and protection	Early education	Psychological counseling	Family foster	Special education	Children's rights and interests	Other training
Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	6	√	√	√			√	√
Jinyanguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City	2	√		√			√	
Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	1		√	√				√
Qinghai Children's Welfare Association	1			√			√	√
Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province	1		√	√			√	
Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province	4	√					√	
Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children(1)	1			√			√	√
Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children(2)	3		√		√	√	√	
Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province	3						√	√

According to interviewees, in offering children service projects, the most important criteria judging the effectiveness of the projects vary from organization to organization. All these eight interviewees believe that the feedback and assessment made by children/families of these children are criteria judging the effectiveness of the projects. Six interviewees believe that social influence is the standard of the effectiveness of the projects, and then it is whether the projects have nurtured the sense of identity of these organizations and their members. Three interviewees have chosen media publicity and social influence. All these indicate that in implementing the projects, social work organizations put the evaluation of children/families of these children in the first place, and also value the social influence of these projects (See Table 6.).

Table 6. Criteria of the Effectiveness of the Projects Offered by Social Work Organizations

Organization of the interviewees	Media publicity	Feedback and assessment made by children/families of these children	Collection of data	Social influence	Sense of identity of these organizations and their members	Others
Huizhong Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	√	√		√	√	
Jinyanguang Social Work Office of Bozhou City		√				
Boai Social Work Service Center of Bozhou City	√	√	√	√	√	√
Qinghai Children's Welfare Association		√	√	√		
Leping Social Work Service Center of Qinghai Province	√	√		√	√	
Xinyuan Relief Center of Qinghai Province		√		√	√	
Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children(1)		√		√		
Yujinxiang Social Work Service Center for Teenagers and Children(2)		√				
Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province			√		√	

Still in the middle of development and transformation, the Chinese social work organizations face various problems and challenges. We can see from Table 7 that, when being asked the problems organizations face in providing children services, most interviewees (10) believe that it's the shortage of fund. So fund shortage is the biggest problem social work organizations face. In interviewing the responsible person of Huimin Social Work Research and Development Center of Qinghai Province, he said that "fund shortage is not the main problem of the projects". He believed that the problem can be addressed if social work organizations can follow a business-oriented and market-based approach. Eight people believed that manpower shortage was the main problem. Manpower shortage was mainly caused by poor pay, which means difficulty in acquiring professionals. Seven people believed that the main problem was the inadequate social understanding/confidence. We can see from the interviews that there was a lack of identity of the public towards the professionals of social work organizations. Most of the public do not know the scope of work of social workers, which made it hard to pursue local social works. Three people said that government policy support was absent, and two said that

social workers need to improve their professional knowledge.

Table 7. Problems of Social Work Organizations

Problem	Number of people selecting the answer
Manpower shortage	8
Fund shortage	10
Lack of knowledge of children services	2
Lack of government policy support	3
Inadequate social understanding/confidence	7

Conclusions and recommendations

The main findings that we have seen through indicate that by purchasing services, governments boost the development of local social work organizations to meet the basic needs of children at risk. Facing the large number of left-behind children, Anhui and Qinghai take the advantage of colleges and universities as a platform. Government purchasing of social services has ensured that left-behind children have access to school counseling, psychological guidance, and living care. In addition, Anqing City of Anhui Province has been chosen as a pilot project. Efforts have been made to explore how to assist child protection cadres (child director) in their work by purchasing services offered by professional social work organizations. For each pilot township and town, the government offer RMB 50,000 each year to purchase social services. And RMB 35,000 is offered to each village to hire professional social workers. “Family Calls” provided by CYC committee, and “Family of Left-behind Children” of the Women's Federation are also available for left-behind children.

It is noteworthy that “Family of Left-behind Children” and other facilities are not put into good use, which is a common problem. In purchasing social services for children at risk, many social work organizations of Anhui Province have undertaken the projects of offering services for government, and have offered support for all types of children at risk. In our investigation, we found that efforts have also been made in Qinghai Province to explore the government practice of purchasing social services so as to provide services to left-behind and migrant children. In Qinghai Province, colleges and universities have been tapped to launch projects, with each project involving around RMB 400 thousand. In Qinghai Province, non-governmental social work organizations of all kinds have undertaken many such projects to provide professional services to children at risk.

Additionally, child service system has basically been in place. In the building of government child service network and service providing in Qinghai Province, a four-tiered child welfare service system and a social protection network for minors have been established. The four tiers of the former includes prefecture (city), county (city, district, administrative district), township

and town (subdistrict office), and village (community). A three-tiered network has been established in Anhui Province, including county (city, district), township and town (subdistrict office), and village (neighborhood committee). In February of 2017, Anhui Province issued *Working Norms for Child Protection Cadres (Child Director)*, making Anhui the first province that have issued such norms. The Norms made elaborate specifications for the setting of child protection cadres (child director) and their scope of work. At present, there are 17,144 child protection cadres (child director) in villages (neighborhood committees), and 1,863 child protection supervisory workers in township and town governments in Anhui Province.

In Qinghai and Anhui Province, policies on child protection and welfare since 2010-2017 have been in line with the relevant policies of the central government, mainly involving policies on orphans, children at risk, disabled children, and left-behind children in rural areas. In Qinghai Province, policies are mainly issued by protection policy documents at provincial level. In Geermu City, one of the cities where we have done field research, relevant documents of policies on child welfare and protection have not been issued. In Lixin County, in addition to the relevant policies issued by Bozhou City, the county government has released *The Note of Office of the People's Government of Lixin County on Issuing the Implementation Plan to Engage Professional Social Work in the Pilot Work of Caring for Rural Left-behind People*, which exists as specific work guidance and implementation plan for caring work towards rural left-behind children within the county.

Judging from the overall picture, we can see that policies on children protection and welfare in the two provinces are not stable, and are still in the elementary or exploration stage, and need further improvement. It is noteworthy that in the two provinces, protection policies and relevant welfare services for abused, overlooked children, and children suffering from violence are absent. The priority should be given to welfare services for children, which should be offered by government purchasing of social services.

The conclusion above highlights that more funds should be allocated for the government to purchase social services, and more efforts should be made to enhance the capacity of social work organizations in providing services. Children protection is a cause entailing expertise. The ever-improving children welfare would generate a large number of professional service works, including evaluation of guardianship capacity, psychological guidance for children, and others. To meet the mental and spiritual needs of children in difficulty, pilot regions of the two provinces have engaged social work organizations to participate in, and employed professionals, making social work organizations better play their role. In recent years, both the two provinces have issued policies and documents on social work, offering sound opportunities for the development of social work organizations for children. Yet the overall picture shows that much remain to be done for the governments to purchase more social services. So we suggest that local governments purchase more social services so as to boost the further development of local social work organizations. Meanwhile, relevant measures can be taken to finance professional social workers to engage in education and training, and to offer systemic, standard training and assessment for governmental child welfare agencies that are not

professional enough, and to expand the group of professional workers of children services, and to provide professional services for children in difficulty.

These conclusions lead to the following recommendations: Firstly, it is imperative to strengthen the capacity of pooling capital, and to explore new ways of survival and development for these social work organizations. Offering services to government is an important source of operational capital for social work organizations. Yet, the long-term and sound development of social work organizations cannot rely only on government fund. Rather, they should explore more sources of fund, and gather operational capital through multiple channels. For Anhui and Qinghai, the availability of capital for social work organizations represents the biggest challenge hindering their development. Social work organizations of the two provinces are also identifying new fund sources for their very survival. For example, some social work organizations, having spun off from nursing homes, also offer child protection services. Meanwhile, cooperation between local social work organizations should be boosted so as to tap into the synergy among professional skills, personnel makeup, and environment. That can ensure a win-win outcome and secure more funds.

Secondly, it is important to enhance the capacity of providing services. First, social work organizations should know well the particularity of children so as to know better the needs of these they serve. That will help them to define purposes, and to provide feasible service solutions, and make themselves fully prepared to offer services to government. At the same time, social work organizations should look forward into the future, and keep expanding their coverage of recipients and scope of services to cater to the changing demands. Second, they should build competent service groups. Improved capacity of social work organizations entails able service groups, including excellent and stable professionals. Social work organizations should come up with mechanisms that retain talents, and adjust salary and benefits in line with the education background, professional title, work experience, and capacity of workers. Social work organizations should also improve staff training, qualification authentication, and establish an employee evaluation mechanism, and seek to enhance workers' professionalism. Third, social work organizations should also nurture corporate culture, since a sound corporate culture and atmosphere will galvanize employees so as to make their work more efficient.

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